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ABSTRACT 
Over the last two decades, a variety of states such as China, Russia, Iran, Venezuela, 
France, South Korea, and Japan have funded 24-hour news stations, called international 
broadcasters (IB), to frame their policies for foreign publics. While a variety of scholars have 
acknowledged the proliferation of state-funded media channels, they have also elided key 
features of IBs. Research in contra-flow theory, strategic narrative theory, and public diplomacy 
analyze IBs as tools of state power intended to promote state interests, but do not analyze 
content. Meanwhile, scholars of global media examine IBs as part of the global media system, 
but omit the broadcaster’s state funding. Building on these complementary but often disparate 
groups of inquiry into international broadcasting, this dissertation provides this dissertation 
provides a comparative analysis of the economic coverage of four international broadcasters: 
Russia Today, China Central Television, Al-Jazeera English, and Deutsche Welle. Using this 
data, the analysis assesses the role of these broadcasters in the projection of state power. Using a 
mixed-methodological approach combining content analysis and critical discourse analysis, I 
compare economic newsmagazine coverage to official state positions on economic issues, which 
allows an empirical and systematic test of the extent to which IB content conforms to the 
respective state’s economic policy. Because specialist economic news caters to elite audiences, 
this dissertation also analyze regular newscast coverage of economic protests reveal the gap, if 
any, between IB’s coverage of economics and thereby determine if state interests determine 
coverage.  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
On March 2, 2011, then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton exhorted the Congressional 
Foreign Policies Priorities Committee for increasing funding for State Department foreign 
outreach efforts:  
We are in an information war and we are losing that war. Al Jazeera is winning, the 
Chinese have opened a global multi-language television network, the Russians have 
opened up an English-language network. I’ve seen it in a few countries, and it is 
quite instructive (quoted in RT 2011). 
Clinton’s testimony called attention to the post 9/11 proliferation of international 
broadcasters (IBs), what Price, Haas and Margolin describe as “a complex combination 
of state sponsored news, information, and entertainment” produced for foreign audiences 
with the goal of shaping public opinion abroad (2008, 152). New channels such as China 
Central Television (2000), Russia Today (2005), Telesúr (2005), Press TV (2007), and 
France 24 (2006) have joined older stalwarts like BBC (1932), Voice of America (1942), 
and Deutsche Welle (1953) in competition for the attention of global audiences in an 
increasingly crowded and complicated global media system. Clinton’s comments further 
illustrated broader debates concerning the relationship between media and state power in 
a global information environment as well as whether state interests are best served 
through the circulation of private or state sponsored media. At stake were the hearts and 
minds of publics around the globe, in the developed and the developing world, publics 
whose allegiances could overturn the international system or preserve it.  
Concurrent to the resurgence in attention to international broadcasting, the Global Financial 
Crisis of 20081 damaged the post-Cold War consensus once pithily labeled by Francis Fukuyama 
                                                 
1 The Global Financial Crisis signifies the set of events immediately triggered by the subprime housing 
crisis in the United States and spilling over into the European Debt Crisis and accompanying austerity 
policies (Steger, Goodman, and Wilson 2013; United States Financial Crisis Inquiry Committee 2011). 
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(1992) as the “end of history.” That consensus, the result of the demise of a bi-polar world 
system, was based on the idea that economic and class conflict were no longer drivers of history; 
instead, political debates were to be based on culture (Huntington 1996). The end of history was 
to be one where market capitalism inevitably led to liberal democracies grounded in Western 
notions of private property, economic development, and individual responsibility. However, 
unlike the polluting and tedious economy of industrial capitalism, with its workers unions, 
workplace injuries, and soulless factories, this new economy traded in information and used 
“knowledge workers.” These workers were so different from their industrial forebears that they 
had “managed to reverse the traditional relationship between employers and employee” claiming 
dignity and value with no need for the social protections previously guaranteed by the state 
(Frank 2000, 202). The end of history was short-lived, however, as the Great Recession of 2008 
led Newsweek to run a headline claiming “We are all Socialists Now” (Meacham and Thomas 
2009). So ended, supposedly, the “Washington Consensus.”2 Certainly, cracks were apparent in 
the façade before 2008 when citizen groups and social activists rejected the free-market policies 
spread over the globe by the USA, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
Nevertheless, the certainties of the Cold War’s ideological conflict, capitalism against 
communism, developed against developing states, free flow of goods and ideas against state 
control and sovereignty had been upended. In the aftermath, states project competing visions of 
the global political and economic system. International broadcasting, the last bastion of state 
controlled international media, arguably provides a critical conduit for the projection of these 
visions. In turn, these visions may support the international system, as with America’s Al-Hurra. 
Alternatively, they may, as Clinton warned of RT, CCTV, and AJE, challenge the hegemony of 
                                                 
2 The Washington Conesus was one name given to the collection of economic and trade policies 
advocated by the US and international economic institutions during the 1990s. See Stiglitz (2003). 
10 
 
liberal democratic capitalism. This confluence of forces, greater marketization and weakening 
faith in capitalism as practiced, technological change opening space in international 
communication for greater numbers of actors, and great power conflict presents a scholarly 
opportunity to examine the relationship between state-run media and power articulation. 
The increase in international broadcasting indicates that states with a variety of political and 
economic systems seek platforms to disseminate their views at a global level. Scholars of 
international communication, however, have rarely tested the extent to which IB content serves 
as a direct articulations of state positions and interests, and have generally not engaged in 
systematic and comparative content analysis of IBs (see for example Figenschou 2010; Kasmani 
2013b; P. M. Seib 2010; Wu 2013). The relationship between ownership and content – that IBs 
serve as conduits for state ideology and foreign policy articulation – is generally assumed rather 
than empirically tested. This dissertation seeks to fill this gap in the literature through a 
comparative case study of the economic news coverage of four state-sponsored television 
channels – China Central Television (CCTV), Al-Jazeera English (AJE), Russia Today (RT), 
and Deutsche Welle (DW). Specifically, I examine economic news with the understanding that 
the global economic system is subject to contestation between states while also limiting potential 
state narratives given the predominance of global capitalist institutions, which limits the ability 
of a network to challenge the global system, their counter-hegemonic potential. In the remainder 
of this introduction I explore the background and significance of my study, identify gaps in the 
academic literatures that address international broadcasters, and conclude with an outline of the 
dissertation. 
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1.1 Background and Significance 
Scholars have long acknowledged the historical role and status of international 
broadcasters in the global media space as well as the recent increase in their numbers. When IB 
networks were founded in the 1930s they served a variety of purposes, from wartime and 
political propaganda to colonial administration (Jowett and O’Donnell 1999). The newswires and 
shortwave radio systems that signaled the status of developed powers remained important during 
the Cold War and became the subject of vigorous debate at the United Nations in their New 
World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) debates in the 70s and 80s 
(Nordenstreng 2012). Even as American funding for IBs dropped post-Cold War (Cull 2009a), 
other states either began or expanded international broadcasting efforts. 
Table 1.1 English Language International Broadcasters 
Host 
Coun-
try 
Network Launch Date Funding  
Model 
Annual 
Budget 
Audience/ 
Reach  
Langu-
ages 
France France 24 2006 Public/ 
Commercial 
€123m 
(2010) 
43.5m 
(2011) 
3 
Ger-
many 
Deutsche 
Welle 
1953 Public €271m 
(2012) 
80-90m 
per week 
30 
Iran Press TV 2007 Public N/A N/A 2 
Japan3 Nippon 
Hoso 
Kyokai 
(NHK) 
World 
News 
1937 
(international 
radio) 1952 
(resumes 
international 
broadcasting) 
1995 
(television)  
Public N/A 273m 
households 
worldwide 
2 (TV) 
18 
(web 
and 
radio) 
China China 
Central 
Television 
News 
2000 (global 
English)/2012 
(America) 
Public N/A 170.92m 
(2010) 
6 
Qatar Al-Jazeera 
English 
1996/2005 
(English)/2013 
(America) 
Public/Commercial N/A 100m 
(Est.) 
3 
                                                 
3 Information derived from NHK About website: http://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/english/faq/ 
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Host 
Coun-
try 
Network Launch Date Funding  
Model 
Annual 
Budget 
Audience/ 
Reach  
Langu-
ages 
Russia Russia 
Today 
2005 (global 
English)/ 2010 
(America) 
Public $147m 
(2008) 
200m  3 
South 
Africa 
Channel 
Africa 
1994 (post-
apartheid); 
2015 (24-hours 
TV)4  
Public  N/A N/A 6 
South 
Korea5 
Arirang 1996 (2000 
worldwide) 
Non-profit N/A 123.69m 
households 
worldwide 
8 
United 
King-
dom 
BBC 
World 
News 
1991 (TV) 
(1932 
originally) 
Public/ 
Commercial  
£66m 74m 
(audience) 
27 
United 
States 
Al-Hurra 
TV/Voice 
of 
America 
(Radio)  
2006/1942   Public  $208.8m 
(2010) 
141m 
(audience 
for all 
media) 
43 
Venez-
uela 
Telesúr 2005 State $10m 
(est.) 
<1m (est.) 2 
Data Sources: (Geniets 2013; Painter 2008)  
 
As Table 1.1 shows, no fewer than nine countries have either expanded their IB capacities or 
started new ventures since the mid-1990s. Notably, several of these networks started with 
English language channels, indicating that their managers desired to communicate to wider 
audiences. As a share of a potential global audience, however, English-speakers represent a 
relatively narrow, but important, market. The English language is both an artifact of and a 
facilitator of cultural and media globalization (Kuppens 2013). English language media, such as 
the Financial Times, serve as conduits through which elites communicate and thereby solidify 
                                                 
4 Channel Africa began as shortwave and eventually internet radio. It has only recently made the 
transition to television (“SABC Extends 24-Hour News Channel into Africa” 2015). 
5 Information derived from Arirang About website: 
http://www.arirang.co.kr/PrRoom/about_arirangn1.asp?sys_lang=Eng  
13 
 
their connections with one another (Corcoran and Fahy 2009). In broadcasters such as AJE, 
which are staffed by native-English speakers trained in British or American journalism 
traditions, English serves as a means to “build bridges” between cultures but also to show that 
AJE is a professional channel worthy of respect from its peers. As such, IBs use of English 
indicates which populations they target as well as the kinds of journalists they may seek to hire. 
This new wave of IBs, like the waves that preceded it in the 1920s and 1940s, serves as an 
indication of state interest in influencing the information available in the global media system.  
Scholars acknowledge these trends and examine international broadcasting from two 
different groups of literature. The first group includes scholars of public diplomacy who consider 
broadcasters to be one part of a broader set of government policies, including cultural diplomacy 
and exchanges of citizens, used to reach foreign publics and shift target audience’s perceptions 
of the state sponsor (Cull 2009b). Newer scholarship on “strategic narratives” suggest that states 
promote specific narratives to frame issues, state actors, and the international system itself 
(Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2012). Doing so allows a state to constrain actors to 
specific behaviors and influence potential outcomes in geopolitical conflict. Scholars of contra-
flow and counter-hegemony, for example, have suggested that the Chinese and Russian IBs 
represent challenges to the Western dominated global news system (Rantanen 2007; Thussu 
2007a). Within these frameworks, the state and state power occupies the foremost position of 
analysis and grounds scholarly inquiry. While these scholars recognize IBs as important tools of 
state power and often emphasize the potential of IBs to shape public debate. However, specific 
content remains unexamined. 
When considered as global news media, much of the contemporary literature elides the 
role of the state in financing IBs. Scholars in this group approach IBs with a variety of concerns. 
14 
 
Scholars of media events examine the role of media, including IBs, in nurturing shared 
experiences and identity during major events or disasters (e.g. Couldry, Hepp, and Krotz 2010; 
Dayan 2010; Dayan and Katz 1992; Katz and Liebes 2007; Kyriakidou 2008). These scholars 
argue that distant people watching those events may come to feel a sense of shared experience, 
which is all the more important given the counter-hegemonic and news diversification missions 
of several IBs. In turn, several scholars have examined media’s role in eyewitnessing events and 
how doing so provides credibility for journalism and journalists (Chouliaraki 2010a, 2006b, 
Mortensen 2011b, 2011a; Tait 2011; Zelizer 2007). Others have suggested “globality,” or the 
ways in which news constructs the global system itself and its connections to the viewer, as a 
means of understanding the power of news (Berglez 2008; Olausson 2013). Literatures on 
eyewitnessing and globality emphasize the ways that content can construct a sense of global 
citizenship and make distant happenings appear real to audiences, even as most media outlets 
lack a truly global reach. Scholars have also begun to conduct ethnographic analyses of IB 
journalistic routines (Figenschou 2012; Jirik 2005). Some scholars have also examined 
television’s unique characteristics as a medium of images (Silverstone 2007) and its role as a 
kind of institutional center of news media (Scannell 2013). These scholars call attention to IB’s 
potential to influence global media flows, affect audiences, and diversify the views seen in news 
profession. All of these scholarly and theoretical issues directly influence IB’s content and, thus, 
ability to project the sponsoring state. However, most of these scholars leave the role of state 
sponsorship, interests, and policies aside in favor of event driven coverage focused on particular 
regions. The emphasis is not the network per se, but the content concerning particular stories. 
My dissertation weds these two bodies of literature by analyzing the extent to which IB 
content conforms to the sponsoring government’s policies as well as international 
15 
 
communication theories of global news. I conduct a comparative case study of the economic 
news coverage of four international broadcasters – China Central Television, Al-Jazeera English, 
Russia Today, and Deutsche Welle – to test the extent to which each conforms to its sponsoring 
state’s policy preferences and evaluate whether structural differences between them such as 
journalistic training and/or domestic media system norms influence their content.  
The scholarly significance of this project resides in bringing together the study of public 
diplomacy, strategic narratives, contra-flow, and international media studies as well as the 
particular contributions it makes to each of them individually. Scholars of public diplomacy, 
strategic narratives, and contra-flows have registered the increase in the number of international 
broadcasters (McNair 2006; Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2013; Price 2014; P. M. Seib 
2010; Snow 2010; Thussu 2007a). At the same time, there have been few studies that engage 
with the textual content of IBs; and these typically do not provide analysis of state interests (see 
for example Figenschou 2010; A. Robertson 2013, 2014). The lack of comparative, content-
oriented analysis of IBs represents a particularly important gap given that prevailing theories 
emphasize the role of ideas and ideologies in international relations, state power, and global 
news. In these theories, state power is derived from the attractiveness of a particular set of values 
(Nye 2009), a narrative capable of constraining behavior (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 
2012), or control over media flows that lead to the normalization of one’s culture (Thussu 
2007b). Given the rarity of comparative analysis of content, the actual discourse that serves state 
interests remains poorly understood. 
Second, this project shifts focus from political or military conflict to economics. The 
normalization of neoliberal economic theory is one of the most important power shifts of the last 
forty years but previous studies that engage with IB content tend to focus on political events, 
16 
 
such as elections, (C. Boyd-Barrett and Boyd-Barrett 2010; Kasmani 2013a; Wu 2013) or routine 
news coverage (Figenschou 2010; Painter 2008; A. Robertson 2010). Neoliberalism’s prevalence 
as a post-Cold War ideological framework has engendered grassroots resistance (Steger, 
Goodman, and Wilson 2013) and reconfigured the way states engage with global economic flows 
(Harvey 2007; Ong 2006), arguably pitting states against each other in a drive to be more 
competitive. In this context, international broadcasters are potential sites of economic 
contestation that have been underexplored.   
Finally, this dissertation is one of the few comparative analyses of IB news that uses 
more than two broadcasters. Scholars that examine IB content tend to focus on Al-Jazeera 
English (AJE), typically as a test of the extent to which AJE is truly an alternative to IB 
mainstays such as BBC (Barkho 2008; Kasmani 2013b) or as a control for comparison with 
newer broadcasters such as Telesúr (Painter 2008) or Channel News Asia (Wu 2013). Only the 
work of Geniets (2013) on reception of IB content and Robertson’s (2015) book Media and 
Politics in a Globalizing World attempt a large scale comparison between several international 
broadcasters. Interestingly, studies of IB content tend to be grounded in contra-flow theory 
(Thussu 2007a). They, thus, typically focus on whether a given network is “counter-hegemonic” 
(i.e. does it represent an ideological alternative). Questions of the role of the state or political 
power tend to get lost in the analysis. By analyzing content empirically, comparatively, and 
systematically, this dissertation tests the prevailing theories of international broadcasting within 
and beyond contra-flow theory, strategic narratives, and public diplomacy while examining the 
ways content does or does not support state interests.  
17 
 
1.2 Plan of Dissertation 
In the following chapters, I examine and compare international broadcasters’ economic 
news content with particular attention to the degree it conforms to state economic interests. I also 
situate international broadcaster’s role within each state’s public diplomacy program as well as 
its larger national media system (Hallin and Mancini 2004). Chapter 2 contextualizes my study 
within the broader literature and outlines the details of my mixed-methodological approach. It 
establishes the need for analysis of content to test theories of global media, strategic narratives, 
and public diplomacy. It also contextualizes the resurgence of IBs within trends of greater 
marketization and neoliberalization of the global economy and national economic systems.  
In Chapter 3, I provide a short founding history, analysis of each IB’s funding structures, 
general programming, and its economic news programming analyzed in this dissertation. In 
addition, I contextualize the place of each IB within each sponsoring state’s public diplomacy 
program  to deepen understanding of the role of IBs among the variegated tools states use to 
reach foreign publics. Finally, I detail each state’s economic interests and recent policies to 
provide a baseline to judge the conformity between broadcaster content and the state sponsor.  
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 provide the bulk of my analysis of economic news content. Chapter 4 
examines the ways in which the flagship economic programs discursively construct domestic or 
national economic news for their global audiences. In particular, I examine sponsoring state 
narratives and test the degree to which IB content projects preferred state identities and 
narratives. Chapter 5 follows a similar procedure to Chapter 4, but examines international news 
items. It analyzes if and how IB news coverage reflects state interests concerning regional and 
global economic policies as well as the status of the sponsoring state in the international 
economic system. Because three of the four broadcasters claim to operate outside prevailing 
18 
 
norms of the international media system, I also test the degree to which IBs instrumentalize 
counter-hegemonic discourse in the service of projecting state narratives. Chapter 6 moves 
beyond analysis of the dedicated economic news programs to examine how regular IB newscasts 
cover economic protests. In contrast to the business programs, which rarely cover protests and 
offer versions of the global economy unmarred by grassroots conflict, analyzing protest coverage 
reveals the ways broadcasters project economic actions from below and if they vary from more 
elite driven economic news. Chapter 7 draws together the findings outlined in Chapters 4 
through 6. It provides a summary of my findings and analyzes how they inform theoretical views 
of international broadcasting and global media. It also situates my findings within the large 
political and populist shifts seen in the USA and Europe. I conclude with recommendations, 
limitations, and recommendations for future research.  
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2 INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTERS AND THE “GLOBAL WAR OF IDEAS” 
The number of 24-hour private news outlets increased from a handful in the early 1990s 
to well over a hundred by 2010 (Rai and Cottle 2010). The proliferation of private news outlets 
was part of a broad set of patterns characterizing media and the world political system at the end 
of the Cold War. The ideological conflict between capitalism and communism that typified the 
post WWII world was to give way to what Fukuyama (1992) heralded as the “end of history;” 
states would gradually wither as global networks of free trade and capital would lead, ultimately, 
to prosperity. Seminal critiques of the economic consensus of the 1990s and early 2000s 
emphasized variously the ideological uniformity of the business press (Frank 2000), the cultural-
ideological package of Western media exports (Schiller 2009), and the homogenization of news 
media around pro-business and infotainment models of journalism (McChesney 2008; Thussu 
2007c). While such critiques existed, intensified market pressures suggested that states would 
gradually succumb to capitalism just as communism had.  
The number of actors on the world stage has also increased, with NGOs, citizens, 
activists, terrorist groups, and stateless nations all contributing to the mix of global media voices. 
In this milieu, states and their governments appeared anachronistic, unnecessary in an age of 
hyper-capitalism. States, however, did not go meekly away, rather they continuously explore 
new mechanisms for leveraging new communication technologies and in many cases are 
zealously pursuing complex strategies for adding their own voices to this cacophony (Price 
2014). Paralleling this rise in private broadcasters and social media, state-funded IBs have 
proliferated, representing a renewal of direct state participation in producing global media. 
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Several, such as Iran’s Press TV and Venezuela’s Telesúr, broadcast from the “periphery” to the 
“core”6 nations of the industrialized capitalist world.   
All this is to say that states, like other actors, are leveraging media to (re)assert power on 
the global stage. In turn, greater financing of international communication strategies illustrates 
increasing state interest in exercising power through language; international broadcasters, at least 
theoretically, act as a conduit for that power articulation. This dissertation utilizes the definition 
of power derived from Habermas and McCarthy’s (1977) analysis of Arendt, Weber, and 
Parsons’ scholarship and holds that power is the ability to accomplish particular goals, either 
individually or collectively.7 Leaving aside coercion, as it does not pertain to this discussion, I 
am concerned here with states use of media, and through them language, to achieve their policy 
aims, specifically economic ones. Price (2002) suggests that states achieve this power through 
their sovereignty; the ability to make and enforce laws and monopolize the use of force, 
supported by a connection between a given state and some form of identity. Media influence, in 
Price’s thinking, reifies identity and rationalizes a state’s sovereignty through imagery, and as 
such states would prefer to have a “monopoly over media imagery” (2002, p. 26). In the case of 
international broadcasting, states challenge the media sovereignty of other states; and as I 
demonstrated in the introduction governments in the developed West have taken notice (C-SPAN 
2011; Nimmo and Eyal 2016). 
States predicate their financing of international broadcasting’s renaissance, in part, on 
diversifying news or providing different perspectives to CNN or BBC. For example, upon its 
                                                 
6 This language is taken from Wallerstein’s (2004) world system theory in which of the rich nations being 
the core and the poorer ones the periphery.  
7 This is not to simply ignore the substantive differences between the three scholars reviewed. They differ 
on coercion and persuasion, self-interest and collective interests, power as a process versus teleological 
point. One point they agree on is that power is the capacity to produce change in the world.  
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launch, AJE’s Nick Parsons claimed the station would, “target an international audience and fill 
a gap in international news… that is not filtered through the lens of the West” (as cited in Powers 
2012, 19). Similarly the mission of France 24 is to “cover international current events from a 
French perspective” (Kuhn 2010, 270). In turn, a variety of scholars have acknowledged these 
goals and international broadcaster’s potential to fulfill them (e.g. McNair 2006; Miskimmon, 
O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2013; Price 2014; P. M. Seib 2010; Snow 2010; Thussu 2007a). 
However, such scholarly engagement is fitful and relatively few have given IBs sustained 
attention. We can fruitfully divide these scholarly efforts into two different but inter-related 
strands of research. The first group – composed of scholars of strategic narratives, public 
diplomacy, and contra-flow – emphasizes states and their role in the global communication 
system (see for example Hayden 2013a; Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2013; Thussu 
2007a). These scholars’ primary concerns lay with the actions and policies of states and the 
actors within them. They highlight IBs as extensions of their state sponsor and their interests and, 
thus, as tools of state power. The second group of scholars is united more by their interest in 
global media and its immense potentialities to counter dominant ideologies, eyewitness news 
events, and contribute to a sense of global citizenship and cosmopolitanism as opposed to the 
role of states (see for example Berglez 2008; Chouliaraki 2010b; Cottle 2009; Figenschou 2011; 
A. Robertson 2015; Zelizer 2007). These scholars in analyze and compare different network 
content, typically as a means of evaluating a communication theory or exploring particular 
events such as elections or armed conflict. In the process, the state’s role as broadcasting sponsor 
tends to be lost and a possible explanatory factor in IB content remains underexplored. Both lines 
of inquiry are necessary to account for IBs and to understand what they provide for both viewers 
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and their state sponsor. The group, focused on state power, elucidate the primary logic of IBs’ 
creation while the second group provides additional detail on the journalistic practices IBs use. 
While all media, arguably, play an important role as conduits between political 
establishments and the public (sometimes foreign or domestic), international broadcasters are in 
a unique position – they are embedded both within the structures of the state and also act as 
media organizations subject to competition with other media actors as well as the demands of 
their audiences. The research and methods of this dissertation evolved out of a pairing of these 
two complementary but often disparate groups of literature: those who use theories of public 
diplomacy, strategic narratives, and contra-flow who emphasize the role of states, and global 
media scholar who emphasize the power of media. The first two sections of this chapter provide 
a detailed analysis of these two approaches vis-à-vis my comparative study of Al-Jazeera (AJE), 
China Central Television (CCTV), Deutsche Welle (DW), and Russian Today’s (RT) flagship 
economic news programs. The third section examines the literature on the role of economic 
journalism, media market liberalization, and the neoliberal ideological framework that 
undergirds them. Using economic news with a case study approach facilitates analysis of a 
bounded phenomenon, financial journalism, as it manifests in IB content. This manifestation, I 
argue, should be influenced by state interests, journalism norms derived both from financial 
journalism and national norms, and the broader ideological framework of capitalism itself. In 
short, economics provides a playing field for state to state conflict, but also potentially for 
ideological conflict. I then detail my research questions and methods and conclude with 
limitations.  
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2.1 Agents of State, Agents of Power 
International broadcasters exist, at their most fundamental level, because a state made a 
conscious decision to fund a broadcaster, among other methods, to reach foreign publics. As 
such, when I say that strategic narratives, public diplomacy, and contra-flow literatures explore 
international broadcasters as tools of states I am also saying, obliquely, that state power, the 
ability of governments to achieve change in the world, is a primary concern of their analyses. In 
turn, scholars examine IBs as one asset among several that states use to influence foreign public 
opinion. However, even while the number of IBs has increased, and many scholars have 
acknowledged this, IBs and their unique role as news outlets and their journalistic content are 
overlooked. In particular, while the claim that IBs serve their state sponsor’s interests is logical, 
it is rarely rigorously tested. As Painter, one of the few who has conducted analysis of IB 
content, says: “there seems little doubt that many of the state-funded channels are a means of 
augmenting national prestige in the way that a national airline might,” and in some cases, “they 
also exist to propagate a particular political perspective favorable to the funder” (2008, 5).  
Research grounded in public diplomacy has identified IBs as an element of state efforts to 
reach foreign publics (Cull 2009b), but have not focused on them to a great degree. Scholars 
such as Hayden (2011, 2013a) and Pamment (2012, 2013) both note the increasing numbers of 
international broadcasters and suggest IBs’ importance as public diplomacy tools. However, 
neither provides truly sustained attention to these networks. For example, Hayden’s (2011) 
assessment of soft power policy rhetoric focuses on political elites, but does not engage with 
many elites’ desire for an international broadcaster. Likewise, Pamment’s (2013) analysis of 
German public diplomacy does not address the German international broadcaster Deutsche 
Welle. Zöllner’s (2006a) analyses of Deutsche Welle’s Arabic channel uses interviews to 
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understand Middle Easterners’ reactions to the network. However, Zöllner does not engage with 
content or comparison, though he does suggest analysis of content as a site for future research (p. 
178). Additional analyses of Russian (Avgerinos 2009; Simons 2014) and Chinese (Hong 2011; 
Jirik 2005; J. Wang 2011; X. Zhang 2011) public diplomacy activities register the importance of 
media, but then shift to the broader public diplomacy programs in which states embed IBs, 
leaving broadcasters aside. 
Similarly, scholars who study the attempts of states to put forward “strategic narratives” 
as a means of binding action in the world system acknowledge the rise of IBs, but do not provide 
it with lasting consideration. For example, in Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and 
the New World Order, Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle claim that several states have 
“invested in multilingual transnational television in remarkably similar ways” (2013, 4). 
However, they only examine the BBC, not new channels such as CCTV and RT and do not fully 
explicate the specific role of international broadcasters in promoting strategic narratives. An 
earlier paper suggests that IBs serve as one part of a broader communication infrastructure that 
incorporates digital distribution and uses several outlets to disseminate narratives (Miskimmon, 
O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2012). Similarly, though Price has acknowledged international 
broadcasting’s importance repeatedly (Price 2002, 2003; Price, Haas, and Margolin 2008), but in 
his most recent work (2014) international broadcasting tends to be lost in the discussion of state 
interests, technology, and infrastructure. For example, in a brief discussion of the ongoing 
Ukrainian crisis, he notes only that Russia made use of its Russia Today network to foster its 
own narrative of the crisis. 
It was the perception of bias in Western news narratives that motivated states like Russia 
(“About RT” 2016) or China (CCTV 2010) consciously market their IBs as a contribution to 
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diversifying global information provision; and Thussu’s (2007a) often cited mapping of 
dominant flows and subaltern contra-flows suggests that the West may be facing more 
competition in news provision.8 While media flows scholars have typically focused on 
entertainment television, likely because it constitutes the bulk of international media content 
(Biltereyst and Meers 2000; Miller 2010), newer research on news flows suggests potential 
contra-flows in the form of international broadcasters. Thussu argues that state sponsored 
networks such as CCTV and RT represent potential subaltern flows and show “the importance of 
the English language as the key to success for global commerce and communication” and that 
IBs are part of a larger public diplomacy strategy designed to bring Chinese and Russian views 
to a global audience (Thussu 2007a, 13). Unfortunately, that is all he says about new IBs; his 
analysis focuses on the overwhelming economic dominance of Western media or the ideological 
conversion of domestic news towards Western models. In another case, events like the Iraq War 
motivated US networks to use and acknowledge the visual feeds of Al-Jazeera (Wessler and 
Adolphsen 2008a). Similarly, Rantanen (2007) calls CCTV and RT, “recent attempts to provide 
global contra-flows in news, supported by government” (p. 175). Hong’s (2011) analysis of the 
Xinhua news agency, Sakr’s (2007) work on Al-Jazeera, and Keane’s (2006) examination of 
new media centers in East Asia all acknowledge the potential for contra-flows, but, again, do not 
engage with content and a rigorous testing of the theory remains elusive. 
The lack of comparative, content-oriented analysis of IBs represents a particularly 
important opening given that prevailing theories emphasize the role of ideas and ideologies in 
international relations and state power. In these theories, state power is derived from the 
                                                 
8 While Thussu’s scholarship is primarily concerned with media, over states, he uses nations and national 
economic data as the object of analysis in his work and, therefore, states remain the key focal points of 
media production and distribution in his schema 
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attractiveness of a particular set of values (Nye 2009), a narrative capable of constraining 
behavior (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2012), or control over media flows that lead to 
the normalization of specific cultural packages (Thussu 2007b). In these ways, language use is a 
form of power exercised by a state via its international broadcaster. 
Academic consideration of public diplomacy is intimately connected to work on soft 
power pioneered by Nye and Keohane (1998), where soft power draws attention to the discursive 
and ideational aspects of international relations (Cross 2013; Hayden 2011). As Hayden (2011) 
notes, the emphasis in definitions of public diplomacy appears to be on “influence” (p. 9); and 
“attractive power” and “soft power resources are the assets that produce such attraction” (Nye 
2009, 333). Said attraction is not derived from force; instead, it is based in smart policy and 
attractiveness of values, both of which rely on communication. In an increasingly interdependent 
world, information flows are “vital for international interactive processes to occur. Therefore, 
whoever exerts the greatest control over those processes, may find themselves in a greater 
position of power” (Rogerson 2000, 425–26). IBs are one aspect of state efforts to secure soft 
power; and in an interconnected world, where news networks seek images captured near events,9 
IBs may have the capacity to alter information flows and thus shape soft power attraction.  
Strategic narratives are a relatively new object of research pioneered by international 
relations scholars such as Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle (2012). In their view, the 
communication and dissemination of narratives in an ever more complex “media ecology” is a 
primary means by which states attempt to influence and constrain other international actors; and 
international broadcasters are a key dissemination platform for those narratives. Strategic 
narratives have two functions: first, they shape behavior; second, they constitute identity. 
                                                 
9 For example, during the Iraq War, while AJ was being decried by the Bush administration, their images 
were widely used by American cable and broadcast news (Wessler and Adolphsen 2008a). 
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Narratives influence audiences by constituting actors, systems, conflicts, and information 
infrastructures they also signal right and wrong behaviors. As such, actors who violate a given 
narrative damage their legitimacy (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2013).10  Theories of 
strategic narratives suggest that IBs will deploy narratives that serve the interests of their state 
sponsors and thus project state power. The focus of the theory is on the rhetorical power of 
narratives to shape behavior; but international broadcasters, a key means of spreading that 
narrative, remain an underexplored aspect of this work.  
Similarly, Thussu’s (2003, 2007c) main complaint about uneven international media 
derives from his concern that Western media carries with it the ideological package of 
consumerism and spectacle. They also emphasize the degree to which Western news norms or 
consumerism constrain the potential of contra-flow and thus possible resistance to the American 
led global order. In each case, the theory emphasizes the expanding role of discourse in securing 
a state’s desired policy or interpretation of events or, in the case of contra-flow theory, the 
relative weakness of contra-flow, particularly ones operating outside of neoliberalism’s ideology 
of consumerism in the face of dominant Western media flows. As such, scholars theorize, 
logically, that IBs project state interests and do so via some form rhetorical action. Nevertheless, 
content specific studies that test these propositions remain scarce.  
  
                                                 
10 Narratives are strategic to the extent that actors craft narratives to secure particular ends. But actors are 
also constrained by the resources that can be crafted into a narrative in general, and hegemonic narratives 
that resist new interpretations in particular (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2013). 
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2.2 International Broadcasters and the Global Media: Trends and Patterns in News 
Norms 
 Without undermining the value of the preceding research, it is fair to say that few 
scholars have engaged with the actual content output of IBs, despite calls for more “holistic” 
research into them (Hanusch and Obijiofor 2008). Scholars who operate from a contra-flow 
perspective and use methodologies such as content analysis (Painter 2008) and critical discourse 
analysis (Barkho 2011) have analyzed IB content but typically without attention to states’ role in 
international broadcasting. Furthermore, they have tended to focus on Al-Jazeera English. These 
scholars provide important indications of what we can expect when studying IB content and the 
ways in which they cover news. This is what I call their “news norms,” that is the ways in which 
they use onsite reporting, interviews, and reporting in their coverage. As such, studies of global 
journalism and IB content elucidate the form and contours of coverage, but less so its potential 
function as a projection of state power. However, they have important limitations given their 
focus on AJE over other networks and their focus on newscasts and web article content over 
newsmagazines. Finally, much of this scholarship predates Qatar’s recent defunding of Al-
Jazeera and other outreach efforts (BBC 2015b). For example, while scholarship shows that AJE 
focuses on the Global South more than BBC or CNN, the extent to which networks like RT or 
CCTV focus on underreported regions remains underexplored. In addition, previous 
scholarship’s analysis of newscasts, while important, misses the specialized content that makes 
up much of a 24-hour news station’s schedule. Nevertheless, these studies provide valuable 
insights into the visual, journalistic, and editorial approaches of their respective objects of study. 
Before reviewing scholarly analyses of IB content, I must register a caveat. While there is 
a wide variety of scholarship on how global news covers crisis (Cottle 2009) or crafts a sense of 
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global citizenship (Berglez 2008; Chouliaraki 2006b), I do not examine these possibilities with 
great depth. First, journalistic depictions of crisis is not the subject of this dissertation and nor is 
the possibility of producing a cosmopolitan frame of mind. All of these possibilities are 
interesting, and certainly deserving of further study, but I am resolved in this dissertation to 
question several fundamental assumptions about international broadcasters and the content they 
carry. My primary focus is on whether or not IBs do serve the interests of the state by projecting 
narratives or frames and how they operate to do so. Likewise, I am not concerned with counter-
hegemony and contra flow per se, but rather its potential instrumentalization by international 
broadcasters and the possibilities of such to support state interests. Consequently, my emphasis 
and review of the literature draws on work that either theorizes international broadcasting as an 
aspect of state power or directly analyzes its content. At bottom, the key question addressed here 
is how and if states use economic news to project state narratives. 
Taken together, available analysis of IB content paints a mixed picture. Figenschou’s 
(2010, 2011, 2012) developing body of work suggests that AJE, for example, is qualitatively and 
quantitatively different from traditional Western outlets and is, thus, a form of alternative contra-
flow, at least in some limited sense. Conducting a quantitative content analysis of the main news 
hour, she determined that AJE is a contra-flow in terms of geographical source of stories (South 
vs. North), use of independent over establishment elites, and amount of coverage devoted to the 
Global South. To the extent that any network defines itself in a similar way to AJE, we might 
expect that the network will cover parts of the world ignored by traditional global news outlets 
like CNNI and BBC, as well as use non-elite sources. Given its skill and intelligence, her content 
analysis framework informs my own as a way of testing the extent to which the broadcasters 
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analyzed here live up to any claim to diversify news flows and to uncover which features suggest 
state interests.   
Other scholars have conducted critical discourse analyses and shifted focus to power in 
news discourse (Barkho 2008, 2011, Kasmani 2013a, 2013b; Ozohu-Suleiman 2014; Wu 2013). 
The results of these studies suggest that new international broadcasters at least have the potential 
to provide alternatives to traditional global news such as the BBC or CNN but fall short in key 
respects. Kasmani’s (2013a, 2013b) analysis of BBC and AJE’s Iranian election coverage shows 
that networks stake out different interpretations of political events, providing options for 
audiences. Similarly, Barkho (2011) argues that AJE distinguishes itself from BBC through its 
equity in source quotation and coverage. Wu (2013) analyzed Channel New Asia (CNA), as 
compared to AJE, and found that CNA failed to “gather news images and opinions from people 
on the ground, especially when it came to protests and demonstrations” (p. 95). Finally, Ozohu-
Suleiman (2014) compared AJE and Iran’s Press TV coverage of the Israel Palestinian conflict 
and found that both networks produced pro-Palestinian frames, but they also produced “war 
journalism” that normalized armed conflict. Taken together, the preceding scholarship suggests 
that AJE, compared to other new international broadcasters in particular, may function as a 
contra-flow in terms of giving “voice to the voiceless” and covering traditionally under covered 
parts of the world, but also conform to traditional patterns in coverage of specific topics. None of 
these studies relates content to state interests.   
Of the limited work that analyzes networks other than AJE, Robertson (2014) and Painter 
(2008) stand out and helpfully complicate the idea that IBs connected to states opposed to the 
West are necessarily propagandistic. Their analyses of Russia Today (A. Robertson 2014) and 
Telesúr (Painter 2008) newscasts indicated networks that characterize themselves as “counter-
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hegemonic” are not uniform in their approaches to international stories and do not necessarily 
falsify news. Instead, their story selection  reflects both the interests of Latin Americans and the 
Venezuelan government. For example, Telesúr emphasized Nicaraguan elections instead of 
American elections, both of which occurred in 2008. Alternatively, Borchers (2011) argues that 
RT consistently projects narratives of its Baltic neighbors that associate resistance to Russian 
interests with fascism as a way to undermine Western oriented governments. These findings 
further suggest that IBs cannot be simplified as crude governmental mouthpieces without 
analysis of content and comparison between networks.  
While the studies in the two groups of literature examined above provide useful insights 
into international broadcasting, they often speak past each other and thus omit key aspects of 
broadcasters. Scholars whose focus remains on states and their communication efforts argue that 
IBs are a state tool. While logical, this claim remains more or less untested and the ways in 
which IBs may or may not support state narratives remains unexamined. Scholarly examination 
that treats IBs as artifacts of global news too often elide their origin as state tools for power 
projection. While their observations inform my methodological approach, and my ultimate 
argument, the key question of how states use the news to project power remains, likewise, 
unexamined.  
Another important feature of these studies is their focus on political content/conflict or 
routine news coverage. As such, these analyses examine international broadcasters in political 
terms, either as conveyers of political information, or as political tools. Nevertheless, IBs can 
also disseminate discourse on wider fields of human endeavor, such as the economy. Because 
neoliberalism was and is, in part, the product of contestation and debate, we can also expect that 
IBs have the potential to contest it. The lack of focus on economic news might indicate that it is 
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not a worthwhile subject of inquiry. However, economic theories and doctrines are also subject 
to contestation, and IBs potentially play a role in that contestation.  
 
2.3 The Neoliberal Turn and Financial Journalism: Making the Case for Economics 
My analysis of the academic literature on international broadcasters suggests that there is 
an academic opportunity to combine the best insights of the two groups of literature – state-
centric and network-centric – described above through a comparative examination of IB content 
and state’s specific policies and interests. Doing so complements both sets of research and help 
to build theories that explain IBs content and their broader place in the global media system. 
Having identified this gap, however, still leaves the question of what specific content to explore, 
or put another way, what news beat to explore; what should form the basis of my case study of 
IB content. We have seen that content and discourse analyses of IBs typically examine specific 
political events or regular newscasts, however, I decided to conduct a case study on specialty 
economic news.  
A case study approach provides several advantages. First, case studies provide specific 
examples of how phenomena function and allow scholars to check those examples against each 
other to reveal essential qualities of that phenomenon. When it comes to IB content we are 
lacking in such examples and a “discipline without a large number of thoroughly executed case 
studies is a discipline without systematic production of exemplars” (Flyvbjerg 2006, 272). 
Exemplars, importantly, serve as a signpost for future study, allowing disciplines to thrive and 
develop. Second, case studies build theory when they provide thick descriptions and clear steps 
which others can follow. Because in the specifics of the “case the potential to recognize a 
universal truth” exists well developed case studies can elucidate the weaker parts of a given 
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theory (Rule and John 2015, 3). In this dissertation, for example, while well-developed theories 
of international broadcasting, such as public diplomacy, exist, they often have limited 
examination of content or cases to support their assertions, instead relying on governmental 
rhetoric to support their claims (for example Hayden 2013a; Pamment 2013; Zöllner 2006b). 
Third, at least some scholars have adopted case study approaches to examining public diplomacy 
in general and IBs specifically. Painter (2008), for example, conducted a case study comparing 
Al-Jazeera English and Telesúr selecting examples of elections and political conflicts that 
directly implicated their state sponsors and showed that the latter broadcaster was not simply 
propagandistic. Cull (2009b) also selected several paradigmatic examples of success and failure 
in public diplomacy to illustrate his broader taxonomy of the phenomenon. Case studies, in short, 
permit a sophisticated analysis, which then informs theoretical understandings of international 
broadcasting. 
The rest of this section illustrates why economics represents a useful and valuable case 
for examining IB content and testing its congruence to state interests. As seen above, several 
scholars argue that international broadcasters articulate and project state power and have the 
potential to diversify global information flows. When the subject is economics, however, they do 
so within an ideological framework that has transformed the global economy and international 
system of economic governance. I adopt Harvey’s position that neoliberalism is a “political 
project” and a political economic theory that holds economic prosperity can be secured through 
liberating “individual entrepreneurial freedoms… within an institutional framework 
characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade” (2007, 2).11  
                                                 
11 Neoliberalism is the term describing the ideology while “neoliberalization” is the term used to describe 
the process of making a given system more neoliberal in it makeup and functions.  
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Developed in the 1940s, the application of neoliberalism intensified in the 1970s with 
“stagflation” in the West, South American states’ debt crises, and its institutionalization in global 
economic organizations such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (Prashad 
2008).12 In the ensuing years, the US and Europe as well as the World Bank and IMF have 
imposed neoliberalism on cash starved states who often had little choice but to radically change 
domestic policies (Harvey 2006, 2007), and thereby give up a portion of their control over 
domestic economic and media policy (R. H. Brown 2002). Economic news programs are, to 
some extent, an extension of neoliberalization, reflecting the growing prevalence of finance as a 
mode of economic activity and everyday life (Martin, 2002).  In addition, the increase of 
financial news in non-Western media markets, as documented by Chakravartty and Schiller 
(2010), further suggests that the neoliberalization documented by Harvey (2007) remains 
prevalent.13 In this sense, capital as personified by a global capitalist class has interests that 
compete with other sectarian interests such as nationalism, religion, or other political ideologies. 
However, even though neoliberalism has been successful in remaking the global order its 
application has been uneven.  
To some extent, it is certainly true that international economic organizations imposed 
neoliberal economics on weak and cash starved nations. However, viewing neoliberalism as only 
externally-imposed misses the variations of state responses to its imposition, which are 
conditioned by their unique historical trajectories and interests (Beck 2005; Ong 2006). States 
remain the primary site for media and communication lawmaking and regulation; therefore, 
                                                 
12 While its policy package of structural adjustment, austerity, and monetarism were often unpopular and 
ineffective, they came backed by the considerable power of the United States and Europe through the 
World Bank and IMF (H.-J. Chang 2008; Stiglitz 2003). 
13 While neoliberalism remains a prevalent ideological force in economic discourse and policy, it has 
never completely sidelined alternative forms of capitalism such as Keynesian economics or avoided 
criticism, as evidenced by repeated protests at meetings of the G-7, G-20, IMF, and World Bank.  
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states do shape the contours of domestic media neoliberalization to support their policy goals 
(Morris and Waisbord 2001). In 2003, for example, the head of China Central Television 
(CCTV) announced that all television, with the exception of news, would be judged on its ability 
to pull in advertising revenues (Zhu 2012). As such, while non-news media content in China 
proliferated and generated large profits for CCTV news content remained subject to strict 
government monitoring.  
In Russia, despite that country’s ostensible shift to liberal market democracy, the state 
and media remain closely connected. Russian media firms, in theory private enterprises, hire 
managers who work closely with the government in what Vartanova (2012) calls a 
commercialized statist model. Like China, Russia needs profit driven media for government 
revenue. However, instead of a profit driven liberal democratic media system promised by 
neoliberalism (Steger 2008), because of the “combined function of political power and market 
force[s],” media markets are defined by “parameters determined by the state and the mechanism 
of state control evolves as media marketization develops” (Meng and Rantanen 2015, 7). Despite 
the proliferation of media outlets in both Russia and China “most big media have remained 
mainly under government control” (Rantanen 2007, 175).  The Russian and Chinese states’ 
centrality in their respective political and economic systems means that government elites use 
media to foster nationalist sentiments based on sovereignty or language, while transformations 
concerning media’s function mean they also function as commercial ventures. As such, Russia 
and China’s trajectory contrasts with traditional Western notions of media development (Meng 
and Rantanen 2015; Rantanen 2007, 175; Zhao 2012). 
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In those European states that are democratic and have public service broadcasters (PSB), 
neoliberalization as well as Europeanization14 has signaled major changes in the role of the state, 
but without the central role seen in Russia. European PSBs are drawn between neoliberalism’s 
proscription to limit the role of the state (Jakubowicz 2010) and European Union policies 
designed to foster a collective European identity (Połońska-Kimunguyi and Kimunguyi 2011). 
Gollmitzer’s (2008) analysis of different drafts of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive 
indicates that EU lawmakers shift their emphasis between PSBs’ role in fostering cultural 
development through relevant programming and the desire of the European Commission to make 
media a profitable sector of the economy. The BBC, for example, is now divided between a 
publicly-funded domestic branch and a commercially-funded international branch (Chalaby 
2010), and the German broadcaster, ARD faced court challenges when it attempted to enter into 
digital television (Woldt 2010). In both cases, PSBs found themselves reacting to market forces 
that constrained the potential of their cultural or political remit. 
In the Middle East, where governments often tightly monitor media, private media firms 
have run into a combination of religious conservatism and geopolitics. Kraidy (2013) observes 
that a Bahraini version of Big Brother brought about conflict between traditional religious values 
versus the fitness for foreign investment. He further suggests that conflict over content can 
actually lead to “structural changes in industry” when states put pressure on private channels 
who then must move to operate under different jurisdictions. In Qatar, the ruling family invested 
in Al-Jazeera at the same time it connected itself to flows of people and capital to shift away 
from petroleum extraction as their primary revenue source (Abduljawad 2015; Fromherz 2012).  
                                                 
14 Europeanization is the process by which European Union members legal and political system are 
brought into line with broader rules defined by the European Parliament and Commission (Cowles, 
Caporaso, and Risse 2001). 
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Rather than a movement towards homogenization of media systems feared by some 
scholars (O. Boyd-Barrett and Xie 2008; e.g. O. Boyd-Barrett 1980; McChesney 2008), these 
examples suggest that states have adopted different media models in response to the pressures of 
neoliberal media reform put forward by the World Bank, IMF, and US. Yet literature that 
addresses neoliberalization tends to cast states, with the possible exception of the US, as more or 
less passive recipients of neoliberal thought. While scholars have acknowledged that states 
respond to neoliberalism in historically, political, and culturally situated ways, they tend to elide 
the possibility that states may speak back to neoliberalism in particular ways. McChesney, for 
example, writes, “The U.S. government… aggressively and persistently acted as if only a profit-
driven media system… could be considered acceptable…. As many nations came up short in that 
department, the government worked to eliminate barriers,” to US modes of commercial media 
(2008, 313). While he does acknowledge that sectorial class interests in a variety of states may 
support or oppose neoliberalization, he does not take into account that many states have newly 
acquired international broadcasting capacities, and that those states might use those capacities to 
support or challenge neoliberal economics or other state’s position within that framework.  
Indeed, recent developments suggest that some states desire to reshape the global 
architecture of neoliberal capitalism without necessarily promoting an alternative. Policy 
initiatives such as Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union (Dutkiewicz and Sakwa 2014; Eurasian 
Economic Commission 2014) and China’s New Silk Road and Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (AIIB) projects (Tiezzi 2015; Simpfendorfer 2009) indicate that states are actively working 
to craft different institutions and regional organizations alongside neoliberal mainstays such as 
the IMF and World Bank. In the long term, it is an open question as to what these developments 
mean for the global economy and geopolitics. They do imply, however, that neoliberalism drives 
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states to be competitive as sites of global capital investment. On the other hand, forums like the 
Eurasian Economic Union may also indicate that states are interested in changing the design of 
economic governance. 
The examples above indicate that state responses to neoliberal media reform vary given 
the actual media system and political interests of the respective state. As such, neoliberalism 
remains the dominant ideological framework that IB economic news must engage. Within this 
framework, greater marketization necessarily shifts the ground on which states project economic 
narratives as well as the language of dedicated financial media and economics broadly defined.  
Following in the footsteps of McCloskey (1998), several rhetorical scholars explored the 
“rhetoric of economics,”15 or the ways in which actors use language to legitimize particular 
economic theories and ideologies. They suggest that rhetorical topoi (topics) and styles mediate a 
public’s relationship with a particular economic system. Aune’s (2001) analysis of American 
right-wing economic rhetoric suggests that free market proponents utilized a rhetoric of 
“economic correctness” grounded in scientifically positivist theories of how the economy 
functions.16 Because economic correctness produces social norms for discussion of the economy, 
it also produces social norms that serve as a, “resource for condemning opponents and for 
valorizing particular cultural constructions” about the economy (p.24). Economic correctness, 
therefore, serves a kind of disciplining function for members of government and media by 
demarcating the range of normal economic opinion. In the context of this dissertation, the 
rhetoric of economics represents economists’ professional norms. In IB content, rhetoric of 
                                                 
15 See the following scholars for example: (Aune 2001; Chaput 2010; Cloud, Macek, and Aune 2006; 
Greene 2004, 2010; Houck 2000; Levasseur 2000; Vivian 2006). 
16 As McCloskey (1998) argued, economists tend to style their arguments in the same terms as the hard 
sciences and rely on a positivist epistemology, which privileges knowledge derived from statistical 
methods.  
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economics provides a source of norms and topoi professional journalists and economists draw 
upon to frame economic policies and events. 
Given that IBs primarily function as news outlets, we must also connect with the 
literature on financial journalism to understand how journalists and journalism discursively 
construct economics. Lee’s (2014) meta-literature review of “financial journalism” scholarship 
suggests that financial journalists typically rely on financial professionals and government 
officials as elite sources (Fahy, O’Brien, and Poti 2010). In addition, some scholars have argued 
that financial journalism does not play a “watchdog” function and fails to seriously question the 
arguments of economists or experts (Usher 2013). The growth of finance as a prime area of 
economic activity has also enabled the expansion of financial journalism out of print and into 
television and cable (Arrese and Medina 2011; Lee 2012) and outside of the West to fast 
developing economies in other parts of the world (Chakravartty and Schiller 2010; Shrikhande 
2004). However, Lee (2014) suggests that scholars have by and large avoided television and non-
Western sources of financial news as scholarly objects. In addition, since this scholarship focuses 
primarily on privately owned networks it does not easily match IBs. It is possible that IBs will 
actively use different kinds of sources in the process of articulating state policy or contra-flow 
compared to private networks, as scholars’ research on AJE illustrates. The preceding literature 
suggests that IBs’ economic coverage may have to serve two masters, one corporate and the 
other governmental.  
International broadcasters operate at the intersection of state interests and journalism 
norms. They must be news, but also something else that meets the needs of their state 
benefactors. In addition, financial journalism as a news genre supplies its own norms and 
expectations that constrain and enable particular interpretations of economic events. 
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Acknowledging the potentially complex interplay of influences on IB content while also testing 
the content for its conformity to state interests is crucial to understanding how these new 
channels work in a complex media environment.  
 
2.4 Addressing Critical Political Economy 
Before moving on the research questions, several factors introduced in the preceding 
sections suggest that critical political economy (CPE) and its various theoretical concerns. CPE 
scholars “take it as axiomatic that the media must be studies in relation to their place within the 
broader economic and social context” (Winseck 2012, 4). Within this framework, scholars study 
media as industries, as institutions, their role in shaping and being shaped by market forces, and 
their economic effects on society. This project has already tacitly elucidated IBs affinity for CPE 
research. I demonstrated that neoliberalization has been a powerful force for media consolidation 
but also the proliferation of private 24-hour news stations (Rai and Cottle 2010) and that all four 
states analyzed herein have incorporated, to varying degrees, neoliberal polices of privatization 
and marketization. I also demonstrated that finance and business media have expanded in size 
and scope and have the potential to carry ideological packages concerning economic 
development to local elites (Chakravartty and Schiller 2010). Finally, I briefly discussed, and do 
so in more depth in the next chapter, that networks like RT, CCTV, and, though not analyzed 
here, France 24 bear within their editorial statements and the circumstances of their founding a 
profound sense that their state sponsors’ legitimate criticisms of American policies did not 
receive due respect or were deliberately distorted. International broadcasters, therefore, enter into 
and are a response to a media ecology with high consolidation of enterprises, increasing numbers 
of private broadcasters ensconced in Western norms of news production (Thussu 2007b), and a 
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hostile Anglo-American dominated global journalism system. CPE scholars would, then, 
examine IBs as media institutions: their financing, distribution models, their similarities and 
differences to established media companies, the role and effects on society at large, and their 
place in the intellectual property regime, each emphasizing different influences in economics, 
politics, and technological development. 
CPE scholars are, however, not united in how they might situate IBs within the above 
trends. A neoclassicist, for example, would likely see the greater number of outlets as signs of 
robust competition (Thierer and Eskelsen 2008). In this sense, government intervention is only 
necessary to achieve successful markets and IBs would be a wasteful effort to “pick winners” in 
an already healthy media market. Thinkers inspired by Schumpterer’s (1942) concept of 
“creative destruction” would point to changes in the global media as the inevitable results of 
technological changes in media distribution systems. The proliferation of media actors seen by a 
variety of scholars (see for example Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2013) is the result of 
technological change and efforts to preserve the central role of state in media would be an 
exercise in futility. The radical school, to give one final example, emphasizes the role of media, 
and journalism especially, as a public good which must be protected from complete 
marketization for the good of the people and their responsibilities in a democratic system 
(McChesney 2004; McChesney and Nichols 2010). Taken to a global level, media consolidation 
must likewise be resisted given it potential to homogenize new content in the interests of 
corporate bottom lines (Schiller 2009). IBs, in this school of thought, may represent needed 
government intervention to correct diversity of perspectives and ideas in journalism and thus 
their role as a public good. On the other hand, that CCTV and RT are, presumably, not interested 
in informing their audience so as to enhance democracy may suggest that radical CPE thinkers 
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would see those networks as state-funded networks that simply provide alternative ideological 
packages. 
 The preceding paragraphs suggest that CPE would be rich theoretical grounds on which 
to base my study of international broadcasting, especially given my emphasis on economic 
discourse. Certainly this is true, in general, and a CPE analysis of IBs is well and truly needed. 
Nevertheless, I do not substantively engage with CPE for three reasons. First, and as discussed 
previously IBs are relatively small players in international journalism. They are important, and 
the English speaking variants I analyze here are particularly important given their elite 
audiences. However, figures of capitalization, consolidation, and revenue are not readily 
available for these networks, nor is their raison d’etre profit generation. The amount of money 
states invest in these ventures is important, and discussed above and in Chapter 3, but this money 
is usually a small fraction of each state’s larger budget for foreign policy activities. With the 
exception of AJE, who is part of a globally popular brand, these channels have targeted, rather 
than more generalized, influence. Second, my focus remains on IBs and their relationship to their 
state sponsor, not the larger media markets in which they operate. In their competition for limited 
attention spans, understanding an IB in the context of market competition is also critical to 
gaining a full understanding of state’s various public diplomacy efforts, but reception is also not 
the main topic of this dissertation. Instead, the main purpose of this project is to first detect the 
degree to which IBs project their sponsor’s economic policy and discourse and if so, how they do 
so as journalism outlets. Finally, IBs unique status as journalism outlet and tools of state power, 
their functionally limitless funding, and their position in a larger firmament of foreign outreach 
tools make positioning them as media outlets in a CPE analysis a potentially arduous task. One 
that is necessary, of course, but also one beyond the scope of this specific project. With these 
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caveats in mind, I return to the core scholarly home of this project, the role of IBs as tools of 
state power and their use of journalism in that goal. 
 
2.5 Research Questions 
The literatures above argue that IBs operate as articulations of state power with the purpose 
of enhancing the perception of the host state, a practice that is increasing in the early 21st 
century. Concurrently, states across the geopolitical spectrum have adapted to neoliberal 
economics domestically and internationally, indicating some amount of acquiescence to the 
global economic system. These two trends sit uncomfortably next to each other, given that 
neoliberalism entails limiting government activity and public diplomacy necessitates government 
sponsorship. Certainly, IBs retain value by framing conflict and disputes as well as disseminating 
particular political positions, but we do not know the degree to which they conform with state 
interests. When the topic is the neoliberal global economy, a system that IB sponsors have 
joined, do IBs contest it or support it? We can say that IB economic news content operates at the 
intersections of neoliberal capital’s power and state power; but the literature on financial 
journalism suggests that business news often fails to question the basis of the economic system. 
When the audience and those featured are members of the global business elite, then what kind 
economic discourse can be expected? The following research questions are intended to explore 
these issues.  
• RQ1: Does an international broadcaster’s economic coverage serve as a direct articulation of 
its sponsoring state positions and policies? What are the differences and similarities between 
different IB network coverage? 
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o  Sub: What national economic identity narratives do flagship economic news 
programs project? 
o Sub: What system narratives do flagship economic news programs project? 
o Sub: To what extent do any of the preceding categories of coverage serve as a direct 
articulation of the host nation’s economic policy? 
o Sub: How do transnational news outlets discursively construct international economic 
protest? 
o Sub: Given that economic news output is typically oriented towards elites, what 
narratives do international broadcasters project about economic protests? 
o Sub: Do economic protest narratives conform to sponsoring state economic interests? 
• RQ2: Does IBs’ content output conform to expectations grounded in the major theories of 
international broadcasting?  
o Sub: Do transnational business programs conform to public diplomacy and soft power 
theory? 
o Sub: Do transnational business programs conform to strategic narrative theory? 
o Sub: Do transnational business programs conform to contra-flow theory? 
• RQ3: What news norms and patterns of coverage do networks use; do networks that claim to 
provide contra-flow and counter-hegemonic coverage actually do so?  
These research questions draw our attention to several dynamics that potentially 
influence international broadcaster content. First, the degree to which IB content projects state 
narratives, as theorists of public diplomacy and strategic narratives suggest they will is unknown. 
So too are the factors which may influence coverage. Second, the potential for any of these 
networks to be counter-hegemonic, particularly if that is their stated editorial mission remains 
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unknown as well. Third, and implied by the two preceding points, the extent to which any new 
IB provides something qualitatively different from previous global news outlets and traditional 
financial journalism, must also work in concert with state interests. To confirm or deny any of 
the RQs, requires and analysis of both news norms, i.e. broadcast content’s particular use of 
onsite reporting, interviews, and speakers who convey a news story, and how those features work 
to project state narrative. In turn, the methods I apply need to access both features.  
 
2.6 Methodology 
In this dissertation, I compare AJE, CCTV, DW, and RT’s flagship economic news 
content to each other as well as its respective state sponsors’ economic positions. Because 
broadcasters do not confine economic news coverage to flagship programs, I also analyze and 
compare newscasts coverage of economic protests both within and between broadcasters. 
Dedicated economic news programing caters to elite business audiences (Corcoran and Fahy 
2009), and thus provides a limited set of possibilities for state narrative projection and counter-
hegemony. In contrast, economic protests encompass economic discourse and activity from those 
dissatisfied with elements of the economic system and may provide a wider range of discourses.  
For each of the two sets of primary source materials I relied on a mixed-methods approach using 
a qualitative content analysis and a complementary discourse analysis. Content analysis is 
systematic and comparative while critical discourse analysis allows for deeper consideration of 
power relationships between states, citizens, and economic actors. Combining these two 
approaches ensures analytical rigor with comparative empirical data, while also attuning me to 
the ways IB content discursively constructs economic activities. In this way my analysis of 
economic news functions as a case study of international broadcaster economic content, which is 
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an initial step in developing a more generalized theorization of international broadcasting and its 
role in the global media system (Flyvbjerg 2006). In the rest of this section, I detail my discourse 
and content analysis procedures and my justification for using these methods. I also examine the 
materials I collected and the study period for this project and explain my coding schemes. 
 
2.6.1 Mixed Methods – Content  
 My analysis began with coding all gathered media texts prior to a deeper textual analysis. 
To test the extent that IBs function as public diplomacy, strategic narrative, or contra-flow in 
relation to official economic agendas, the coding scheme (see all Appendices) identifies who 
speaks, for whom, and of what. I adopted and modified Robertson’s (2010, 2014) coding 
schemes from her analyses of mediated cosmopolitanism and IB economic newscast items. Her 
(2010) scheme coded news items as domestic, international, or intersectional. Domestic stories 
focus only on the network’s country of origin. Intersectional stories focus on the relationship 
between the country of origin and one or more other countries. International stories focus on two 
or more states that are not the country of origin. In the case of international or intersectional 
news items, I also coded the non-host states names in the order they appeared inspired by Cohen 
and Atad’s coding framework (2013). 
Robertson’s (2014) scheme emphasizes speakers, and codes them as political, economic, 
expert, ordinary people, or workers (see Appendices C and D). Political speakers are members of 
government Bankers and business people/owners represent economic speakers. Experts include 
individuals such as academics, independent economists, or think tank researchers. 
Nonprofessionals are “ordinary people” on the street, market, or in their home, perhaps best 
represented by the “vox pop” interview. I developed the worker category myself to account for 
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speakers who were engaged in economic activity but did not have economic decision making 
power.  
I placed speakers into specific categories based on their organizational affiliation shown 
on screen as well as the role they play as speakers. AJE, for example labeled Martin Lidegaard as 
“Danish Foreign Minister,” a clear indication of his role in government. Political figures could 
work at national levels as well as regional levels, say the governor or mayor of states and towns, 
or supra-national levels, for example IMF President Christine Lagarde. I coded activists as 
political figures as well as their activity reflects their engagement with political processes. 
Economics figures, in contrast, were typically labeled with words like “president,” “CEO,” 
“CFO,” “chairman/woman,” or “founder.” These terms signal that the speaker is in a leading 
position in an business enterprise. For experts, the organizational affiliations sometimes confused 
coding. If a speaker was affiliated with a university or a think tank and provided analysis of 
economic policies or issues then their expert status was relatively clear. However, some speakers 
in this category could be labeled “Senior Statistician National Bureau of Statistics” of China. Is 
this person a political or expert figure? They are both, surely, but their role in this specific 
example is to provide analysis and context, not stump for the government. At some levels this 
distinction is unsatisfactory because it presumes neutral engagement with information on the part 
of the speaker. That said, their role on the program is to provide authority of expertise. Networks 
labeled ordinary people with affiliations like “Seoul resident” or “Hong Kong resident” and even 
“mother.” Ordinary speakers spoke to the effects of economic issues and policies and their 
remarks lack the authority of expertise or economic leadership. Finally, I distinguished workers 
from economic figures as the former, while engaged in economic activity in the form of labor, 
did not speak as leaders of business enterprises, as CEOs did. Examples of this category include 
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“sushi deliveryman” and “taxi driver.” While individuals can and do inhabit multiple roles, these 
categories are not meant to be completely accurate representations of these individuals but rather 
identify the roles which the speaker plays in IB content.  
I coded each speaker’s name, organizational affiliation, gender, nationality, and the 
network on which they appeared. Of these, nationality was the most difficult as accent, skin 
color, and name may only dimly reflect a person professed national identity or citizenship status. 
For political figures, for example, this code was simple; Chinese President Xi Jinping is clearly a 
citizen of China.17 Several economic or expert figures were also relatively simple given their 
high public profile, for example Lego CEO Jorgen Vig Knudstrop is an internationally known 
businessperson. In cases where I could not find any secondary or primary sourcing affirming the 
national identity of a speaker I left the variable blank. I also adapted Figenschou’s (2010) coding 
of AJE newscasts for the location of the story and where the story was reported from i.e. in 
studio, onsite, studio interview, onsite interview, or some mixture of the four. Studio items occur 
entirely within the studio as a reading of the news by the anchor. Onsite items may be introduced 
by an in studio anchor but spend the majority of their time with a correspondent at the location of 
news events. Onsite items typically included several interviews. As such, studio and onsite 
interviews are distinguished by their focus on a single interview subject, either in studio or at a 
different location. Whether a report comes from in the studio or out of it is a reflection both of 
relative importance given to the story and the degree the viewer can engage with the subjects of 
the story (Chouliaraki 2006b; Figenschou 2012). Finally, I coded each story for the sources of 
economic data, for example the UN or the World Bank or central banks like the Federal Reserve, 
which were often clearly labeled on the screen. If there was no sourcing given for data (which 
                                                 
17 When speakers were from Hong Kong, they were labeled as such rather than Chinese to reflect the dual 
governing structure present in the territory.  
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was extremely rare) I noted the presence but not the source of the data. Finally, I coded the main 
topic of a given story, labeled issue, as an indication of the principle subject of the story. As with 
newspaper headlines (Henry and Tator 2002), the first sentences of a news item illustrate the 
broader news topic being discussed. Oil prices, for example, were a common topic during the 
study period and anchors introduced items with clear verbal indications that oil was the primary 
topic of the item; for example, “the price of oil continues to decline.” Anchor’s subsequent 
statements then focus the report; for example, “having an effect on Russia’s economy.” Another 
way to think of this distinction is that oil prices are the phenomena or cause and the Russian 
economy is the effect. These basic variables allowed me to discern patterns in each broadcaster’s 
content and thereby direct my subsequent discourse analysis.  
 
2.6.2 Mixed Methods – Discourse 
Critical discourse analysis has many variants and no individual piece of scholarship 
incorporates all of them. However, I take inspiration from Dialectical-Relational CDA as a 
method designed to engage with the “semiotic dimensions” of social practices, and in turn link 
those dimensions to other areas of scholarship in a “transdisciplinary” way (Chouliaraki and 
Fairclough 1999; Fairclough 1989, 2001). Fairclough (1999; 1989, 2010) argues that social 
actors use language in “orders of discourse” that dialectically constrain and enable particular 
discourses through the creation of spoken, written, and visual texts. In this dissertation, order of 
discourse include state economic interests, norms derived from sponsoring state media systems, 
and financial journalism practice. I argue that these orders of discourse interact in the production 
of international broadcaster content. Analysis from a CDA perspective encourages the scholar to 
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“unmask” ideological discourses and how those discourses maintain, justify, or resist relations of 
power through hegemonic closure of possible discursive choices.  
CDA is appropriate for this dissertation for several reasons. First, it theorizes and 
examines language’s role in naturalizing and contesting power. In addition, CDA can address 
large amounts of material, but also provide the analytical and theoretical tools needed to 
understand language use at a micro level. IB news content, should it work to project state 
narratives, is fundamentally enmeshed in competing power relations between states and is, as 
such, amenable to CDA. These materials are semiotic and thus contain a discursive dimension 
shaped by the structures in which they were produced. Second, while there has been scholarly 
attention to IBs from a variety of perspectives (Hayden 2011; Jowett and O’Donnell 1999; 
Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2013; Price 2003; Thussu 2007a), very few have 
systematically and comparatively examined their content (Figenschou 2010; A. Robertson 2014). 
CDA’s focus on deep textual analysis and the role of power in shaping discourse means that this 
dissertation provides one of the first empirically grounded analyses of economic news coverage 
by IBs in comparative perspective with an emphasis on state power. 
CDA, in addition to being an appropriate method, has been applied to the materials 
gathered here, thus illustrating this project’s alignment with previous research. Scholars who 
applied CDA to international broadcasters generally examined AJE as a new form of 
oppositional or alternative journalism (e.g. Barkho 2008, 2011, Kasmani 2013a, 2013b; Wu 
2013). Of these scholars, Barkho (2008, 2011) and Kasmani (2013a, 2013b) examined specific 
events, Israeli-Palestinian conflict and an Iranian election respectively. As such, events 
constrained their samples and their analyses. Wu (2013) pulled news stories from the BBC and 
Channel News Asia’s websites and selected the two events with the highest rate of reporting as 
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measured by number of bulletins. Other scholars have analyzed IBs using different methods than 
CDA, but provide useful coding schemes to be modified here (Figenschou 2010; A. Robertson 
2010, 2014). By combining analysis of routine economic news coverage, official economic 
discourse, and economic protests with a focus on power, this dissertation unravels IBs potential 
in disseminating alternative economic discourses as an facet of state power.  
Finally, Kaufer and Hariman (2008) suggested that CDA and rhetoric developed from 
different intellectual traditions and rarely speak to each other, a situation that has changed little 
since they wrote their article (Tracy et al. 2011). However, the two have much to offer each 
other. In this dissertation, I combine the rigor content analysis provides in data collection and 
initial coding with scholarship on the rhetoric of economics. Doing so moves my analysis past 
Widdowson’s (1995, 1998) now classic criticism that CDA misapplies the knowledge of formal 
linguistics and thereby engages in a form of literary criticism. Using the analytical rigor of 
content analysis provides a check on my close textual analysis, while also incorporating the 
range of findings from rhetorical analyses of economic rhetoric. Combining these two 
approaches to the study of language, thereby, permits a multi-level of analysis of my texts’ 
broader patterns and close textual levels.  
Procedurally, CDA does not apply any single correct or rote means of gathering data or 
analysis (Carvalho 2008; Tenorio 2011). Because of its fundamental concern with unmasking 
power relations in society (van Dijk 2008), CDA begins with a “social wrong” or problem in 
society. They work from the literature on the problem to determine what object(s) of analysis are 
most appropriate. Having identified a wrong and topic, the researcher then collects data that 
reflects or speaks to the topic, organizing and coding it for later, in depth semiotic analysis. I 
have already examined the relevant literatures and describe the materials below. Nevertheless, it 
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is important to consider the nature of the “wrong” studied here and why CDA is a useful method 
to examine it. 
International broadcasting efforts signal a greater role for states in the global news 
system, one increasingly defined by the presence 24 hour private news channels (Rai and Cottle 
2010). Private media proliferation resulted, partially, from neoliberalism’s incorporation into 
global economic governance, and several scholars regard such channels as harbingers of news 
homogenization, Americanization, or infotainment  (O. Boyd-Barrett and Xie 2008; Harvey 
2007; McChesney 2004; Thussu 2007b; Wasko 2013). Nevertheless, states reliant on the global 
economy such as Russia and China have made providing different views on international news 
their stated goal (Avgerinos 2009; P. M. Seib 2010; Zhu 2012). In turn, this suggests that several 
states desire an IB in direct contravention of the global media system shaped by neoliberalism. 
While neoliberalism may be economic orthodoxy, state IBs grounded in counter-hegemonic 
editorial stances, like RT and AJE, may undermine such orthodoxies. This complex interplay of 
power relations is an important and under analyzed aspect of the global system grounded in 
competing discourses, and therefore open to CDA and rhetorical analytical approaches. 
CDA, in addition to its attention to power dynamics, distinguishes itself from agenda-
setting or content analysis (Scheufele 1999; Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007) by doing deeper 
forms of textual analysis. CDA’s attention to power in its semiotic dimension and its insistence 
on deep textual analysis after initial coding entails that practitioners engage in interdiscursive 
and semiotic analysis following initial coding. Semiotic/linguistic analysis seeks to detect 
ideological constructions in a “text” and understands these constructions as both shaped by 
power and the application of power. The researcher looks for a variety of linguistic features such 
as: synonymy, antymony, hyponymy, nominalization, metaphor, pronoun use, passive/active 
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voice, synecdoche, and expressive and relational values (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999; 
Fairclough 1989, 2001). No single text contains all of these features, but particular language 
choices enable and limit interpretations of actors, ideas, institutions, and governments that reflect 
the position of their author. Schumpeter’s (1942) “creative destruction,” for example, assumed 
the status of a paradigmatic metaphor for neoliberal capitalism. Schumpeter used it to illustrate 
the processes by which free-market capitalism fosters innovation by replacing old industries with 
new ones. The juxtaposition of “creative” and “destruction” shades the unemployment, poverty, 
and social dislocation that accompany many macroeconomic decisions with a positive and 
progressive valence. Likewise, the linguistic means IBs use to frame state policies, the global 
economy, and geopolitical rivals carry within them presumptions about their legitimacy or lack 
thereof.  
Interdiscursive analysis connects a given text with the discursive resources the author 
draws upon in its production and highlights the intertextualities that constitute texts. Given my 
research questions, the interdiscursive analysis necessitates comparison between IB content and 
primary and secondary sources on state sponsor economic policies. Concretely, interdiscursive 
analysis of my selected texts requires determining the extent to which IBs carry or reproduce 
government economic policy rhetoric. The greater the overlap between these two areas, 
government policy papers and IB content, the greater likelihood we can definitively say that state 
interests influence broadcaster’s content.  
Procedurally, the CDA I use here involves the following steps that follow the initial 
content analysis outlined above. First, I examine the results of the coding, investigating particular 
patterns seen in the data. CCTV’s consistent reporting on the Two Session, the period when 
legislative councils debate government policies, serve as an excellent example. Analysis of the 
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issue variable, which coded for the main topic of story as introduced by the anchor, illustrates 
that CCTV reported on the Two Sessions in 3% of their total items. While apparently a small 
number, it is still higher than a variety of other issues. In addition, while the coding does not 
account for these features, Two Sessions items were always at the beginning of the program, 
sometimes with multiple individual items on the many parts of the sessions themselves. These 
features signaled that these news items were ripe for deeper analysis, especially as these items 
represented a clear opportunity for Chinese leaders to address network audiences directly. 
Second, I reexamined the episodes with particular attention to repeated words, phrases, and 
metaphors and several immediately stood out. Among these were China’s new normal, 
innovation society, belt and road initiative, and market-oriented reform. As part of this process, I 
also looked for the verbal context of these phrases, were they presented positively or negatively, 
who was permitted to speak about them (political figures, economists, experts). In addition, I 
asked how reporters and speakers discursively connected actors, like the state, to the terms and 
how have these terms been used in other contexts (notably economic reports, academic studies, 
and journalistic accounts). 
I will use new normal as an example. Anchors and reporters used this term frequently, 
inside and outside of Two Sessions reporting. The term itself juxtaposes the concept of newness, 
or change, with normality. It suggests an irrevocable shift from a previous condition to a new 
one, and, therefore, could cause fear. Anchors connected the term, discursively, to the larger 
changes in the Chinese economy including: slower growth, weakened housing markets, slower 
manufacturing growth, and government attempts to increase consumer spending and internet 
commerce. Analysis of Chinese government communication (ChinaFile 2013; Xinhua 2015), 
academic analysis (Shambaugh 2013), and news items (BBC 2015a) illustrated that China is, or 
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is perceived to be, enduring a transformation of its economy from a manufacturing export based 
system to a consumption and service based economy. In each item that used the term new normal 
anchors claimed the CPC and Chinese state implemented reforms to addresses the marco-
changes in China’s economy, but were proactive in doing so. In a January 20 episode, for 
example, Jeremy Stevens of Standard Bank argued that China’s slowdown was the result of 
structural factors like a weak housing market. The host, then, claimed that the government was 
planning reforms around the slowdown and used interviews with Bert Hofman of the World 
Bank, Liu Baocheng of the University of International business and Economics (China), and 
Jurgen Conrad of the Asian Development Bank to highlight the positive aspect of CPC reforms 
and the overall strength of the Chinese economy. In this sense, CCTV used the new normal in 
ways that associated it with the CPC and their reform policies, supported by Chinese and foreign 
experts, and rendered structural changes in the Chinese economy knowable and less worthy of 
anxiety. CDA illustrates that the use of language is both a reflection of power in that CCTV 
journalists use the language of the Chinese government without skepticism, but also an 
application of power to the audience in attempting to shape their understanding of the Chinese 
economy in ways that the CPC may prefer. I apply content analysis and CDA, therefore, as a 
mixture of rigorously empirical analysis of news item features as well as a flexible discourse 
analytic tool to unmask the power dynamics at play in IB content.  
 
2.6.3  Material and Data Collection: Economic News Programs 
My primary data falls into two categories: flagship economic programming and economic 
protest news coverage. While both come from the broadcasters, gathering them required different 
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procedures, and coding them required some limited changes to my coding scheme. Here, I take 
each in turn and then describe collection for government primary sources.  
Previous studies of IB content have tended to engage with regular news content in the 
form of newscasts (Figenschou 2010; A. Robertson 2014) or pulled only those items that related 
to particular events via searches (Barkho 2011; Kasmani 2013b). In contrast, flagship economic 
news programs cover economics as a specialist form of journalism catering to elite audiences 
(Corcoran and Fahy 2009). This might suggest that I should examine newscast content. 
However, Robertson (2014) found that IB newscasts devoted between 4.4% (CNNI) and 7.74% 
(RT) of their stories to economic news, indicating a relative lack of coverage in newscasts. On 
the other hand, financial journalism relies more on official sources (Fahy, O’Brien, & Poti, 2010) 
and its practitioners often have close relationships with financial professionals (Manning, 2013), 
which undermines their ability to be critical. This might mean the IB economic programs are 
limited by the conventions of their genre. Alternatively, these programs air on networks designed 
to forward the perceived interests of the sponsoring state. This means economic news programs 
are pulled between the interests of their sponsor and the norms of financial journalism. As such, 
economic news programs are richer sites than traditional newscasts for assessing IBs’ 
articulations of economics and serve as a window into IB content aimed at economic elites 
possibly constrained by state interests (see Table 2.1).18 Each program has its own website and 
archives individual episodes for an unspecified period. I downloaded and stored all episodes. 
(See coding and analysis procedure below.)  
I based my selection of Russia Today, China Central Television, Deutsche Welle, and Al-
Jazeera English on several factors. First, they are geographically dispersed: one from Europe, 
                                                 
18 That said, economic protests are also an object of analysis for this project. Data on these protests will 
encompass economic programs, newscasts, web articles, and state communications and positions.  
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one from the Middle East, one from East Asia, and one from Eurasia. Each network comes from 
different political systems: one democracy (Germany), one illiberal democracy (Russia), a 
constitutional monarchy (Qatar), and a one party state (China). Given, Price’s (2003) suggestion 
international broadcasters are torn between the desire for political exigencies of the network’s 
effectiveness and the knowledge that naked propaganda is unlikely to affect audiences. As such, 
the journalists working for these networks work in conditions shaped by political needs and 
journalistic norms. Discourse analysis of the resulting content of these networks may shine light 
on this relationship in different political systems.  
 Table 2.1 Network Flagship Economic News Programs 
Host 
Country 
Network Program Air Time(s) 
GMT 
Format/ 
style 
Length Archive 
period 
avail-
able 
Russia Russia 
Today 
Boom 
Bust 
Daily Anchor w/ 
interviews 
Approx. 
30 min 
10/16/13
-present 
Qatar Al-Jazeera 
English 
Counting 
the Cost 
Weekly 
(Saturday) 
Anchor w/ 
interviews 
Approx. 
30 min 
11/15/14
-present 
China China 
Central 
Television 
Global 
Business19 
Daily Anchor w/ 
interviews 
Approx. 
45 min 
12/29/14
-present 
Germany  Deutsche 
Welle 
Made in 
Germany 
Weekly Anchor w/ 
interview 
Approx. 
26 min 
03/30/14
-present 
Sources: Network’s relevant webpages 
 
I selected these programs because they are all flagship economic news for their respective 
networks. In addition, they share the same basic format, using anchors in a studio and reporting 
news items, as seen in Table 2.1. News items can be both on location or reported from the studio. 
All use in studio and televisual interviews. Three of these programs are a standard 22-30 min in 
length, with Global Business being the exception. These program features, in turn, justify coding 
                                                 
19 Global Business transitioned from the program Biz Asia, their episodes are catalogued together on the 
CCTV website.  
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the total number of news items instead of the length of a given item. DW’s Made in Germany, 
for example is significantly shorter than CCTV’s Global Business, using long form news items 
instead of short bulletins. Because of these features, comparisons of length are not as valuable as 
comparing the overall number of items and their individual features. Table 2.2 shows the total 
number of episodes and total number of news items for each network. Although two programs 
are daily and two are weekly, the programs still have more commonalities than differences. 
Subsequent analysis pairs the daily and weekly shows for validity and compare in between the 
groups afterwards.  
 Table 2.2 Episode and News Item Frequencies 
 AJE CCTV DW RT 
Total episodes 13 64 15 56 
Total News 
Items 
57 738 60 207 
 
 I derived information on state economic policy from a combination of secondary 
journalistic sources and government authored documents, speeches, and policy papers. While I 
do not conduct a full discourse or content analysis of formal government documents, where 
necessary I gathered and analyzed these documents as a check for analysis of IB content. I 
collected government materials from the various government ministries connected to economic 
affairs as shown in Table 2.3. News items constitute the unite of analysis for this dissertation. 
Using the lede (or headline) of each item to signal its beginning and switches to different ledes or 
news items signaling the end. They can be of varying lengths but still indicate in absolute 
numbers the attention given to particular issues. 
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 Table 2.3 Government Economic Ministries and Offices with English language websites 
Russia Germany20 Qatar China 
Ministry of 
Communications and 
Mass Media of the 
Russian Federation 
Federal Ministry for 
Economic Affairs and 
Energy 
Ministry of 
Development 
Planning and 
Statistics 
Ministry of 
Commerce 
Ministry of Labour and 
Social Protection of the 
Russian Federation 
Federal Ministry of 
Economic Cooperation 
and Development 
 
Ministry of Economy 
and Commerce 
18th National 
Congress of 
the Communist 
Party of 
China21 
Russian Federal 
Treasury 
Federal Ministry of 
Finance 
Ministry of Energy 
and Industry 
Communist 
Party of China 
Ministry of Economic 
Development of the 
Russian Federation 
Federal Ministry of 
Labor and Social 
Affairs 
Ministry of Finance The State 
Council 
Office of the President German Federal 
Government 
Ministry of Labor and 
Social Affairs 
 
  Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs22 
 
 
2.6.4 Material and Data Collection: Economic Protest News Items 
Dedicated financial news provides a rich site for analyzing state economics narratives. 
However, my initial analysis indicated that they also portrayed a limited range of economic 
activity, dominated by states and elites with workers and nonprofessionals excluded and no hint 
of economic discontent except that between states. Hence, I determined that a full reading of 
state economic narratives required two data sets; one for elite driven financial news and one for 
economic activity from below, here represented by protests. Analyzing economic protests 
required changes to my data gathering approach applied in Chapters 4 and 5. In addition, protests 
                                                 
20 Germany has five ministries directly related to economic affairs.  
21 While not strictly a government ministry, the Congress is a big moment of political transition in China 
that last occurred in 2012. The current Chinese premier gave lengthy remarks, and the website has a 
variety of economic news. 
22 This is counter-intuitive, but the office of the Emir does not have a specific website devoted to his 
office, like the office of the President does for Russia. Consequently, the most appropriate website 
available for the Emir appears to be Foreign Affairs as it hosts the Emir’s particular speeches and policies.  
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were required that met several requirements based on geography, likelihood of coverage, and 
economic dimensions. However, changes to the coding scheme were relatively minor and 
allowed me to code for the differences between regular newscasts and dedicated economic news. 
First, I added a variable called “section” that codes for the typical news “beat” the story belonged 
to, for example: politics, economics, science, arts/culture, and sport. I divided politics into two 
categories, politics/domestic and politics/world, which apply to the actions of government and 
politicians in these respective spheres. If I coded the story as intersectional, covering the 
sponsoring state and its relationship with another state then it was coded as world. In addition, 
science encompasses all environment, technology, and health reporting for ease of analysis. I 
kept the “topic” variable, and combined with the section variable allowed a finer analysis of the 
specific subject of each news item, for example, “Iran Negotiations” was used as a catch all term 
to code for the Iran nuclear negotiations of summer 2015 and I coded these stories as 
politics/world given their multilateral dimensions. Otherwise, the coding schemes used in 
preceding Chapters remains unchanged and codes for geography, speaking actors, and economic 
sources.  
Next, I selected protests for analysis. I began by developing a list of protests that 
occurred either right before, during, or after the January to March 2015 study period. The list 
eventually encompassed anti-austerity protests in the UK, Spain, and Greece from 2009 to 
present; the “Blockupy” anti-ECB protests that started in 2014 and continue to present; protests 
over economic performance in Venezuela from 2014 to present; anti-corruption protests in Brazil 
during March 2015; university tuition protests in Quebec in March 2015; minimum wage 
protests in the USA from 2013 to present; and, the Umbrella protests in Hong Kong from 
September 2014 to early 2015.  
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 Table 2.4 News Item Frequencies 
 Blockupy  Umbrella Brazil Protest Greece Protest 
AJE 1 11 2 1 
CCTV 0 16 0 0 
DW 1 5 1 3 
RT 1 5 0 4 
Totals 3 37 3 8 
Ultimately, I selected Umbrella, Brazil, and Greek Bailout negotiations. The German 
Blockupy protests also received coverage during the Greek protests and I therefore include it but 
I do not have a complete week worth of coverage for it. These protests have several features that 
recommend them for selection, including their duration, location, and economic character. First, 
Umbrella and the Greek protests are part of long lasting movements while two occurred on one 
or two days of activity. Table 2.4 shows the total number of news items coded. As with 
economic news programs, these are individual news items recognized with the “issue” variable 
(see Appendices E and F) using the lede of each item to signal its beginning and switches to 
different ledes or news items signaling the end. The table also indicates that differences in the 
length of protests lead to differences in total amount of coverage, in turn, allowing us to see how 
narratives of protest movements take shape under different conditions. We know that long-term 
protests like Occupy or the Arab Spring fall into particular narratives over time (Gottlieb 2015). 
While Blockupy and Brazil’s protests reflect long present socioeconomic and political divisions 
in their respective societies, the actual events of civil disorder and protest occurred so quickly 
that new narratives, arguably, could not take shape. In addition, state sponsors showed keen 
interest in some protests, as seen in CCTV’s sustained attention to Umbrella. These conditions 
are important limitations on news discourse, which often changes and molds itself to events over 
time. 
Second, the protests are geographically dispersed, in some cases directly effecting 
sponsoring states as in the Greek Crisis and Umbrella movement for Germany and China 
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respectively. In other cases, sponsoring states are connected indirectly or obliquely to protest 
events; for example, Greece to Russia and the Brazilian protests to all sponsoring states. They 
also reflect a spectrum of economic development with Greek and Blockupy protest action taking 
place in the developed world and Umbrella and Brazil in the developing though emerging 
economies.  
Third and most importantly, each has a clear though often underreported economic 
dimension. The Greek protests and the Blockupy protests are the most directly economic based 
protests in the sample. Blocupy’s stated mission is “to connect our struggles and powers beyond 
nation-state lines. Together we want to create a common European movement, united in 
diversity, which can break the rule of austerity and will start to build democracy and solidarity 
from below” (Blockupy 2015 emphasis mine). In addition, they direct their protest against an 
official symbol of international finance, the European Central Bank (ECB). The Greek Debt 
Crisis is also directed at economic institutions like the IMF and ECB, but is also directed at the 
current German government (Kutter 2014).  
Brazil’s recent and ongoing political turmoil, though often framed in terms of political 
corruption, reflects class divisions within the Brazilian political and social structure. Some 
Western outlets suggested that anti-government protestors grievances lay in corrupt use of funds 
from state firms like Petrobras to finance political candidates (BBC 2016a). At the same time, 
some protestors cite a recent recession and weakening economy as the cause of their anger 
(Watts 2016). Meanwhile, Rousseff draws protest support from the trade union networks and 
groups sympathetic to her Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers' Party) who protested in “defense 
of democracy and the rights of the working class” (Douglas 2016). As we will see in Chapter 6’s 
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analysis, the colors protestors wore to rallies carry symbolic power as Rousseff’s supporters 
wore the red of the labor movement and her opponents wore the yellow of the national flag.  
Likewise, the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong reflects overlapping layers of 
grievance on the part of protestors. For example, Li writing in the Washington Post argues that 
the “central theme” of democracy in the protests is misguided as the region has greater 
representation than others parts of China. Instead, he suggests that, “General discontent has 
provided fertile soil for this movement, and the sources of that dissatisfaction have nothing to do 
with imaginary diktats from Beijing. Hong Kong is going through a tough period of economic 
and social dislocation” (2014). In contrast, Cheung writing in the Diplomat argues the protests 
are a “warning of the comprehensive breakdown of confidence in Hong Kong’s governing 
institutions – it reflects growing public disillusion with the institutional means of making their 
voices heard” (2014). At the same time, those same governing structures reflect the collusion of 
Hong Kong’s wealthiest with the Beijing leadership to maintain both stability and economic 
growth. As David Zweig of the City University of Hong Kong observes, “The conservatives, the 
tycoons, the business elite can really control the legislature and prevent any kind of social 
welfare policy… Beijing has to realize that they have a social problem—it’s not just a political 
problem” (quoted in Schroeder 2014). 
I collected data from an archive of global news broadcasts housed at the institutionen för 
mediestudier at Stockholm University. The programming broadcast by each network at 7:00pm 
Central European Time were selected because they are typical evening newscasts. Sometimes 
this process did not yield usable programming, as in the case of DW where programs on 
environment, science, and culture were aired during these timeslots or when in July 2015 CCTV 
replaced the regular newscast with one devoted to Asian news. However, data collection still 
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found n=807 total news items. I followed the same analysis procedure as in Chapter 4 and 5, 
coding each episode as described here, while also coding for common metaphors, arguments,  
and discourse in each item.  
 
2.6.5 Study Period 
The study period for this project was constrained by the available materials. CCTV’s 
Global Business was, at the time of collection, archived back to December 29, 2014, and this fact 
constrains the start date of the study period. I collected, economic news programs from each 
network from December 29, 2014 to March 31, 2015, yielding 12 episodes for weekly programs 
and approximately 80 episodes for daily programs. This is the primary study period and the study 
periods for the other two sets of materials follow from this. For economic protest coverage, I 
used that same study period to determine the extent to which economic protests are a subject of 
specialist economic news. I collected sources of state economic rhetoric during  and immediately 
preceding the same study period. 
The study periods for the economic protests centered on events such as strikes, protests, 
or riots that draw media attention. The study periods are one week long, with the event date in 
the center, thus giving three days both before and after the event. First, the Greek Debt 
negotiations and Parliamentary vote led to strikes on July 15, 2015 with a date range of July 12 
to July 18. Second, the Umbrella movement from September 28 to October 4 encompasses the 
beginning of the protests, but also the first use of violence by the police to clear financial areas of 
Hong Kong. Third, anti-Dilma Rousseff protests in Brazil between March 12 and March 18, 
which include a major rally for the opposition in addition to pro-Rousseff protests earlier in the 
week. Finally, March 18 was the date of the Blockupy protests in Frankfurt and while the study 
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period does not encompass a full three days after, it does encompass three days prior. With this 
limitation in mind, I included news items covering those events. 
Applying a mixed methodological approach, across several texts, and across different 
types of economic activity provides a complex picture of IB content. Content analysis combined 
with discourse analysis permits a transparent and nuanced examination of IB news items and the 
extent to which it conforms to state interests. Comparison of elite economic news to economic 
protest illustrates the potential of a given broadcaster to insturmentalize counter-hegemony for 
state interests. As a case study, with a reproducible procedure, this mixed methodological 
approach provides clear examples of how IB content supports, or does not, state interests.  
2.6.6 Clarification of Terminology 
Because this dissertation draws from several different literatures – strategic narratives 
and global media studies – and appeals to different academic communities – international 
relations and international communication – I want to clarify terms that appear with great 
frequency. These terms are: states, frames, and narratives. All three have specific academic as 
well as colloquial definitions and their use requires clarification. I do not believe that my 
definitions are the last word, but readers going forward should bear in mind the following 
caveats in my use of terminology. 
Like scholars of strategic narratives, public diplomacy, and contra-flow, I use the state as 
a primary unit of analysis. Furthermore, I consider international broadcasters as state agencies, 
even though it must be acknowledged that individual IBs have varied relations with their state 
sponsors. However, I do not adopt the realist view that states are monolithic entities that are 
rational in their actions. I am more persuaded by newer theories such as Castells (2011) or 
Mann’s (2012) understanding of the state as a network of institutions, each with power deriving 
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from it relationships with other entities. Even an entity that might seem monolithic, like the US 
State Department, contains many subsections and offices. For example, Price (2002) observes 
that the 1998 NATO intervention in Serbia involved both jamming Serbian media as well as 
supplying their own news and information, the latter being a form of international broadcasting. 
However, American IBs are normally under the purview of the Broadcasting Board of 
Governors, an independent agency that is in turn supervised by the Committee on Foreign 
Relations in the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House.23 As will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 3, all of the networks analyzed for this dissertation have their own 
histories and evolving relationships with the sponsoring state, and states or organs of states can 
place competing or complementary pressures on broadcasters. Therefore, when I use a sentence 
construction such as “X content projects Y policy as an articulation of state power” the reader 
should not assume that I believe that states immediately respond to conscious dictates from a 
unitary leader. Some states are more similar to this model than others, for example China under 
the CPC, but even there struggles over ideology, institutional power, and political legitimacy 
shape civil society and role of the party-state apparatus (T. Zhang 2016). When I invoke “the 
state” as an actor, the reader should recognize the actual complexities of states and the many 
forms states take in practice. 
Just as the concept of “state” carries with it ambiguity, so does the concept of frames or 
framing. Several decades ago, Entman wrote that framing a “scattered conceptualization” (1993, 
51). Subsequent analyses show that this remains the case (Gottlieb 2015; Scheufele 1999; 
Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007). Framing as a concept represents the “assumption that how an 
issue is characterized in news reports can have an influence on how it is understood by 
                                                 
23 For more information, see the BBG’s About Page at: http://www.bbg.gov/about-the-agency/  
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audiences” (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007, 11). It is in this most basic sense that I use framing, 
as a signal that news items do not provide all the relevant details of a story, but make selections 
and thereby raise the salience of specific details. On some levels this is an unsatisfactory 
simplification, especially given the high number of framing studies used in Chapter 6’s analysis 
on economic protests. However, rather than involving this study in the lengthy debates over what 
a frame is, or framing’s relationship to other theories such as agenda-setting, I want to emphasize 
that frame or framing here have limited meanings and should be seen in relation to the topic 
variable. Recall the example above where “oil prices” was the main topic of the news item. 
Several broadcasters covered low oil prices, and that fact suggests several factors that may 
influence IB content. However, the variable does not indicate the nature of the coverage. Are low 
oil prices the result of short-sighted over investment in the USA, as AJE suggests, or are they the 
Machiavellian plan of Saudi Arabia and the USA to destabilize Iranian influence in the Middle 
East, as RT claims? In this sense, my use of the term “frame” is less theoretically robust than 
those of other scholars. That said, my use should signal to the reader that I am considering the 
ways in which news items selectively present real phenomena, like oil prices, in ways which 
differ from other IBs. 
Finally and relatedly, narratives must be distinguished from frames. Fundamentally, 
narratives are distinguished from frames by virtue of their temporal and causal structure. As 
Miskimmon et al. write, “It is that temporal dimension and sense of movement that distinguishes 
narrative from… frames. Narratives can orient audiences to a future” (2013, 7). Narratives also 
possess actors, events, settings, and a sense of time and conclusion. Frames, on the other hand, 
while they may have these but, in Entman’s (1993) definition, are not required to. To be sure, 
this is also a limited comparison; Gottlieb’s (2015) analysis of Occupy Wall Street points to what 
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he calls “framing cycles” which shift frames over multiple news items, newspaper articles in his 
case. However, for the purposes of this dissertation, narratives work to craft a sense of past, 
present, and future, and function strategically, intentionally or not, when they bind the actions of 
actors. To use the oil example one final time; RT airs items with the topic of oil prices, and 
frames low prices as the result of American and Saudi dumping on international markets. 
However, the USA in Miskimmon et al.’s reading is a “great power”; a power whose identity is, 
in part, related to its responsibility towards weaker powers (2015, 35). Dumping oil, then, lowers 
prices, which damages economies around the world, Iran and Russia of course, but also the UK 
and allied Gulf States. In addition, the eventual rebound of oil prices will, inevitably, mislead 
economic actors who will make decision based on faulty information and greater economic 
dislocation will result. A frame, which says low oil prices are the USA’s fault, may not lead to a 
negative judgement of the USA, the viewer may dislike Russia and see American actions as 
justified. However, a narrative with this dystopian future of oil prices shocks invites the viewer 
to judge the USA as a bad actor, and correspondingly see Russia as a victim. In this sense 
narratives are temporal, future oriented, but also causal, in that they can proscribe blame. Good 
stories, after all, need a good villain. On final point, is that I do not use Miskimmon et al.’s 
(2013) concept of aligned and non-aligned narratives, which suggest that when to actors, like 
states, project narratives that are aligned in their basic framework of causes, actors, and potential 
action, they can then work to achieve non-violent change in the global system. I address this 
more fully in the limitations but I omit this concept for two reasons. First, my data set is 
relatively limited in terms of length and lacks the robustness to make any clear claims about the 
possibilities of narrative alignment. Oil, for example, is unlikely to see such alignment given the 
vicissitudes of the market. Second, the degree to which narratives allow cooperative state action 
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is not the subject of this dissertation, the degree to which IBs project state power and serve state 
interests is. Future scholarship based on these ideas may incorporate this alignment, but here the 
focus remains steadfastly on state’s and the factors that shape IB content in service of that state.  
Likewise, I have avoided the use of a strict narrative analysis. Narrative analysis has a 
long history in rhetorical criticism (Fisher 1984) and a developing one in international relations 
(Hayden 2013b). While narrative analysis is an important approach I have not used it for two key 
reasons. First, Hayden’s application views “narrative as a kind of independent variable for 
influence” (2013b, 5). Neither influence, or a narratives effectiveness, nor the larger 
epistemological questions thinkers like or Fisher examine are the primary focus here. Instead we 
are examining the degree to which IB content conforms to sponsor policy as well as how IBs use 
journalism as a projection of state power. On the question of power CDA is more useful, being 
specifically attuned to questions of power through language. In any case, new work has 
suggested that narrative analysis and CDA can be fruitfully combined (Souto-Manning 2014), 
but narrative analysis remains outside the scope of this project. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter shows that states create and fund broadcasters to shape the views of foreign 
publics, to improve the sponsor’s ability to act and exert power in the international system. 
However, broadcasters are also, typically, 24-hour news channels and face similar pressures as 
their private cousins, such as issues of credibility, access to news events, and competition. 
Scholars who examine international broadcasting illustrate this bifurcation. Scholars of strategic 
narratives, public diplomacy, and contra-flow connect IBs to states while global media studies 
analyze them as components of the global media system. They are in fact both; and 
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understanding state power projection via IB requires seeing them as outlets for journalism as 
well as instruments of the state. Combining literatures that examine IBs alternatively as 
instruments of government as well as journalism outlets is not the only contribution this study 
makes. I also situated international broadcasting within the broader marketization and 
neoliberalization of both national and international media. I showed that in the realm of 
economics, states act but are acting within a system that they may have had a limited role in 
creating and now have a direct stake in. In turn, these literatures – strategic narratives, global 
media study, and neoliberal critique – emphasized the importance of language as a means of 
achieving state goals and projecting state power. Methodologically, I drew from the strongest 
theoretical and analytical scholarship on IBs and melded them to provide a holistic analysis of IB 
content.  
Nevertheless, there are several limitations to my content and discourse oriented approach. 
Because I am using a discourse analytic method, this dissertation does not explore reception 
(Geniets 2013) or the journalistic culture of these networks (Figenschou 2012). This project will 
need to rely on extant analysis of reception and the history and funding models for these 
networks to fill those gaps. Following from the previous limitation, this study is not contributing 
new knowledge of the networks’ structure or working culture. As such, it is not possible to 
determine the extent to which journalists understand their role in terms of theories of soft power, 
contra-flow, or strategic narratives. As such, any claims must be limited to broadcaster output. In 
addition, because this study does not engage with reception, I cannot verify that non-academic 
viewers will share my interpretations of a given news item. However, deep analysis of content is 
often the first step in proposing ideas for reception studies or news room ethnographies (Fürsich 
2009). Official economic communication from a given state is unlikely to comment on how 
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states understand the role of their IB. States are not monolithic and even one such as China, with 
its centralized Party control, has many agencies, bureaus, and layers of governing structures and 
institutions. At most, I can examine content and test the degree to which it conforms to state 
economic policy and rhetoric. While a limitation, I must presume that there is some connection 
between the state and the international broadcaster. Finally, analyzing only specialist economic 
news programs means that the content I examine is for a specialist audience. The operating 
assumption of those scholars who have analyzed IB newscasts (Figenschou 2012; A. Robertson 
2014) or particular news stories (Barkho 2011; Kasmani 2013a) appears to be that more people 
watch newscasts or devote attention to particular stories. In short, the presumed audience for 
these programs is small and any claim I can make as to the reach of the content must also be 
small. 
This dissertation also has a weakness in terms of what it can tell us about state 
perceptions of international broadcasting. Unlike Hayden’s (2011, 2013a) rhetorical analyses of 
policy discourse, this project analyzes the outputs from international broadcasters as a reflection 
of those policies. While both objects are connected, my analysis cannot answer the question of 
how states view the content of their IB or if they approve of it, we can only infer if they do.  
While these limitations are real, they do not fundamentally undermine the argument I 
have presented so far. IBs reflects both state interests and journalism norms; they serve two 
masters or purposes so to speak. However, the IBs – AJE, CCTV, DW, and RT – are also 
institutions, and they reflect the circumstances of their founding, their funding, their staffs, and 
the broader political and economic goals of their sponsors. These factors, in addition to a 
broadcaster’s status as news outlet and state project, influence and shape the form of the channel 
and, ultimately, their content.  
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3 THE RISE OF THE NETWORKS 
International broadcasters are unique among media organizations; they are constrained 
not only by the political and economic dictates of their state funding bodies but also by the 
journalistic norms of their sponsoring state and trends in global news flows. They are neither 
solely media nor solely governmental organizations – but must serve as both in order to secure 
audiences in a crowded global media environment and to retain and expand funding from their 
government sponsors who have ever-evolving foreign policy goals and priorities. While the bulk 
of this dissertation is concerned with exploring the extent to which the content of international 
broadcasters conforms to broader perceptions of these organizations as sources of state power 
articulation and public diplomacy, this chapter is focused on the organizational and institutional 
factors that shape that content. It provides critical context that will help to round out the analysis 
of broadcaster content in Chapters 4-6. The Chapter also provides concrete information on each 
network’s founding, funding, and the larger bureaucratic context of its sponsoring state. The goal 
is to situate each network in a larger world of international broadcasting specifically, public 
diplomacy generally, and specific state policies states designed them to, theoretically, project. It 
provides this analysis in three parts: First, I situate each broadcaster individually with the broader 
history of international broadcasting as well as the specific exigencies that led to their founding 
as well as the national media systems of their state sponsors. Second, I examine each sponsoring 
state’s public diplomacy programs to contextualize their international broadcasting efforts. Third, 
I examine the economic policies and interests of the state sponsors to provide a baseline against 
which to test the extent of broadcaster conformity to state interests.    
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3.1 International Broadcasters and National Media Systems 
States develop international broadcasting capacities as responses to exigencies in the 
international political system when political leaders see that reaching foreign publics may be 
necessary to achieve policy goals. While propaganda has existed for centuries (Jowett and 
O’Donnell 1999), radio signaled a new potential for mass persuasion. Subsequently, and when 
the states of Europe developed IB radio networks in the 1920, they served a variety of purposes 
from wartime and political propaganda to colonial administration (Taylor 1990). The BBC, 
founded in 1932 to combat Nazi influence, established many of the principals for subsequent IBs 
and remains today the prototypical international broadcasting network. IBs flourished in the 
wake of WWII. Both the US and Soviet Union developed networks as part of their respective 
Cold War policies. The US launched Voice of America in 1947 as a means of combating Soviet 
influence in countries where media systems were tightly controlled. The US followed VOA up 
with several radio networks dedicated to particular regions like Radio Free Europe (1949) and 
Radio Marti (1983) that responded to the particular political context of the target region (Heil 
2003).The conclusion of the Cold War undermined the urgency of networks like VOA and Radio 
Free Europe. Some in government felt new private networks like CNN, carried by satellite 
around the world, could accomplish the goals of VOA (Price 2003) and American and British 
funding for IBs fell in the 1990s as a result (Cull 2009a). Events such as the Arab Spring, the 
Color revolutions in Eastern Europe, and the war in Iraq, however, prompted the USA, Russia, 
China, Germany, Venezuela, Iran, and France to either reinvigorate or found new international 
broadcasters built on a 24-hour television news model (Geniets 2013; P. M. Seib 2010). These 
new channels, marked a new age of international broadcasting in a significantly more complex 
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media environment (see for example Price 2014; Rai and Cottle 2007; Roselle, Miskimmon, and 
O’Loughlin 2014).24 
As this section will demonstrate, each of these broadcasters are best understood when 
viewed in the context of their peer institutions, the normative domestic conditions that limit or 
propel their respective missions, and the particular journalism culture of their newsrooms. VOA, 
for example, committed itself to providing “accurate, objective, and comprehensive” news while 
also representing American values, such as journalistic objectivity, abroad (Heil 2003, 65). Voice 
of America’s commitment to accurate journalism, and the countervailing pressure to be an 
effective policy tool, reflected the values of American media. Likewise, the networks analyzed 
here reflect the prevailing media system norms (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 2012) and public 
diplomacy practices of their sponsoring state.  
While they did not examine IBs, Hallin and Mancini’s model for comparing media 
systems provides a useful framework with which to begin my analysis of the institutional context 
of each broadcaster. Specifically, their work is avowedly comparative in approach, which 
“sensitizes” researchers to similarities and differences between systems, and allows for a fuller 
testing of hypotheses than single nation studies and lets me respond to calls from other scholars 
for more comparative work (Meng and Rantanen 2015). Their typology contains four 
dimensions: the development and structure of media markets (the degree to which a mass 
circulation press developed); political parallelism (the degree to which the media system reflects 
the political system and its stakeholders); professionalization (composed of the factors that make 
journalism distinct profession such as autonomy from other professions, distinct professional 
                                                 
24 I am not trying to say that these event are the same, the world is very different from the 1920s. 
Nevertheless, it is worth considering that technological change over time does have a relationship with the 
decision of states, NGOs, and other actors to engage in communication across borders.  
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norms, public service orientation, and the potential for instrumentalization by the government); 
and the role of the state (characterized by the legal, social, and economic frameworks states 
implement to govern media). Some measures, like role of the state, may seem inappropriate as 
states founded and financed all of these networks. However, IB are not cookie cutter 
organizations. Each broadcaster is legislatively and legally tied to their state sponsor in different 
ways. Neither are journalists tabula rasas who mindlessly repeat a broadcaster’s editorial 
positions. As Robertson argues, “understanding power relations [between media and other 
actors] should thus maintain an analytical distinction between” media institutions and the 
journalists who staff them (2015, 55).  
 
3.1.1 Russia Today 
Founded in 2005, Russia Today is part of a broad strategy to counter perceived Western 
media bias against Russia. Central to this feeling was the Russian belief that Western reporting 
on Russia’s involvement in the Ukrainian Orange Revolution was unfairly negative and 
represented weakness in Russian “political technologies” of information management (Saari 
2014). With these criticisms in mind, the Russian state threw its weight behind founding RT to 
cover “stories overlooked by the mainstream media to create news with an edge” and provide an 
“alternative perspective on major global events, and acquaint international audiences with a 
Russian viewpoint” (“About RT” 2016). RT is the foremost component of Russian plans to 
counter Western news; as Dmitry Peskov, a Kremlin spokesperson, said in 2016 “We are 
currently in a state of information warfare with the trend-setters in the information space, most 
notably with the Anglo-Saxons, their media” (RT 2016). The Kremlin has amply funded that 
war.  
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RT claims to use a combination of private and public funding, however, Geniets (2013) 
suggests that the reality is somewhat different. RT is largely state-funded, but its private funding 
originates from banks and commercial entities with close ties to Putin and his United Russia 
Party. The network is operated by RIA Novosti, the state owned and operated press agency, 
which was placed under the Press and Information Ministry by Presidential decree in 1991 
(Geniets 2013). RT’s budget has gone from US$30 million in 2005 to US$300 million in 2013 
and was expected to rise again for 2015 (Rawnsley 2015b). Studios in New York, London, and 
Moscow broadcast in English, Arabic, and Spanish. 
RT’s funding and position in the Russian media system reflects their relatively high 
degree of political parallelism and government intervention. Vartanova (2012), using and 
updating media systems theory, characterized this as a “statist commercialized” system in which 
high levels of commercialization and economic pressure coexist with a superior role for the state 
and the political-business elite who define the informal and formal rules that shape media 
content. This means that both high levels of political parallelism, which means news aligns itself 
closely with Putin’s United Russia party, and media market development, which means a high 
degree of commercial pressure, particularly in television, combine in a state control apparatus. 
The state reportedly controls 80% of Russian media either through direct ownership, subsidy, or 
through the informal rules that govern the limits of acceptable political conversation in Russia 
(Sakwa 2014). These structural factors cause news outlets to self-censor; their content typically 
avoids criticism of the government. The role of Vladimir Putin in centralizing and constraining 
media activity in Russia is difficult to overstate.25 Indeed some of his first and most controversial 
                                                 
25 Vartanova (2012) is also careful to note that even Putin has not completely constrained political 
factionalism, merely severely restrained it. Media outlets exist who are willing to criticize Putin and the 
Russian state, but always mindful of the informal restrictions that guide such actions.  
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political actions involved punishing dissident oligarchs and placing media holdings under gas 
company, Gazprom (Sakwa 2014). Given their history as an autocratic and then communist state, 
Russia had late media market development and journalistic professionalism. This means that 
Russian journalists operate under twin pressures of the market and the state, with younger 
journalists sometimes eschewing a public service role (Erzikova and Lowrey 2010) and 
journalists’ work is tightly intertwined with the interests of the state (Roudakova 2009). RT’s 
journalists, however, appear to be mostly Western, specifically British and American, but 
features of the Russian media system do shine through, particularly the informal rules that keep 
Russia off the channel’s radar, the presence of younger journalists in key positions, and a focus 
on Russia’s geopolitical rivals.  
Russia Today broadcasts it programming 24 hours a day and focuses predominantly on 
political news. Avgerinos (2009) and Rawnsley (2015b) note, and my subsequent analysis 
shows, that RT’s programming is fixated on North America and Europe, not typically reporting 
on Russia directly, except in the case of an ongoing news event like the Ukraine crisis (Price 
2014) or relations with its “near-abroad” in the Baltic Sea region (Borchers 2011). Unlike AJE or 
CCTV, who have programing dedicated to specific geographic regions like 101 East or Spectrum 
Asia, RT’s programming does not directly focus on particular regions. In addition to political 
debate and interview programming common on other networks, RT has political comedy 
programs such as Redacted Tonight and News Thing as well as programs headed by recognizable 
British and American political or media figures. For example, former professional wrestler and 
Minnesota governor Jesse “the Body” Ventura hosts Off the Grid and former Respect Party 
British MP George Galloway hosts Sputnik, and venerable US interviewer Larry King hosts two 
programs. Despite the presence of Larry King, most RT journalists are actually young, 
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inexperienced, and Anglo-American. Editor in Chief Margarita Simonyan, for example, was only 
25 when appointed to her post. She subsequently took out ads in the British Guardian newspaper 
and staffed RT with young British and American journalism majors, most of whom were straight 
out of graduate programs (Bullough 2013). It is not clear why RT’s Russian managers would hire 
Simonyan given her lack of experience, but this is indicative of the larger muddled structure of 
RT itself.  
The actual organizational structure of RT is somewhat opaque, as is information on their 
journalism culture, and the majority of evidence either for or against the independence of its 
journalists is anecdotal. At its founding in 2005, the majority of RT on air talent came from the 
UK, and were often fresh out of advanced journalistic training (Bullough 2013), in turn 
suggesting that they have low professional capital. Ioffe (2010), a vociferous critic of Putin, 
claims that RT reporter William Dunbar was reprimanded for reporting rumors that Russian 
forces had inadvertently bombed Georgian territory during the South Ossetia War in 2008. 
Dunbar subsequently tendered his resignation. Ioffe has also claimed that Simonyan has regular, 
maybe daily, meetings with Kremlin officials. On the other hand, correspondent Abby Martin, 
who criticized Russia’s policies live on air during the Ukraine crisis, defended her editorial 
independence and freedom of action while working at the network. During an interview for On 
the Media, Martin claimed she worked with “passionate American journalists,” who, “can speak 
out against different things that other corporate entities can't speak out against that are beholden 
to their advertisers or parrot the establishment line” (Mayer 2014). She also argued that speaking 
positively about Russia was the price one paid to work in media, where money comes from 
“questionable entities” that limit a reporter’s ability to speak truth to power (Mayer 2014).26 
                                                 
26 Despite Martin’s claim during the interview that her bosses accepted her on air editorializing, her 
program Breaking the Set last aired on February 28, 2015, just shy of one year after her on air statements.  
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Whoever’s interpretation one chooses to believe, the precise relationship between individual 
journalists and RT’s executive structure remains unclear, however, it is possible that the same 
informal rules of self-censorship that pertain in domestic Russian television (Vartanova 2015) 
also apply to RT’s staff. However, Martin’s statements hint that the American and British 
journalists who staff RT have made a calculation; to report on under covered American and 
British policies and issues they are willing to accept Simonyan’s and other managers’ mission to 
question Anglo-American news norms. 
Russia Today developed out of Russia’s journalistic tradition where journalists work 
under conditions characterized by high levels of political parallelism, and thus deference to the 
state and its managers, while also lacking a clear tradition of journalistic professionalism. High 
levels of commercialization push journalism towards tabloidization while close connections 
between media oligarchs and Russian government leaders keep criticism of the state to a 
minimum. To be sure, the financial pressures Russian domestic media operate under are less 
important given RT’s state funding. In addition, RT journalists often come from the developed 
West and received training in the Western journalistic tradition and Abby Martin’s comments 
suggest that they see themselves not as dupes but as intrepid journalists unearthing 
uncomfortable truths (Mayer 2014). RT’s management, however, comes out of the Russian 
media system and presumably expects an appropriate amount of deference to the interests of the 
Russian state. These countervailing pressures may account for various on air resignations by RT 
journalists. While on the ground interviews are needed to test manager to journalist relations, RT 
clearly relies on Putin and his regime to set a tone for journalists to follow and self-censor, 
giving RT latitude to frame news according to Russia’s political interests. 
 
81 
 
3.1.2 Al-Jazeera English 
Founded in 2005, Al-Jazeera English is part of the larger Al-Jazeera media conglomerate, 
sponsored by the ruling Al-Thani family of Qatar. The network bills itself as “the voice of the 
voiceless,” and claims to report more from the Global South. In order to truly understand AJE, 
one must actually begin with its older Arabic language sister station (AJA) as the former grew 
directly from the latter.27 Following a bloodless coup against his father in 1995, Sheikh Hamad 
bin Khalifa al-Thani, motivated by a desire to modernize, democratize, and enhance the power of 
his tiny kingdom, offered US$140 million to create Al-Jazeera (El-Nawawy and Iskander 2002). 
Into this mix, 150 BBC-trained and mostly Arab journalists, released from a defunct 
British/Saudi media venture, provided Western journalistic training to compliment al-Thani’s 
directive that AJ coverage would be independent from government interference (Powers 2012). 
AJA’s openness complimented Qatar’s larger foreign policy role as mediator between rival states 
and political factions as well as a safe haven for divergent opinions in the Middle East (Fromherz 
2012; Khatib 2013). Nevertheless, the openness and public service orientation stands in stark 
contrast to Qatari control of domestic media and foreign journalists. 
Following 9/11 and the subsequent US invasion of Afghanistan, Al-Jazeera Arabic found 
itself inundated with calls from English speakers asking for information and international news 
outlets interested in buying the network’s visuals, at that point the only from Taliban controlled 
territory (Powers 2012). The interest from Westerners and their news organizations enticed the 
station’s managers to repackage Arabic content with English subtitles. As Powers (2012) reports, 
                                                 
27 The only other station analyzed here that really seems to follow this kind of organic offshoot growth is 
China’s CCTV International as the network comes out of the official Chinese broadcaster CCTV. 
However, unlike CCTV, AJ was always intended to be a tool of public diplomacy whereas CCTV was 
charged with fulfilling this role after the institution had already been established for Chinese domestic 
audiences. 
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this strategy failed to take into account the differing narratives Western audiences might expect. 
Emir Khalifa lent his support, and reportedly US$1 billion, to create a fully-fledged English 
language news station, separate from the Arab staff who had blazed the trail of BBC style 
journalism in the Middle East. 
Al-Jazeera’s funding comes from the Emir of Qatar through a grant system; and the 
various channels earn some revenue through advertising and cable fees, though precise numbers 
can be difficult to come by (Geniets 2013). The Emir reportedly gives a US$100 million annual 
grant to the network (Powers 2012). In addition, al-Thani issued a directive that AJ coverage 
would be independent from government interference (Powers 2012). In this sense, Qatar might 
be one of the freest countries in the Middle East. On the other hand, Qatar ranks 115 out of 180 
countries on press freedom (Reporters Without Borders 2015a). All media are subject to 
censorship from the government (Freedom House 2015b). In this sense, there is little if any 
domestic media market development and little journalistic professionalism. At least two heads of 
the Doha Center for Media Freedom have been dismissed for criticizing the Qatari regime, 
presumably with irony (Freedom House 2015b; Jalbert 2009), suggesting a high degree of 
political parallelism and state intervention. Finally, foreign journalists have been detained for 
reporting on labor abuses related to construction activities for the 2022 Qatar World Cup, itself a 
centerpiece of Qatar’s PD efforts (Reporters Without Borders 2015b). While the various Al-
Jazeera channels claim to have independence from the interests of Qatar’s rulers, some 
scholarship and recent events suggest that the leadership uses the channel to achieve foreign 
policy goals. Samuel-Aran’s analysis suggests that AJA coverage of Saudi Arabia is “limited by 
the boundaries of Qatar’s crucial interests,” but “operates as a private network on most affairs” 
(Samuel-Azran 2013, 1307). Likewise, the leaked US State Department cables suggested that 
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Qatari royals pressured Al-Jazeera to tone down their coverage of the Saudis and calls their 
independence into question (Booth 2010; NDTV 2010).  
In addition to potential governmental interference, Al-Jazeera faces challenges due to 
falling oil prices and an unstable Middle East. While the English wing of the network gained 
attention for their coverage of the Egyptian uprising in 2011, their dedicated American channel 
failed to attract audiences and folded in 2016 amidst allegations of sexual harassment and 
mismanagement (Greenwald 2016; Ibish 2016). Several Arab states, including Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain charge Al-Jazeera with pro Muslim Brotherhood 
bias in its news and support for rebel groups in Syria, charges that caused some states to recall 
ambassadors (Bakr 2014). Former Al-Jazeera English journalist Mohamed Fahmy, at the time of 
writing on trial in Egypt for spying said that the “Arabic station redubbed our English-language 
news packages with inflammatory commentary” and accused them of using the English arm of 
the broadcaster to meddle in Egyptian politics (2015). When Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani 
became Emir in 2013 reports claimed that he wanted to “quiet down” the channel’s coverage. 
Hafez al-Mirazi, formerly of AJA, says the channel made “‘Qatar a household name, influencing 
politics, at one point it was a powerful tool of foreign policy but all of that is over now’” and that 
job cuts were on the horizon (quoted in Finn 2016). Taken together, the evidence suggests that 
AJE has more independence than its sister Arabic channel has, but that their relative freedom 
faces greater restrictions and greater financial difficulties than in the past that undermine their 
journalism model.  
Al-Jazeera follows a “public service” model of journalism oriented to reporting on under 
analyzed parts of the world, with particular attention to underrepresented viewpoints. Within this 
model, journalists have, in theory, a great deal of freedom to pursue stories that interest them. 
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Nevertheless, we have seen AJA’s coverage of Saudi Arabia often reflected Qatar’s rivalry with 
their neighbor (Samuel-Azran 2013). When the AJ entered the American market with Al-Jazeera 
America (AJAM), managers endeavored to make the network as American as possible, 
eschewing the hard hitting journalism that made it famous in the Arab world (Greenwald 
2016).28 These two points taken together suggest that AJ is more open to government 
intervention and journalistic instrumentalization than the managers back in Doha would likely 
admit. 
Al-Jazeera English broadcasts 24-hours a day out of Doha, London, Washington D.C., and 
Kuala Lumpur. Their programming tends to focus on political magazine and chat shows, but also 
covers technology, health, and the environment as well as geographically focused programming, 
primarily on Asia and Africa. Cohen and Atad (Cohen and Atad 2013) claim that the roughly 
26% of AJE’s news items focus on Arab League members, indicating that a great deal of content 
focuses on the network’s region of origin.  
One of Al-Jazeera’s hallmarks is its hiring of local journalists to increase it’s on the ground 
knowledge and credibility. According to El-Nawayay and Iskander (2002), Al-Jazeera resonated 
with Arab audiences in large part because it contained reporting by fellow Arabs about their 
concerns and interests. While there were controversies when the network branched out into 
English content, the network ultimately hired Waddah Khanfar to run the whole Al-Jazeera 
operation and instill a “public service” ethic in all members of staff. Powers (2012) writes that 
notable Western journalists like Sir David Frost of the BBC and Riz Khan of CNN International, 
were combined with journalists from over 65 different countries to staff the network. This is a 
                                                 
28 As of this writing, AJAM has officially stated that it will terminate all broadcast and internet 
broadcasting sometime in 2016, having failed to gain appreciable market share in the American news 
market. In addition, some employees of the network have sued for sex discrimination. It remains to be 
seen if this means AJE will become available in the American market.  
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similar structure to RT in that the working journalists are not from the state sponsor but the 
managers are. Figenschou’s ethnographic analysis of the AJE newsroom suggests that Western 
journalists’ difficulties in adjusting to their new role on AJE are “symptoms of the structural 
contradictions in the AJE project.” AJE’s editorial line positions the network as an alternative 
news source, “whereas AJE’s editorial agenda and production strategies aim to professionalize 
the alternatives” (Figenschou 2010, 367). As such, while AJE’s journalists operate outside their 
traditional journalism norms and mediate between Qatari interests and global publics accustomed 
to specific news norms.    
Unlike the other broadcasters I selected, Al-Jazeera in either English or Arabic does not 
clearly derive from Qatari journalistic traditions. While Qatar is, like many Middle Eastern 
states, autocratic in terms of free speech, AJ’s editorial independence and ability to question the 
shibboleths of Gulf states is what made it popular in the first place (Sakr 2007). The mechanisms 
that influence channels like CCTV, such as their media system model and journalism norms, are 
not present in the same way for AJE. While Qatar’s press freedoms are week, AJE journalists 
have a relatively free hand to report what they wish. Qatar possesses no indigenous journalistic 
tradition to draw on – as China, Russia, and Germany do – and so they imported one from their 
former British colonial master. In a sense, this means Qatar operates two media systems, one 
typically Middle Eastern characterized by high levels of state intervention and political 
parallelism, and AJ characterized by British journalism norms. This is not to say that AJE is free 
from interference, as we have seen above, but that the degree to which the channels serves as a 
direct articulation of Qatari interests is less a result of media system influence and more likely to 
reflect direct interference.  
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3.1.3 Deutsche Welle 
Founded in 1953 as a German language radio network by West Germany, Deutsche Welle 
is the only network analyzed here that started outside of television. Given the channel’s age, its 
purpose and editorial line have changed over the decades. DW’s early German language 
broadcasting served a rehabilitating role for West Germany following World War II and during 
the Cold War (Geniets 2013). The channel began television broadcasting in 1992 and after the 
end of the Cold-War shifted its focus from rehabilitation to communicating a broader European 
framework of values (Brüggemann and Schulz-Forberg 2009). The 2004 Deutsche Welle Gesetz 
(Deutsche Welle Law)29 codifies the network’s mission to “convey the image of Germany as a 
cultural state in the European tradition and as a free and democratic constitutional state” 
(German Federal Republic 2004, 8). In addition, the law gives DW a mission to provide a 
“forum in Europe and on other continents” for the exchange of ideas concerning politics, 
economics, and culture. DW also promotes the German language facilitates Germany’s 
international development goals (Połońska-Kimunguyi 2015).  
DW receives annually approved funding from the Bundestag, with a budget around €271 
million per year (Geniets 2013). Merkel recently has pushed for greater funding to counter 
Russian PD efforts (Gummer 2015). DW is, thus, subject to the interests of the German 
government and potentially not as free from interference or instrumentalization as its 
constitutional protections might suggest. 
Constitutional protection, editorial independence, and a high level of professionalism 
characterize Germany’s press system. Germany’s press market developed early, and this is 
reflected in the high level of political parallelism in the media with several newspapers and 
                                                 
29 I have seen gesetz translated as “law” (Geniets 2013) or “act” (2016) and will use them interchangeably 
as meaning is not really affected. 
87 
 
broadcast outlets catering to various shades of the political spectrum (Hallin and Mancini 2004). 
While the press market is competitive (Freedom House 2015a), Germany, like most European 
states, has a strong public service broadcasting tradition, though it is facing greater commercial 
pressure (Jakubowicz 2010). The Deutsche Welle Gesetz makes the channel unique amongst the 
others analyzed here in that the German Constitution guaranteed and codified its editorial 
independence in law. In Section 2, Subsection 1, § 26 of the Gesetz guarantees the editorial 
“independence” of managers and journalists and several other clauses limit certain actions, like 
seeking sponsors, when they diminish that independence. In addition, Article 5 of the German 
Constitution guarantees DW’s, and all other German media, freedom from censorship. This 
makes DW the only network analyzed here that can appeal to a broader constitutional framework 
to secure its interests and independence. At the same time, DW fulfills a key role in Germany’s 
broader public diplomacy strategies. Zöllner quotes then director-general of DW Bettermann as 
saying DW “conveys a part of the Federal Republic of Germany’s significance and all her social 
and political positions” (2006b, 171). Among these are development in Africa (Połońska-
Kimunguyi 2015) and cultural dialogue between the Western and Muslim worlds (Zöllner 
2006b). Recent tensions between Russia and Germany over Ukraine and migration have led 
Merkel to advocate for a new multimedia outlet called DWNews, which DW President Peter 
Limbourg says is meant to “‘defy Putin’s propaganda’” (Gummer 2015).  
DW broadcasts 24-hours a day in English, Spanish, German, and Arabic and is based in 
Bonn and Berlin, and has bureaus in Washington D.C., Brussels, and most recently, Moscow. 
The network’s programming, befitting its editorial mission to represent both Germany and 
Europe, has several programs that focus on European politics, culture, and arts. Other programs 
focus on Germany specifically. It also is the only channel with a program devoted to 
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automobiles, perhaps reflecting Germany’s automotive heritage. DW also airs the usual array of 
chat, debate, interview, and politics programming.  
DW journalists come from over 60 countries (Deutsche Welle 2012). For example, Sumi 
Somaskanda is a newsreader for DW who was raised in New York State, while Phil Gayle is a 
British sports caster. Examination of news presenter profiles further indicates that most have 
journalism training and extensive experience (Deutsche Welle 2015a). As with DW’s funding 
model and relationship to the state, the level of journalistic independence at DW is unlike the 
other networks analyzed here. The Deutsche Welle Gesetz and Article 5 guarantee editorial and 
journalistic independence and so the suspicion that RT, CCTV, and AJE coverage receives is less 
common. Silcock’s (2002) ethnographic study, however, suggests that foreign reporters at DW 
must work to bring their stories in line with a German perspective on reporting, which 
historicizes events as a means to contextualize the news in line with the German mythic past. 
The example he uses is of Daniel Goldhagen’s book tour for Hitler's Willing Executioners: 
Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust. While both Anglo30 and German news producers felt the 
tour was newsworthy, “Germans saw the story as an opportunity to expose a challenge to their 
national past as such… Anglos saw the Goldhagen story as one about an individual challenging 
the consensus of the group” (Silcock 2002, 345). While German producers rejected the idea that 
the government enforced picking and framing stories based on German history, Anglos 
sometimes reported feeling frustrated with having to conform to German, over international, 
expectations for news reporting. While most DW journalists come from the developed West, this 
does not mean that there is alignment between station managers and journalists. At the same 
time, most of their journalists, and all in Made in Germany were European or German 
                                                 
30 In Silcock’s article, “Anglo” simply means English speaker or non-German, and is used to describe 
Americans and English.  
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specifically. DW journalists, then, are diverse but also reflect the differences in Western 
journalism broadly. In all, even if the government does not mandate story selection, the culture 
of the DW newsroom suggests that, at least at the time of Silcock’s writing, that cultural 
pressures constrained DW journalists.  
Germany’s media system encompasses a well-developed media market with high levels 
of political parallelism with a pluralist political framework. Even though media reflects political 
parties, low levels of state intervention mean that media mirrors the interests of various segments 
of the political spectrum. International broadcasting complicates these presumptions. Germany is 
not financing several different broadcasters to accurately reflect the panoply of German political 
opinion and, therefore, we should question which specific political beliefs DW projects. In 
addition, Germany serves a useful function in this dissertation as a representative of democratic 
values of freedom of expression notably absent in the other states analyzed herein. Whereas 
Chinese journalists see little conflict between promoting government policy and journalistic 
professionalism, German journalists reflect a tradition of objective if partisan reporting. In other 
words, while its is reasonable to assume that CCTV’s content will reflect Chinese interests, DW 
content will likely reflect tensions between government interests and journalistic 
professionalism.  
 
3.1.4 China Central Television 
Unlike the other networks analyzed here, CCTV International is an outgrowth of the 
Chinese domestic broadcasting system. Established in 1958 as Beijing TV Station, CCTV served 
the information management and propaganda role of the media system in Cold-War era 
communist countries (Zhao 2012). CCTV and China’s wider public diplomacy efforts, much like 
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Russia’s motivation behind RT, reflect the CPC’s concerns with China’s image abroad and was a 
prime factor in their support for public diplomacy in general and the expansion of CCTV in 
particular. The 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations, and the negative international attention 
following their suppression, signaled to the CPC that China needed to be proactive in 
disseminating its policy positions abroad as well as building a positive image of China more 
generally. Additionally, the discourse of the “China Threat,” popularized in the West convinced 
Chinese leaders of the need to communicate with foreign publics (Shambaugh 2013). CCTV 
began international broadcasting in 1992, using Mandarin and targeting Taiwan, Macao, Hong 
Kong, and large overseas Chinese populations (X. Zhang 2011; Zhu 2012). The first English 
language broadcasts came as early as 1986 with an English translation of the National News 
Bulletin, but serious efforts to create an English language news station began in 1996. In the 
early 2000’s, CCTV’s English channel was given a basic remit to present China “objectively” to 
the world and to become a credible international news station along the lines of Al-Jazeera and 
BBC, pursuing accurate and timely news (Shambaugh 2013; Zhu 2012). The network’s 
promotional material describes the channel as “your link to Asia” and “China's contribution to 
greater diversity and wider perspectives in the global information flow,” with a special focus on 
Chinese news and events (CCTV 2010).  
The actual level of funding for the channel is not available, but Shambaugh (2013), citing 
an interview he conducted with Qiao Mu of the Beijing Foreign Studies University, claimed that 
the 2009 budget for the “Big Four” Beijing based outlets was RMB60 billion or US$8.79 
billion.31 All news media in China are officially state run, though this does not mean that there is 
ideological homogeneity in the Chinese media system (Zhao 2012). CCTV’s English and foreign 
                                                 
31 The Big Four are Xinhua News Agency, The People’s Daily, China Radio International, and China 
Central Television. 
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language channels serve as an interesting illustration of the flexibility of the Chinese media 
system and those who staff them, while at the same time illustrating the high degree of 
parallelism between government and media outlets. 
Zhao argues that understanding the Chinese media system requires scholars to move 
beyond frameworks that see state intervention as antithetical to journalism and to capitalist 
development. Instead she suggests that the CPC’s “regime of control has been both a 
precondition and a consequence of China’s accelerated development in the post-1989 era” (2012, 
150). As with Russia, the media market in China is large and subject to commercial pressures as 
well as direct political pressure. But unlike Russia, the CPC owns all news media and provides a 
framework of journalistic ethics grounded in a hybrid of Confucian and Marxist values with a  
strong public service orientation (Zhao 2012).32 CCTV, therefore, seems to hybridize the 
imagery and style of Western news, but remains very much understood by its Chinese staff, at 
least, as a tool to inform foreigners in the same way the state informs Chinese citizens. In this 
sense, China’s journalists view themselves as professional and even independent, but their 
professional identity remains interwoven with a communist ideological framework that 
emphasizes state development over criticism of the state. 
CCTV’s external broadcasting, as an arm of Chinese public diplomacy, falls under the 
State Council of Information Office (SCIO) as well as the State Administration of Radio, Film, 
and Television (SARFT). As such, journalists working for the network understand their purpose 
is to promote China’s image abroad, not to provide confrontational watchdog news coverage. At 
the same time, managers at CCTV have made substantive efforts to shed the older Stalinist style 
                                                 
32 The cases of both Russia and China are especially instructive when considering the relationship 
between markets and states. In both, the state had a dominant role in media systems before reforms, but in 
the Chinese case the state maintains part of its legitimacy by controlling media directly whereas Russia 
uses informal systems of control (Meng and Rantanen 2015). 
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propaganda formats that defined Chinese news in the past in favor of more recognizably Western 
style journalism. Under the doctrine of nei wai you bie different standards are applied to internal 
versus external communications and as such CCTV-International has more leeway than domestic 
broadcasting in its coverage (Zhu 2012).33 For example, in 2003 the channel was revamped and 
began hiring foreign news anchors, an unprecedented step in Chinese media history (X. Zhang 
2011). Taking a lighter approach with the IB wing of CCTV allows the channel to adopt the 
visual and journalistic idioms of the West, such as the unscripted on air interview, and thus 
potentially increases credibility with foreign audiences while remaining consistent with Chinese 
journalism norms (Rawnsley 2015b).  
CCTV broadcasts 24 hours a day and has a wide range of programming, in contrast to the 
very specific focus seen in RT. The channel broadcasts out of Beijing in six languages including 
Arabic and Spanish. Where CCTV particularly stands out, however, is its very clear focus on 
China specifically, Asia in general, and African affairs. For example, the channel has no fewer 
than three programs devoted to Africa,34 four programs devoted specifically to Chinese news and 
culture,35 and three devoted to Asian news broadly.36 There are also many debate and chat 
programs as well as dedicated sports and business news. Based on programming, it appears that 
CCTV’s managers have taken their mission to make the channel a peer of mainstays like AJE, 
CNN, and BBC seriously, designing a diverse line of programs one might expect to see on any 
24-hour news channel. 
                                                 
33 However, the following subsection on broader PD efforts shows that CPC ideological view of the role 
of journalism in a society is not explicitly affected by differing strategies to communicate with foreign 
audiences.  
34 These programs are Africa Live, Talk Africa, and Faces of Africa. 
35 These programs are My China, China Insight, China 24, and Closer to China. 
36 The programs include Spectrum Asia, Assignment Asia, and Asia Today 
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CCTV’s modernization extends to the reporters they hire. Zhu (2012) reports that there 
were at least a dozen foreign copy editors and anchors during a research visit in 2009 including 
New Zealand journalist Edwin Maher who works as an anchor and voice coach.37 Other foreign 
journalists include Beatrice Marshall, a Kenyan who hosts Africa Live, and Anand Naidoo, a 
South African host of The Heat. Both hosts have experience at other broadcasters like KTN 
Kenya and CNN respectively. Zhang (2011) suggests that many of the networks’ Chinese 
journalists are young and have received training in Western journalism practice. She further 
argues that CCTV journalists adhere to standards of journalistic professionalism and do not 
approve of government interference, but must respond to such interference as a matter of course.  
It isn’t necessarily clear how journalists from places like the United States, New Zealand, 
or Kenya, places where there are press freedoms and differing views of the role of journalism, 
negotiate the twin directives of being a world class news channel while also promoting China, 
which boils down to promoting the CPC and its policies. Zhu (2012) observes that the network 
sends its staff to CNN for training, but that foreign anchors also practice the self-censorship that 
Chinese journalists practice in a domestic context. Jirik claimed that the “Party Line” is enforced 
less through diktats than through a constant pressure not to “make certain kinds of mistakes” 
(2005, 141). In this sense, Zhao (2012) argues Chinese journalists are highly professional in a 
system with a high degree of parallelism. The state in the Chinese context exists in part to 
promote “correct orientation to public opinion” (zhengqu yulun daoxiang) and Chinese 
journalists are a key resource in that process. If their work informs the people and contributes to 
the historical goal of public service as defined by Chinese journalistic history, then the Chinese 
staff of CCTV International may not see promotion of China and the CPC as propaganda in the 
                                                 
37 Zhu relates a story in which she asked Maher how he felt about criticisms from his native country that 
he was a “paid mouthpiece for Chinese propaganda.” His response was “Ah well.” 
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negative sense. Rather they might see it as the application of Chinese journalistic norms on a 
global stage in service to their country. In sum, CCTV’s Chinese managers likely influence 
Chinese journalists through familiar mechanisms seen in authoritarian media systems while 
Western journalists, like their AJE counterparts, must learn to navigate their new environment. 
Concluding this section with China means, in a sense, we have come full circle from 
Russia. These countries share several features: communist history, strong states, domination by 
one political party, and late commercial development. Nevertheless, there are key differences as 
well. Chinese journalism operates under an official state ideology and media outlets remain state 
controlled. Unlike their Russian counterparts, Chinese journalists apparently feel professional as 
they work under a system that seeks more to admonish the government rather than to challenge 
it. In addition, because CCTV International operates within the larger domestic media system as 
a public diplomacy extension, the pressures that shape Chinese media are much more likely to 
influence China’s public diplomacy program as well.  These differences, Zhao (2012) argues, 
reflect the Communist Party’s revulsion to Russia’s post-communist transition and encouraged 
intense, direct state involvement in information management. In these ways, China differs from 
Russia, but also in terms of its public diplomacy as their model derives from a system which 
values and upholds different normative expectations than other states.  
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Table 3.1 Broadcasters by Media System Model 
 AJE CCTV DW RT 
Media Market 
Development 
Weak domestic 
media market 
development 
Late and 
characterized by 
post-communist 
market opening; 
large 
commercial 
section 
High; several 
outlets in open 
competition with 
each other 
Late and 
characterized by 
post-communist 
market opening; 
large 
commercial 
section 
Political 
Parallelism 
High; Qatar 
considered one 
of worst places 
to be a peace 
time journalist 
High; all news 
outlets 
controlled by 
state  
High; news 
outlets reflect 
specific political 
positions 
High; Kremlin 
ensures high 
degree of media 
approval for 
ruling party 
Journalistic 
Professionalism  
Low; AJ hired 
people trained in 
British 
journalism 
tradition 
Moderate; 
Chinese 
journalists train 
according to 
developmental 
and pro-party 
model; CCTV 
journalists 
receive varied 
training from 
Western outlets 
High; journalism 
considered 
autonomous 
profession with 
constitutional 
protections 
Low; post-
communist 
journalists often 
do not question 
state; RT staff 
often from UK 
and USA 
State 
Intervention 
High; journalists 
jailed and 
freedom of 
movement 
curtailed 
Officially media 
is an arm of the 
state 
Low; officially 
illegal for 
private outlets; 
constitutionally 
banned for DW 
Direct 
application of 
state power to 
limit media 
ownership and 
punish dissident 
owners 
 
Each state in this study has a specific media system, important because it provides the 
framework IBs arise out of, particularly in the cases of Germany and China. Qatar imported their 
media system from Britain, but AJE still operates within a highly controlled media system and 
remains subject to those mechanisms. I summarize this information for convenience in Table 3.1. 
While each state’s media system shares some elements, for example high degrees of political 
parallelism – the degree to which media outlets represent various political parties or affiliations. 
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However, they also evince differences in the other three categories, even within similar 
situations. Both Russia and China, for example, are “transitional” states moving towards 
capitalism, but RT hires from the USA and UK more than Russia while CCTV uses more 
Chinese journalists whose training reflects both native and Western traditions. Because 
journalists actually implement the editorial mission of a broadcaster, their training and 
backgrounds represent an important influence on content. This section also illustrated the value 
of comparative work, as Hallin and Mancini (2004) attempted in their original theorization of 
media systems and some thoughts on this serves as a useful coda for this section. The 
comparisons I have made here illustrate the limitations of a normative framework when studying 
international broadcasting. Taking Germany, for example, scholars might analyze it in terms of 
its potential to illustrate the value of German civil society and thereby build the attractiveness of 
German society. Doing so, however, would elide the very real role DW plays as a tool of state 
power. In contrast, Russian and Chinese public diplomacy operates according to normative 
expectations grounded in communist and post-communist frameworks designed to maintain state 
power while transitioning to capitalist relations. In this sense, both have failed to construct public 
diplomacy outlets that increase attractiveness, a point Joseph Nye (2013) has made. Scholars and 
practitioners of public diplomacy may throw up their hands, wondering why they just do not get 
how to appeal to foreign publics. Chinese journalists, however, do not see themselves as pawns 
of the state, but as professionals who help their government and their country by presenting it to 
the world and calling on the state to live up to its function as a protector of the Chinese people. 
Understanding that Chinese journalists work within different normative expectations allows 
researchers to see CCTV not simply as state propaganda, but as an amalgamation of Chinese and 
Western journalistic practice with the purpose of demystifying Chinese state policies. Moreover, 
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it is not just Chinese journalists whose practices require analysis. All of the content analyzed in 
this dissertation was produced by journalists operating in specific newsroom cultures (Hanitzsch 
2011) and function as intermediaries between the desires of their managers and expectations of 
their audiences. Comparison, thereby, allows for nuanced examination of media and public 
diplomacy more capable of accounting for our objects of study than studies of singular nations 
could (Meng and Rantanen 2015). Nevertheless, international broadcasters are not simply 
expressions of media systems, but are also the product of specific government public diplomacy 
programs that also exert pressure on their form, purpose, and content.  
 
3.2 Public Diplomacy and State Interests 
As seen in Chapter 2, American thinkers developed the concepts of public diplomacy and 
soft power (Cull 2009b), and other states have come to adopt them both as necessary and 
valuable means to project state power. However, this does not mean that different states 
understand these concepts in the same way. Because of this, Hayden (2011) suggests, we should 
look to the “rhetoric of public diplomacy,” the ways in which politicians and practitioners 
describe and implement public diplomacy policies, to understand state expectations and plans for 
the various assets and tools they deploy. While individual journalists working for IBs often shun 
the term public diplomacy, IBs are typically considered part of the state’s public diplomacy 
apparatus. What this apparatus entails and how it colors IB practices varies widely.  
As the phrase “rhetoric of public diplomacy” implies, language is, if not everything, at 
least important to how states formulate their public diplomacy. Take, for example, the Chinese 
term xuan chuan, which means “propaganda,” called dui wai xuan chuan for “external 
propaganda.” Propaganda does not contain the negative connotations it does in English, being 
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more like “public relations” in the thinking of Chinese practitioners (Y. Wang 2008, 259). 
Rawnsley (2015b) suggests, Chinese PD practice is grounded in an attitude of “to know us to 
love us,” predicated on the idea that managing information about China will cause foreigners to 
have a more positive evaluation of the country. In contrast, Germans may translate public 
diplomacy directly to öffentliche Diplomatie, or some variation like diplomatische 
Öffentlichkeitsarbeit meaning “diplomatic public relations,” while the German government uses 
auswärtige Kulturpolitik, “cultural policy abroad” (Zöllner 2006b, 162). These terms reflect the 
dual role of German PD to support both foreign and development policy goals by managing 
Germany’s image as well as addressing cultural and economic development in other states. 
Połońska-Kimunguyi (2015) argues that German PD’s Cold War role of fostering dialogue has 
increasingly been combined with the state’s desire to see development in African states, and to 
counteract increasing Chinese presence in that continent, to the point of not presenting Germany 
to Africans, but depicting ways in which Africans could potentially be richer and more 
developed, potentially more German.  
While these translations may seem similar, they reflect ambivalence about how 
governments should conceptualize public diplomacy efforts. In Chinese practice, the goal is to 
manage and improve information about China itself, which is what xuan chuan is for, both 
domestically and internationally (Shambaugh 2013). The German approach directly references 
public relations as a field in some cases, and officially focuses on the “abroad” part of public 
diplomacy, indicating that the government sees the domestic and international spheres as 
fundamentally different.  
Alternatively, Russia uses the terms obshchestvennaya diplomatiya, publichnaya 
diplomatiya, or narodnaya diplomatiya, the latter meaning “people’s diplomacy” when targeting 
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Western states. When referring to Russian PD in the post-Soviet space terms like gumanitarnoe 
sotrudnichestvo, “humanitarian cooperation,” or gumanitarnoe napravlenie “humanitarian trend” 
are used. Saari (2014) suggests that these differing terminologies reflect a soft power oriented 
“Western” strand of PD and a “manipulative” Soviet style of propaganda in post-Soviet 
countries. However, scholars like Borchers (2011) and Pomerantsev (2014) might argue that all 
Russian PD is a form of political technology of manipulation and differences between the West 
and post-Soviet spaces derive from their audience specific messaging. In any case, Russian PD 
has neither the consistency of Chinese PD, nor the ideological content of liberal values seen in 
German PD. In contrast, Qatar configures its public diplomacy and broader foreign policy as a 
mediator between diverse interests and states (Gray 2013).38 Public diplomacy in the Qatari 
model involves removing the Qatari state from most mediated interactions and crafting an open 
space for dialogue, going so far as to pursue relations with Israel (Fromherz 2012). Despite 
having very little real press freedom, Qatar’s PD efforts have thrived on their openness, in 
contrast to Russia’s efforts in its “near-aboard” based on Soviet “political technologies” of 
manipulation. In each case, the state has internalized the value, if not necessarily the term in the 
case of Qatar, of public diplomacy, but also modified it to reflect its particular history and 
interests. In turn, just as I expect their respective media system to shape each IB, the ways states 
comprehend PD and soft power shape their larger PD programs.  
Table 3.2 shows that each state in the study uses relatively similar methods of outreach. All 
have multiple media outreach projects in several languages, finance educational institutions, 
promote people diplomacy with schools or think tanks, and have target audiences in mind for 
these various efforts.  
                                                 
38 Though, as we have seen in the previous section there are many reasons to doubt that Qatari efforts can 
rest on an open mediation model anymore (see also Dickinson 2014). 
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Table 3.2 Sponsoring State Public Diplomacy Programs 
 China Germany Qatar Russia 
Media Outlets Wire services 
(Xinhua), 
Newspapers 
(China Daily and 
People’s Daily), 
Radio (China 
Radio 
International), 
several CCTV 
language specific 
channels 
DW Radio 
particularly in 
Africa, 
DWNews 
Al-Jazeera 
conglomerate, 
includes sports 
and specialty 
language 
channels, AJ+ 
online channel 
Wire services 
(Ruptly, 
Sputnik, RIA 
Novosti), Online 
newspaper 
(Russia Beyond 
the Headlines),  
Educational 
Institutions, 
Language, and 
Think Tanks 
Confucian 
Institutes, 
exchange of 
Chinese 
undergraduates, 
exchange of 
intellectuals  
Provides 
German 
language 
education via 
DW, DW-
Academie for 
media training, 
Goethe Institutes 
Qatar 
Foundation, 
partnerships with 
Western 
universities, 
finances 
academic 
scholarship on 
Qatar, finances 
Museums  
Russkii Mir and 
Russian 
Cooperation 
Agency in post-
Soviet space, 
Institute for 
Democracy and 
Cooperation 
Targeted 
Audiences 
Chinese speakers 
abroad, English 
speaking 
travelers, African 
sub-continent  
African sub-
continent, 
Europeans  
Arabs in 
neighboring 
states, English 
speaking elites 
globally 
Russian 
speakers in 
Baltic, 
Americans and 
Europeans in 
English 
 
Within these activities, however, there are key differences where the varied definitions of 
PD seen above shape practices. Key among these differences is the relative amount of state 
direction of the efforts, depth and breadth of media enterprises, and the value placed on 
particular regions and people as targets for outreach. These differences illustrate the variety of 
ways in which states understand public diplomacy and soft power and provide a standard to 
evaluate the content analyzed in subsequent chapters. 
Joseph Nye (2013), has argued that the greatest source of soft power is an active civil 
society. The paradox of this view is that PD is state originated by definition. Nye further argued 
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that both China and Russia make a “mistake of thinking that government is the main instrument 
of soft power. In today’s world, information is not scarce but attention is, and attention depends 
on credibility. Government propaganda is rarely credible.” However, evaluating non-Western (or 
even Western in the case of Germany) PD by American standards risks placing them in a 
normative framework that undermines our ability to understand the internal logic of their 
programs. Indeed, both Chinese and Russian efforts are largely state guided. Media systems 
interact with powerful central governments to make independent action and thought difficult in 
both countries. Meanwhile Germany and Qatar’s public diplomacy, though state funded, operate 
with relative freedom. However, state guidance is what we should expect, especially given the 
Chinese and Russian models of journalism. In both cases, commercial pressures exist but are 
carefully monitored and influenced by the state to achieve broader goals (Meng and Rantanen 
2015; Vartanova 2015; Zhao 2012). So, while we might expect greater conformity to state 
interests in CCTV and RT than DW, it does not immediately follow that CCTV content is 
“brittle propaganda,” to use Nye’s phrase. Likewise, we might expect greater independence from 
state narratives in DW and AJE given the relative freedom of their journalists, though we should 
still see state interests moderate that freedom, not just for Qatar but for Germany as well. While 
Nye suggests that China and Russia misapprehend what fosters soft power, it seems more likely 
that they have a different view on how one gains soft power in the first place. In this way, using 
Western standards of public diplomacy to evaluate non-Western PD efforts can lead to 
misapprehension of the PD policies and methods employed by each state, something I am trying 
to avoid by using a comparative framework (Hallin and Mancini 2004; Meng and Rantanen 
2015). The various media efforts of each state also suggest differing approaches to PD and soft 
power.  
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The networks analyzed herein are not the only mass media efforts adopted by these 
states, but there are important differences between them as well. The choice each state makes 
between traditional broadcast television, wire services, and online platforms illustrate their 
differing conceptions of how IB and PD should operate. China’s wire service effort is 
particularly robust. Xinhua, like much modern Chinese media, started as a tool of the CPC, but 
since the 1979 reforms it has morphed into an international news service working in Mandarin 
and English and is now subject to market pressures (Hong 2011).39 Similarly, Russia has started 
Ruptly, a news service that provides a “bolder, deeper point-of-view than the established figures 
of the news marketplace” (Ruptly 2015). Given international communications long standing 
interest in news wire services (see for example O. Boyd-Barrett 1980), Russian and Chinese 
entrance into this arena represents the continuation of a long standing dispute over control of 
international information flows (Nordenstreng 2012). Alternatively, AJ and DW are invested in 
online platforms such as the AJ+ and DWNews (Gummer 2015). This is not to say that Russia 
and China do not invest in internet space for their PD efforts. RT remains popular on YouTube 
and CCTV has a web presence. Nevertheless, China and Russia opting to create wire services 
that supply media content means they provide sources for other news channels, especially those 
that do not have on the ground assets in either Russia or China, and can alter the global supply of 
information and undermine Western dominance of news services.40 However, information is 
plentiful and each state has other methods for reaching audiences. China’s use of multiple outlets 
including newspapers such as the People’s Daily, an official arm of the CPC, allows CCTV to 
                                                 
39 In addition to CCTV International, the state funds Xinhua News Agency, China Radio International, 
and the People’s Daily Newspaper, all translated into English (Shambaugh 2013). 
40 While a complete analysis is not forthcoming here, it is worth mentioning that RT does use content 
from Ruptly and Sputnik in its reports and CCTV’s web page content lists Xinhua as their wire source. In 
these limited cases, there do appear to be synergies between wire services and some IB content. 
103 
 
operate less as a propaganda mouthpiece and more as a journalistic institution, even if it is one 
based on Chinese journalistic models that encourage deference to the state. Germany continues 
to provide FM radio in many parts of the world, particularly in Africa where educational 
programming is a popular genre (Połońska-Kimunguyi 2015). Finally, Qatar has spun out the Al-
Jazeera brand into a conglomerate structure, providing children and sports programming in 
addition to news and changing the name from Qanat “channel” to Shabaka “network,” signaling 
it expansion and compartmentalization (Kraidy 2008). Each effort, radio, television, online, or 
wire service suggests a different approach and a different audience. Wire services supply news to 
other outlets, but as both Ruptly and Xinhua have access to Russia and China that other services 
may lack, they have the potential to build market niches and alter the flow of information as 
AJE’s images of Iraq, Egypt, and Afghanistan once did (El-Nawawy and Iskander 2002; Ibish 
2016; Wessler and Adolphsen 2008b).  
The variety of media outlets also suggests that each state has particular audiences in 
mind. Their sponsors intended CCTV America and Al-Jazeera America for the US market, while 
wire services are for journalists specifically as opposed to general audiences. Likewise, a state’s 
cultural and intellectual advocacy has specific targets, which indicate particular strategies and 
understandings of PD and influence how IBs address audiences. For instance, Russia’s Russkii 
Mir program exists to promote the Russian language, particularly in the Baltic, while the Russian 
Cooperation Agency promotes Russia’s vision of the international system and foreign policy 
(Saari 2014). These programs, in Russia’s near-abroad, work to activate Russian speakers and 
undermine the states in which they reside by providing specific narratives about Russian history 
(Borchers 2011). Further afield, several European states have accused Russia and RT news 
content of targeting members of their societies and using them to damage national prestige 
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(Amann 2016; Bidder 2013; Borchers 2011; Nimmo and Eyal 2016). In this way, the Russian 
programs and ideas are likely to connect with a narrow segment of “fringe” groups of the left or 
right and operate more as traditional one way propaganda designed to undermine foreign publics 
(Osipova 2014). In contrast, China wants to reach people in the West and depict China to them 
but does so in a way that adjusts to the use of media to conform to the CPC’s goal of maintaining 
domestic cohesion (Edney 2012). Put another way, Russia reaches Western audiences but 
particularly seeks those disaffected with the status quo and speaks to them in their own liberal 
democratic idiom, while China’s PD speaks to Westerners as though they are Chinese. What all 
of this suggests, is that each PD program contains within it different normative expectations for 
reaching foreign audiences and these expectations may influence the form that particular news 
content can take. If RT operates to undermine Western legitimacy, as many have claimed, then it 
appears to speak in the language of Western values to its audience; it is not about Russia it is 
about the West. If CCTV operates as an extension of domestic propaganda targeted at 
international audiences, the channel will seek to convey similar ideas about China’s stability, 
development, and the role of the CPC in maintaining both. If this were the case, I would expect 
the content of each IB to reflect their broader understanding of public diplomacy and target 
audiences in different ways. Because of these factors, I expect IBs to create narratives not only 
based on the norms of economic journalism, but also potentially in specific political languages 
drawn from the journalists and oriented towards specific audiences.  
Broadly speaking two sets of pressures can shape a given international broadcaster, the 
media system where they operate and the public diplomacy program of which they are a part. 
The first provides formal professional limits on journalistic practice and thus content. The second 
reflects state directed norms and the editorial outlook the channel fulfills. While an in-depth 
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examination of these pressures would require a newsroom based study, the presumption in the 
literature is that international broadcasters are subject to these pressures and thus they should be 
detectable in IB content. However, they must also have some concrete policy to narrate or 
project. Otherwise, they would not serve the sponsoring state’s interests. 
 
3.3 Economic Policy and Interests: What the Boss Says Goes 
This dissertation uses a case study of IB economic news to test scholarly assumptions 
about IB’s potential to project state power. Prevailing theories, such as strategic narratives, 
suggest that IBs operate as disseminators of state policy, and as such knowing each state’s 
economic policies is necessary to evaluate the extent to which IBs project those same policies. In 
addition, three of the networks frame their mission as counter-hegemonic with the intent of 
diversifying global news and provide perspectives outside the mainstream and some state 
sponsors have advocated for changes to the global financial order. Examining those specific 
policies, in addition to their general economic policy framework, will indicate the degree to 
which a given broadcaster lives up to its counter-hegemonic mission statement or use it to 
challenge Western hegemony.  
All of the states selected for this study engage in capitalist economic activity, but their 
specific policies reflect their unique histories, capacities, and situations. Qatar and Russia, for 
example, rely on fossil fuel extraction, while Germany and China rely on manufacturing exports 
for growth. Each state has multilateral alliances that limit its scope of action like the EU, 
ASEAN, GCC, or Eurasian Economic Union. Nevertheless, we do not need a complete vision of 
each state’s respective economy. Instead, I provide a brief outline of state economic policies and 
goals to create a standard to measure IB content in subsequent chapters drawing on a 
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combination of primary government sources and secondary scholarship. I pay particular attention 
to economic events within and around the study period as PD theories expect broadcasters to 
serve as a platform for policy advocacy on the part of the state sponsor. 
 
3.3.1 Russia: Remaking the System 
Russia remains a country troubled by low economic performance, low oil prices, and 
Western sanctions, which shape current Russian economic policies by threatening their oil 
exports. During the study period, Russian leaders engaged in “information warfare” with 
Germany and continued to participate in the Syrian Civil War, which is to say that Putin’s focus 
remains on politics instead of economics. As business magazine Bloomberg put it: “the need to 
get the economy back into gear is forcing the Russian president to face a painful choice: bow to 
the demands of the markets or protect his Kremlin-centered system” (Pismennaya and Arkhipov 
2016). Given these factors, Putin and his United Russia Party view the current international 
economic order as unresponsive to their needs, or even openly hostile to their sovereignty and 
interests. Additionally, Western sanctions have forced Putin to orient towards his East and the 
rising economic influence of Asia, especially China (Karaganov, Cherniavskaia, and Novikov 
2016). In pursuit of greater economic opportunities in the East, Putin has also pursued 
multilateral trade and economic unions in Central Asia (Eurasian Economic Commission 2014). 
All of these policies present promising opportunities for challenging the Western economic order 
and promoting a Russian centered system.  
The 2013 Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation described the official 
views of the Russian foreign policy establishment and started from the proposition that 
“International relations are in the process of transition, the essence of which is the creation of a 
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polycentric system of international relations.” In addition, it stated, “The ability of the West to 
dominate world economy and politics continues to diminish” given unsolved structural problems 
in Western economies. Economically, Russia demands “adequate accommodation of Russian 
interests… including determination of the global agenda in the areas of energy and food security, 
[and] improvement of the trade and transport cooperation regime” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2013).  
To accomplish these goals Russia seeks the end of Western sanctions and claims to want 
deeper economic integration with the European Union and the creation of a Eurasian Economic 
Union. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s speech in Luxembourg encouraged an end to sanctions, 
“we talked about the prospects of harmonizing European and Eurasian integration processes in 
order to eventually form a common economic and cultural space from the Atlantic to the Pacific 
(Lavrov 2015). Despite claims from Lavrov and Putin (Zakaria 2016) that they desire economic 
and political cooperation over conflict, Russia continues to engage in tit for tat travel bans of 
diplomats (DeYoung and Roth 2016) and uses its PD to delegitimize Western policies and 
narratives (Bovt 2013; Groll, McLeary, and O’Toole 2016). Other than lifting sanctions, Russia’s 
economic policy appears dominated by its broader foreign policy, and economics appears 
inseparable from larger ideological conflicts over the global system and democratic reform. 
 
3.3.2 China: A Responsible Stakeholder 
China’s post-1979 economy combined managed change where the CPC ruling party 
incorporated capitalist reforms while jealously guarding its own centrality in the Chinese 
political, social, and economic systems. During early 2015, the Communist Party continued its 
plan to receive greater representation in multilateral institutions while also endeavoring to 
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maintain their freedom to run China without outside interference. Specifically, the Party actively 
pursued policies to deepen its global economic integration such as the Belt and Road Initiative to 
link its coastal cities via rail and ship to Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe 
(Simpfendorfer 2009; Winter 2016). In addition, Chinese leaders were busy promoting the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as an alternative to Western dominated institutions like 
the World Bank. Both initiatives had been viewed with suspicion by Washington (Donnan 2015) 
and represent clear opportunities for strategic narrative projection.  
The Party’s plan to manage change in the economy has yielded marked result. The 
OECD reported in 2005 that “economic performance has been driven by changes in government 
economic policy that have progressively given greater rein to market forces,” beginning in 
agriculture and moving to steadily more complex forms of manufacturing (OECD 2005). The 
CPC currently plans to shift from a manufacturing economy to an innovation and consumption 
economy (Xinhua 2015), as the routine economic news analyzed in Chapter 4 shows. Despite 
recent stock market turmoil, experts believe the fundamentals of China’s economy are strong 
(Prasad 2016).41 These policies have made China the second largest economy in the world and as 
Chinese economic standing increased so has the CPC’s demands for a greater share of power in 
global governance. In a 2015 speech, Vice Foreign Minister Li Baodong said that the G20, which 
China leads this year, “is unmatched in its representativeness, thus legitimacy, and the capacity 
to take and implement major, and sometimes tough decisions.” In addition, “There is an intrinsic 
need for a vehicle like the process to advance cooperation in global economic governance in an 
increasingly globalized and interconnected world. Arguably, if [the] G20 did not exist today, it 
will have to be invented” (Baodong 2015). Likewise, China’s AIIB, represents a “great deal to 
                                                 
41 The author of this source, Edwar Prasad, was a China expert at the World Bank and frequently appears 
on CCTV programming.  
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the reform of the global economic governance system. It is consistent with the evolving trend of 
the global economic landscape and will help make the global economic governance system more 
just, equitable and effective” (Jinping 2016). China, therefore, desires greater representation in 
global economic governance, but economics also highlights ideological tensions. 
The Central Committee of the CPC’s Communiqué on the Current State of the 
Ideological Sphere described a series of threats to the Party’s leadership including the promotion 
of universal values, Western constitutionalism, Western journalism, civil society, and, 
interestingly, neoliberalism. The communique says neoliberalism’s weak state and strong market 
model aims “to change our country’s basic economic infrastructure and weaken the 
government’s control of the national economy” (quoted in ChinaFile 2013).42 China’s increased 
prosperity, and the fears it has stoked in the USA and China’s neighbors, has arguably sharpened 
focus on ideology and nationalism (T. Zhang 2016). In the process, President Xi plans to ensure 
ideological stability by strengthening control over media. Xinhua reported him as saying “All 
news media run by the Party must work to speak for the Party’s will and its propositions and 
protect the Party’s authority and unity,” and he encouraged “Marxist journalistic education” to 
counteract fundamentally different and incompatible Western journalism (Tiezzi 2015). This 
directive includes central broadcaster CCTV. In this way, China’s economic development led to 
what the CPC sees as ideological instability and this shows a kind of schizophrenia in Chinese 
thinking. CCTV, as we have seen above, is likely to convey state messages and avoid overt 
criticism, but it must also engage with new ideological confusion brought about by China’s 
economic success.  
                                                 
42 While Harvey (2010) would suggest that the growth of China’s economy represent the global capitalist 
class moving money to where it can exploit development for its own ends, and pundit might say China is 
gradually becoming more capitalist, the Chinese state clearly rejects this.  
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3.3.3 Qatar: Oil and Royals 
Qatar had long been a lonely outpost of the British Empire, reliant on pearl fishing and 
was only granted independence in 1971 (Gray 2013). This all changed with the exploitation of 
oil and natural gas reserves that enriched the ruling Al-Thani family (Fromherz 2012). It was this 
hydrocarbon wealth that allowed Hamad bin Khalifa, who deposed his father, to found Al-
Jazeera in 1995 and engage in higher-level diplomacy than their microstate status would 
normally allow (Kaussler 2014; Khatib 2013). This wealth has also allowed Qatar to finance a 
variety of infrastructure and political projects. Currently Qatar’s regime wants to diversify its 
economy but remains embroiled in the oil politics of the region as well as the larger political 
transformations in its neighbors; specifically Qatar want to sideline Iran, Syria, and Russia to 
supply oil and gas to Europe and at the time of study this dynamic has been playing out for 
several years. During the study period, low oil prices are probably the most relevant economic 
issue in Qatari decision-making as oil and gas account for 80% or revenues and 50% of GDP 
(Heritage Foundation 2016).  Politically, Qatar finances a number of armed groups, some 
accused of terrorist connections, in Libya, Syria, and other Middle Eastern states after the Arab 
Spring (Dickinson 2014). Qatari economic interests are, therefore, pressured on two fronts. First, 
the basic source of their wealth has dropped in price and weakened their relative economic 
power. Second, geopolitical conflict and proxy wars that limit Qatar’s ability to maintain access 
to the infrastructure necessary to gain access to oil markets.  
While Qatar remains reliant on oil and gas, the government has instated reforms to move 
away from reliance on resource extraction and expand their financial and knowledge industries 
(Ibrahim and Harrigan 2012). The Qataris call this and other policies designed to transform the 
economy “Qatarization.” In particular, the Qatari state seeks partnerships with Western 
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universities via the Qatar Foundation to provide high level Western education for its citizens, 
many of whom do not work (Salama et al. 2016). However, the free inquiry model of Western 
education clashes with state control of information and the media, as seen above, limiting the 
effectiveness of these ventures (Vora 2014). Oil price decline led to cuts in state fuel subsidies 
and a general curtailment of PD efforts like AJ, museum financing, and World Cup 2022 
expenditures (Galal 2016). Qatar, like Russia, finds itself in a precarious position economically, 
racing against time to displace petroleum as the centerpiece of its economy and move into 
knowledge, finance, and service sectors. It is unlikely that AJE will openly discuss Qatar’s recent 
weakness, but we may find that their economic coverage receives impetus from the need for 
innovation in the Qatari economy and may well focus on those kinds of stories.  
 
3.3.4 Germany: A Steady Hand 
German economic policy promotes strengthening European Union governance, political, 
and economic structures, and integration while promoting what they call the “social market 
economy” (Schauble 2016). Within this framework, German political leaders have spent much of 
the past few years addressing the European financial crisis, the Greek Crisis, migration, and 
Russian provocations in Ukraine all while attempting to expand Germany’s overseas profile as a 
valuable trading partner. In particular, the election of the Syriza Party in Greece represented a 
fundamental challenge to German led austerity efforts in the European Union and a prime 
opportunity to use DW to frame Syriza’s policies and project German interests.  
According to the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, the social market 
economy is a system that protects “the freedom of all market participants on both the supply and 
demand side, whilst also providing for a strong safety net” (’Öffentlichkeitsarbeit’ 2016b). In 
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this way, Germany can serve as a model for other nations and as a bulwark against Russian 
influence. German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schauble recently said that as former Soviet 
states entered the EU Russia saw “European soft power… moving closer, coming face to face, 
with the Russian system…. Putin appears to be afraid to let this competition play out openly” 
and this is “why he’s trying to weaken Europe by dividing us and tempting us to think only in 
narrow national terms” (Schauble 2016). Germany sees its national interest as tightly intertwined 
with the fortunes of the broader European Union, and seeks to strengthen that Union providing 
its own economic system as a model.  
What this has meant in practice, however, are rising tensions within the Union that Russia 
seeks to exploit.43 Germany’s government advocated for tightening fiscal discipline in those 
countries effected by the Euro Crisis, most famously in Greece where many see German policies 
as punishing austerity (S. Brown 2012). Chancellor Merkel placed blame for the crisis squarely 
on member states who did not maintain target deficit spending levels and argued that had they 
“engaged in reform to increase their competitiveness, economic and monetary union would never 
have been embroiled in such a crisis even with a relatively weak economic union” (Merkel 
2012). As such, as anti-EU parties gain toeholds in parliaments across the Union, her 
government advocates for deeper policy coordination and economic integration. When we 
consider that Putin’s Russia openly finances parties like the Front Nationale in France and the 
Alternative for Germany, it becomes clear that German and European economic strength are 
crucial to challenging Russian aggression (Amann and Lokshin 2016). 
Beyond strengthening European governance and integration, Germany sees international 
trade as a valuable source of economic growth and potential soft power. German trade officials 
                                                 
43 Russia exploits rising righting wing nationalism in Europe in other ways as well. As these parties gain 
seats and visibility, RT reports on these events as signs that the West is fundamentally corrupt.  
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say that, “Free trade is generating a great deal of employment and economic growth in our 
country. This is why Germany has long been an advocate of open markets and trade 
liberalization based on a clear set of predictable, multilateral rules” (’Öffentlichkeitsarbeit’ 
2016a). Asian countries are particularly important for expanding German trade; and Germany 
advocates a policy in the region that stresses the interest of German companies as well as the rule 
of law and competition policy (“Asia in German Foreign Policy” 2015). Merkel’s recent visit to 
China, her ninth, focused mostly on economics and development issues, specifically Chinese 
rules that limit the competitiveness of German companies. In order not to anger her hosts, she 
omitted any mention of human rights issues, illustrating the importance Germany places on 
economic relations with China (Stanzel 2016).  
Each of these states pursues active economic policy, pushing for more trade and 
development, or reform of the economic governance system. Nevertheless, they are not 
unanimous in their approaches to achieving these goals. History and geography constrain and 
enable each to pursue their preferred policies. Theories of international broadcasting and public 
diplomacy suggest that the channels analyzed here will project these policies as legitimate and 
desirable to foreign publics. However, this assertion has yet to be tested.  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
The analysis in this chapter showed that each network arose out of contingent conditions 
and that no two networks operate under the same set of pressures. First, states develop 
international broadcasters out of specific exigencies that may influence their editorial positions 
and thereby their content. RT and CCTV, for example, were direct responses on the part of their 
state sponsors to counter what they saw as Western media’s bias against their political systems 
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and interests. Second, IBs also reflected multiple pressures during their operations. Media 
systems define journalistic norms and thus the ways in which IB journalists create content. At the 
same time, a state’s public diplomacy program influenced the place of an IB in a broader policy 
platform for reaching foreign publics. Specific definitions of PD employed by sponsor states 
suggest that each network operates as different manifestations of state understandings of PD and 
information outreach and management. Finally, financial journalism norms provide generic 
conventions while newsroom cultures provide normative expectations that each journalist 
working in an IB must consider when crafting their product. These pressures all potentially exert 
influence on IB content. 
I have also shown that each state has specific economic views, interests, and policies. 
Examining these provides a baseline for analyzing the extent to which IBs directly promote 
strategic narratives and state interests. In addition, my analysis showed that each of these states 
remains connected to larger networks of global commerce and none of them exist in isolation. In 
turn, each shows different levels of acquiescence to the global economic system with two states – 
Russia and China – exemplifying counter-hegemonic views of global commerce. While all of 
these states need global capitalism they are not all happy with its operation. Indeed, some of 
these states are in direct conflict with each, as with Germany and Russia over Ukraine, and Qatar 
and Russia over Syria. In short, while all of these states are nominally engaged in capitalist 
activity, sites of conflict, and thus opportunities for state power projection, are readily available 
to each broadcaster.  
Literature on international broadcasting suggests that these channels exist to promote and 
project state narratives. However, we have also seen that each state possesses a unique 
understanding of how public diplomacy should function, how international broadcasters should 
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treat information, and how journalists see their particular roles. As such, the comparative 
analysis in the Chapter also highlights the significant differences in PD practice. In turn, the data 
will help account for the content analyzed in subsequent Chapters.  
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4 VISIONS OF NATIONAL OF ECONOMY 
Under a grey sky, tugboat captain Dirk Woltersdorf guides a container ship down the last 
stretch of the Elbe to the German port city of Hamburg. A deep, masculine voice narrates 
Woltersdorf’s actions as the young man checks sonar and communicates with his home base in 
one of Europe’s biggest ports. The narrator claims that the ship, like one in three that enter and 
exit the port, comes from China and that these ships stitch together the pathways of global 
commerce. We learn that the tugboat captain and his crewmates will spend two weeks on the 
water and two weeks on land. As the story ends, Dirk expresses his concern that without 
deepening the Elbe, global commerce may pass by the now prosperous city in favor of more 
amenable facilities. Deutsche Welle’s Made in Germany reported this story as part of an episode 
devoted entirely to the economic history and life of Hamburg. The episode also included reports 
about an American immigrant working in an ad agency, women workers at an Airbus plant, and 
wealth inequality and affordable housing. Overall, the episode handily illustrates how 
international broadcasting projects a national brand and serves as a tool of state power. The 
program paints a picture of German history and culture for global audiences, while also serving 
as a sort of documentary highlighting the positive aspects of modern Germany. Drawing upon 
what Silcock (2002) calls the German mythic past, DW uses history to contextualize news 
events; each story begins with an individual engaged in their daily routine, as opposed to a larger 
news event or issue to be reported. In contrast, RT, AJE, and CCTV news programs typically 
begin with the issue itself. In this sense, the program illustrates the hybrid function of state-
sponsored IB: part news, part public diplomacy aimed at addressing foreign publics to shift their 
attitudes towards the sponsoring state.  
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This example also illustrates that international broadcasters, as tools of state power 
projection and public diplomacy, are not homogenous, but rely upon a variety of narratives and 
visual techniques. Instead, a complex set of features--including sponsor-state interests, the 
respective media system, journalistic culture and routines, and genre conventions--all contribute 
to shaping the actual IB content. Analysis of these features, thus, informs our understanding of 
media flows, complicates our understanding of counter-hegemony, and invites further analysis of 
the global newsroom. 
In this chapter, I examine the domestic news narratives projected by AJE, CCTV, DW, 
and RT. Using the coding scheme and methodology described in Chapter 2, I analyze each 
networks’ common story topics, geographic focus, type of speaking actors featured, style of 
news reporting, narratives of the sponsoring state, narratives of their geostrategic rivals, and the 
presence of neoliberal ideology in the narrative. An analysis of these variables provides a test of 
the extent to which IBs conform to the assumptions present in the existing literature about their 
role in projecting state power narratives. As this chapter will demonstrate, my findings suggest 
that generalizations about the relationship between IBs and the sponsoring state that dominate 
the literature are misguided. Even in countries where IBs have constitutional protections, such as 
Germany, Połońska-Kimunguyi argues that DW operates “in line with one of the key areas of 
German development policy” (2015, 388). This quotation illustrates the generalized, and logical, 
belief that IBs work directly to promote state interests. Likewise, leaked State Department cables 
indicate that foreign service officers believe Al-Jazeera’s “ability to influence public opinion 
throughout the region is a substantial source of leverage for Qatar,” and, “can also be used as a 
chip to improve relations”  with other states (Booth 2010). However, with closer analysis we can 
identify how domestic journalistic norms, the global news agenda, and the political interests of 
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the sponsoring state interact to facilitate a range of relationships between the state and the IB. 
Financial journalism, in particular, with its deference to market ideology and economic actors 
shapes IB content in ways arguably not seen in other forms of journalism.  
 
4.1 State Sponsored Though not of a Kind 
Public diplomacy (Cull 2009b; P. M. Seib 2005) and strategic narrative (Miskimmon, 
O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2013; Price 2014) literature assume that IBs serve a central purpose: to 
present the state and its policies. They provide little if any detail of how and to what extent the 
actual content of IB coverage conforms to such a purpose. Seib, for example, claims, “Russia 
Today provides news with a spin that favors the interests of its proprietors. Many news 
consumers presumably recognize how the game is played and judge the information they receive 
accordingly” (2010, 737). Similarly, Miskimmon et al. claim, “The recent proliferation of 
transnational television channels such as Al Jazeera, Telesur, Press TV, Russia Today, and 
CCTV9, alongside BBC World and CNN International, may suggest state control. However, 
each features platforms and interactive features” (2012, 10).44 However, in neither case do these 
scholars examine the content of these channels, and while their presumptions about state control 
and spin are logical, they have yet to be directly tested. Furthermore, scholars that examine the 
potential of IBs to be a contra-flow or counter-hegemonic (Ozohu-Suleiman 2014; Painter 2008; 
Sakr 2007; Thussu 2007a) have studied news content for reliance on establishment elites like 
politicians, on ethnocentric focus in covered regions, how distant places are reported, and weak 
coverage of developing world that focuses on violent conflict. Avoiding such patterns would 
indicate the possibility of contra-flow and counter hegemony (Figenschou 2010). However, few 
                                                 
44 He does not substantiate his claims about reception.  
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of these studies relate the content to the sponsor state’s political interests. Literature on financial 
journalism (Chakravartty and Downing 2010; Corcoran and Fahy 2009; Fahy, O’Brien, and Poti 
2010; Lee 2014) suggests that this genre of news is overly reliant on official sources and 
generally lacks academic, worker, and union voices. It also suggests the genre is not critical of 
the economy and its structure, and are fascinated with new things or products. However, since 
the literature focuses primarily on privately owned networks, it must be determined if IBs follow 
the pattern seen in private business news because government funding partially shields 
broadcasters from market forces. It is possible that IBs will actively use different kinds of 
sources in the process of articulating state policy or counter-hegemony compared to private 
networks, as scholars’ research on AJE illustrates.  
I have organized the findings into six topical categories based on the theoretical issues 
outlined above. As Table 4.1 illustrates, the “issue” variable (see Appendix A and B) shows that 
there were particular stories that each network covered such as: the Greek debt crisis, ECB 
policy of quantitative easing, and US Federal Reserve plans to raise interest rates, suggesting that 
there is something like a global financial news agenda. Recall that “issue” refers to the lede of 
the story, how the anchor or journalist introduces a given news item, as opposed to the framing 
or narratives within a news item. As such this table indicate the total number of discrete news 
items, across networks, where these terms were used in the lede. 
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Table 4.1 Most Common Stories 
 AJE CCTV DW RT 
Interest Rates 0 23 0 14 
Greek Debt 
Crisis 
2 34 7 19 
ECB 
Quantitative 
Easing  
1 11 1 10 
Chinese 
Economy 
3 5645 0 1 
Russian 
Economy 
3 046 1 0 
Japanese 
Economy 
2 2 0 0 
Oil Prices 3 18 2 9 
Commodity 
Prices 
1 10 0 4 
Currency 0 22 0 9 
Asian 
Infrastructure 
Investment 
Bank 
1 11 0 1 
Trade 0 18   
 
Nevertheless, each network also covered issues of particular interest to the sponsoring 
state. CCTV, for example, devoted coverage to Chinese economic reform, while AJE negatively 
framed Russia, a country on the opposite side of the Syrian civil war. RT featured several items 
on technology and currency that did not feature any state directly, and DW’s reporting paid 
particular attention to German industries rather than event driven news. Story selection suggests 
that IBs need to be responsive to the news cycle while also projecting state power, a tension 
apparent in several of the coding scheme’s variables.  
                                                 
45 This number reflects stories about the Chinese economy at a macro-level, several hundred other items 
covered specific sectors 
46 There were no stories about the Russian economy on a macro-level, however, there were six stories 
devoted only to Russia and several stories discussed Russia in terms of oil and their credit rating. 
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4.1.1 Geographic Focus – Where is my Country? 
Scholars who examine international broadcasting suggest that sponsoring states finance 
networks to influence foreign publics by increasing the state’s soft power or providing strategic 
narratives and, thus, we should expect them to cover the sponsoring state (for example Price 
2014; Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2012; Pamment 2012). Analyzing the geography 
variable, therefore, illustrates each channel’s geographic attention, and thus gives insight into 
potential areas of state interest. As such, we should see that each network covers their sponsoring 
state to a degree, and thus project the state sponsor, though how much is not known. The 
prevalence of the state sponsor as the topic of a given news item also serves as an indication of 
the potential presence of state strategic narratives. In order to test this, I coded for a set of 
features in each news item including focus on domestic or foreign news, the name of the states 
discussed in the item, and if those states came from the Global North or South. In other words, 
these variables tell us where each programs’ editorial attention lay and give us the relative 
number of items that focused on domestic versus international news as well as more specific 
information about those states. Because CCTV, AJE, and RT claim to depict underrepresented 
issues and regions of the world, we may therefore expect some coverage of states in Asia, Africa, 
and South America. CCTV specifically claims to be a “link to Asia” and DW claims to cover 
Europe, so we may also expect a degree of regionalization based on editorial pressures. 
Examining the geographic focus of news coverage is also a way of testing the degree of news 
homogenization, a feature Thussu (2007c, 2007b) predicts will increase with media deregulation 
and which some networks claim to resist. 
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Table 4.2 shows the percentage of total news items that cover domestic, intersectional, or 
foreign news items aired by each broadcaster. Domestic items are about the state sponsor, 
intersectional items are about sponsor and at least one other state, and foreign items about non-
sponsor states only where news items are discrete units of news characterized by individual ledes 
(see Appendices A and B). Given the claim that IBs can project state narratives and can serve as 
platforms for advocacy and cultural diplomacy (Cull 2009b), its surprising that only DW and 
CCTV spend any substantive amount of time discussing their state sponsor. While it is at this 
point well known that AJE does not cover Qatari affairs (Sakr 2007; Figenschou 2010), more 
surprising is that RT’s Boom Bust devotes little attention to Russian economic news. Russia 
Today content covered the foreign news in 96.1% of items with few explicit references to 
Russia.  
Table 4.2 Geographic Frequency 
 
 
Only 1.1% of items were domestic and 2.8% were intersectional i.e. about the sponsoring 
state in relation to another state. The USA received the most attention accounting for 31.9% of 
RT news items. Greece accounts for the next most being the subject or related to the main 
subject in 16.0% of stories and the EU appears in 13.2% of items. RT’s editorial attention, 
therefore, is focused on the developed world, particularly the USA and EU in general, and states 
 AJE CCTV DW RT 
Domestic 0.0% 31.1% 51.7% 1.1% 
Intersectional 1.8% 32.0% 31.7% 2.8% 
Foreign 98.2% 36.9% 16.7% 96.1% 
N =  57 192 61 57 
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in the midst of financial crisis specifically. Western states featured in RT coverage are also the 
countries of origin for many of their reporters, including host Erin Ade and producer Edward 
Harrison (both Americans). These facts suggest that Boom Bust does not project narratives about 
Russia itself. In turn, RT’s public diplomacy strategy does not directly seek to improve Russia’s 
image but gives space to viewpoints that undermine its geopolitical rivals using reporters from 
those rivals, which I examine in the “opposing power narratives” sub-section below. 
Nevertheless, the RT content analyzed here shows that the network remains focused on the 
Global North, covered in 69.3% of news items, and does not diversify global news output in the 
same ways as CCTV and AJE, with 44% and 56.1% of their items covering the South 
respectively. As such, if we are to conclude that RT projects state narratives we must look to the 
specific discourses about its rivals present in its programming. Likewise, RT’s claim to provide 
an “alternative perspective on major global events, and acquaints international audience with a 
Russian viewpoint” and operate counter-hegemonically as operationalized by Figenschou (2010), 
Painter (2008), and Robertson (2015) must be found in content.  
In contrast, CCTV and DW are on the other end of the spectrum, suggesting a bifurcation 
in the networks’ geographical focus. In turn, this suggests each networks applies different 
approaches to PD and economic news. CCTV stories focused on Chinese domestic economic 
news (31.1%) and many others focused on Chinese relations with other states (32.0%). CCTV 
intersectional stories exemplified the Chinese PD policy of “to know us is to love us” (Rawnsley 
2015b) and often covered Chinese economic relationships (e.g. when China and Argentina 
signed a series of trade deals). CCTV also depicted multilateral relationships and diplomacy such 
as when the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) met in Beijing in 
January 2015 and the Boao Forum of Asian States or China cosponsored the German CeBit 
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Technology show in March. In these stories China goes out into the world, the world goes to 
China, and these relationships support the view of China as a safe multilateral actor that the CPC 
wishes to project (Shambaugh 2013).  
DW news items focused on solely domestic stories 50.8% of the time and the relationship 
between Germany and some other nation 31.1% of the time. As seen in Chapter 3, Germany’s 
foreign policy involves promoting European integration and cooperation and promotes economic 
development and increased trade with Africa and China, while promoting Germany as a model 
of capitalism and the welfare state. However, Made in Germany rarely goes to these places to 
explore those relationships; instead we see foreign citizens come to Germany (such as in a 
feature on a Mexican family immigrating to Germany). In this sense, DW projects Germany as a 
model for other countries to follow. DW like CCTV exhibits a higher degree of parochialism in 
its broadcasts when compared with AJE or RT. 
The parochialism of a given network suggests the degree to which it is ethnocentric in its 
coverage, a scrutinized feature of international news reporting (Sreberny and Paterson 2005). 
Ethnocentrism in news and the general pattern of North to South and West to East flows of 
media content (Thussu 2007a) means that journalists from the Global North report on the 
developing world more often than the reverse.47 Covering states in the Global South may serve 
state interests, as in the case of Chinese coverage of domestic news, or editorials interests, as in 
CCTV coverage of their Asian neighbors. CCTV’s coverage may also reflect the interests of its 
Chinese journalistic staff who, while working for an arm of the Chinese government, are also 
seasoned financial journalists who may take this opportunity to explain their nation and region to 
Western audiences. As such, the degree to which an IB covers the developed versus the 
                                                 
47 It was this situation that made Al-Jazeera Arabic so interesting when it premiered as an Arab owned 
and operated channel speaking to and for Arabs. 
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developing world has potential to both distribute state narratives and diversify global news in 
accordance with specific editorial missions.   
A central part of the mission statement of RT and AJE and CCTV are to privilege voices 
from the Global South and to diversify global news flows. In one sense, this goal is a clear 
response to the weaknesses of traditional global news outlets. In another sense, however, states 
can use speakers from the Global South, and counter-hegemonic coverage more generally, as a 
means to project their narratives or undermine rivals’. Ultimately, speakers from the Global 
South can diversify news, but also serve a state sponsor depending on their specific needs. 
Accordingly, networks’ distribution of coverage of the Global North or South varies widely. AJE 
conforms to previous research (Figenschou 2010) that shows the network focuses on the Global 
South, in this sample accounting for 56.1% of all news items. DW focuses on the Global North 
in 85.0% of its items, largely because of its focus on German affairs. As such, DW functions as a 
tool of PD by broadcasting news about its sponsor state. This is also consistent with research that 
suggests most news providers focus on the Global North (Sreberny and Paterson 2005). 
CCTV diversifies global news by virtue of fulfilling its function as a tool of state power 
projection and providing a “link to Asia,” where many states are classified as developing nations. 
Journalist’s focus on the Global South in 53.4% of the items in the sample, which can partially 
be accounted for by the relatively high number of domestic items (45.3%) coded. As noted 
above, topics cover a wide range including major holidays, government economic policy, and the 
lives of China’s nouveau riche, projecting an image of Chinese prosperity to global audiences. 
China’s relationships with South American, Asian, and Western states account for 32% of all 
CCTV items. This does not mean that CCTV’s content is necessarily “objective” or challenges 
the state. It must still fulfill its function as external propaganda in the CPC’s sense of the term, 
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but the data does show Global Business news items project Chinese state narratives about a wide 
swathe of the world, and that the network provides coverage of the developing world at a higher 
rate than other networks studied here.  
Scholarship has, up to now, suggested that IBs are critical tools of state narrative 
projection and they might be expected to discuss the sponsoring state in some detail. 
Nevertheless, the data here suggests varying strategies in terms of geographic focus. Omitting 
the sponsoring state, as AJE and RT do, means that we cannot necessarily expect either to 
directly project Qatar or Russia respectively. Meanwhile, DW and CCTV’s relatively high 
amount of domestic and intersectional coverage indicates that state sponsor narratives might be 
present in their content. Likewise, RT’s claim to cover news outside the mainstream does not 
extend to covering the Global South, while both AJE and CCTV appear to live up to their 
editorial mission to cover the Global South and Asia. Geographic data does not reveal anything 
about specific narratives, it does show DW and CCTV do present the sponsoring state. However, 
AJE and RT do not which suggests different potential approaches to serving state interests and 
projecting state narratives.  
 
4.1.2 Voices – And Now, Live from… 
Geographic focus tells us where editors want our attention, but the people empowered to 
speak actually tell the story. Zelizer (2007) argues that journalists, and those they interview 
including ordinary people, bear with them the duty to “eyewitness” the news and thereby provide 
credibility to the news source itself. By privileging certain voices, international broadcasters can 
directly address sponsoring state’s specific interests when media like CNN and BBC do not 
devote sufficient coverage to their views (Kuhn 2010; Pomerantsev 2014; Rawnsley 2015b). 
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While the presence of overt political propaganda is unlikely because it would undermine network 
credibility, Cull (2009b) suggests that IBs provide platforms for diffusion of policy positions by 
the sponsoring state or as direct communication channels between members of the sponsoring 
government and foreign publics. Consequently, one would expect networks to feature members 
of the sponsoring government to project and promote state interests. In addition, AJE and RT 
might pursue their stated goals of diversifying news by including underrepresented groups in 
terms of political party, nationality, gender, or ideology. Nevertheless, scholarship shows that 
financial journalism caters to elite audiences and IB’s economic news content could follow these 
journalistic conventions illustrating the importance of journalism cultures in the production of 
content  (Fahy, O’Brien, and Poti 2010; Hanitzsch 2011; Schiffrin and Fagan 2013).   
Table 4.3 provides an overview of the different populations featured in the four programs 
under review: political (those connected to governments), economic (people in charge of 
buisnesses), expert (speakers who provide context and analysis), workers (those engaged in work 
but not in a position of power), and ordinary people (person on the street interviews).48 Activists 
and members of international organizations such as the IMF are included in the political 
category. As the table demonstrates, just as stations vary significantly in their geographic focus, 
so too do they vary in whose voices they choose to privilege in economic news and thus who 
witnesses economic activity and policy. These figures represent total number of appearances 
across all news items for the speaker categories. No matter how short the speaker’s total amount 
                                                 
48 For the reader’s convenience, the speaking actor categories include: political (works for a government 
or supra-national governance organization like the IMF; also includes activists), economic (those engaged 
in economic decision making for private profit), expert (people invited to provide analysis of the news), 
worker (people engaged in economic activity who do not have decision making power, and ordinary 
(someone used to provide opinion but not specifically and expert).  
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of time in a given item, I coded them as having appeared; each speaker was limited to once per 
item (see Appendices C and D). 
Table 4.3 Speaking Actor Frequencies 
 AJE CCTV DW RT 
Political 21.4% 21.6% 9.4% 5.2% 
Economic 29.0% 20.5% 36.8% 4.6% 
Experts 29.8% 47.8% 21.7% 89.0% 
Ordinary 14.5% 8.7% 18.9% 1.2% 
Worker 5.3% 1.4% 13.2% 0.0% 
N =  131 1362 212 173 
 
Despite claims that IBs can be platforms for state officials, political figures from the 
sponsoring state or from other states comprise a relatively small percentage of the speakers 
across networks.49 CCTV features the most political actors (21.6%) of all the networks, with 118 
speakers connected to national, regional, or local Chinese governments. Interviewees ranged 
from local government officials such as Guangdong Deputy Mayor Yang Xiaotang; to national 
figures like Chinese Finance Minister Lou Jiwei. Such speakers fulfill a variety of roles from 
explaining national policy during press conferences to commenting on economic issues in his/her 
particular locality during onsite interviews. The numbers of political speakers, however, 
represents a small fraction of the total number of CCTV speakers, which totaled 1362 as seen in 
Table 4.3.50 RT featured no members of the Russian government and AJE only presented one 
member of the Qatari government, a Qatar Airways representative. These numbers show that in 
economic programming, government members are rare and policy advocacy needs to be 
accomplished by either the journalists themselves or other guests. State economic narratives are, 
                                                 
49 China and Russia have used direct state sponsored advocacy via advertorials in Western newspapers to 
directly communicate their governments positions with foreign publics (T.-K. Chang and Lin 2014; Golan 
and Viatchaninova 2013), suggesting their willingness to use direct government appeals. 
50 The annual Two Sessions and the multiple multilateral forums held in China during the study period 
accounts for these relatively high numbers.  
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thus, presented through surrogates and economic policy and opinion remain the preserve of 
experts and economics actors, which provides credibility via economics’ professional norms 
(McCloskey 1998). This appears to be true even for RT, often accused of towing the Kremlin 
line (Bidder 2013), or CCTV where the principles of journalism subordinate criticism of the 
government to improving national image and development (Zhao 2012). How programs 
distributed the rest of the speaker types suggests that each network engages with economic news, 
and projects state narratives, in different ways.  
Although IBs do not necessarily feature government speakers, their reliance on elite 
speakers from the private economic sector belies particular positions and interests. As Table 4.3 
shows, economic actors (those who are presented as engaging in economic activity as opposed to 
analysis) account for between 36.8% (DW) and 4.6% (RT) of speaking actors, mirroring trends 
identified in commercial economic news (Schiffrin and Fagan 2013). With the exception of RT, 
to which I return below, all the IBs rely on economic elites as speakers. However, they also use 
entrepreneurs and small shop owners. Economic actors, therefore, operate at different levels of 
the economic system. This arguably builds eyewitnessing credibility in terms of the speaker’s 
status.  
DW’s use of high-level economic actors, such as the CEO of Lufthansa, emphasizes its 
access to German business elites and highlights the economic power of Germany. However, DW 
items often focus on economic actors in charge of small or medium sized enterprises or 
“entrepreneurs” who are starting new companies and, in the process, transform traditional 
German business practices.  For example, a DW story from early March 2015 follows a young 
woman who left the relative conformity of German business to start her own “management 
training” company. Another story from March focused on Berlin based French restaurateur 
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Sebastien Gorius who the reporter claims, “loves his country but says fundamental changes are 
needed,” to be competitive. Comments like these echo Angela Merkel’s position that “All [EU] 
member states need to implement reforms, structural changes and tough consolidation steps to 
increase competitiveness” to counter the European financial crisis (Merkel 2012). In this 
example, a French economic actor praises both the dynamism and Germany to be worthy of 
emulation on the part of European neighbors, thereby indirectly supporting German economic 
policy.  
Similarly, CCTV interviewed powerful Chinese business people, even producing a series 
of stories entitled “high-flyers” featuring Hanergy CEO and the richest man in China, Li Hejun, 
or head of the Alibaba group, Jack Ma, among others. CCTV journalists also devoted stories to 
small businesspersons, particularly from new ecommerce ventures, which the state had just 
authorized. As China’s “Economic and Social Development Plan” from 2015 makes clear, 
foreign direct investment and opening China to greater capital flows is a key part of the CPC’s 
overall economic strategy. Additionally, Chinese Foreign Minister Hua Chinying responded to 
German criticisms of Chinese investment policy saying “‘China is willing to cultivate a fair and 
transparent investment environment for investors both at home and abroad’” (People’s Daily 
2016).51 Using business actors allows DW and CCTV to promote their countries as desirable 
sites for economic activity and thus promote the broader interests of the state and in the process 
conform to financial journalism’s generic conventions. In this way, DW and CCTV appear to use 
economic actors to project desirable narratives of their economic vitality and fitness.  
                                                 
51 While outside the study period, the comments indicate a long-term trend in Chinese economic policy of 
attracting investment, people, and capital to foster Chinese economic growth and innovation in line with 
previous policy efforts.  
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The presence of economic actors is largely consistent with studies of financial journalism 
which show the business press rely on economic elites as sources for information and as 
commentators (Lee 2014) and suggests the IBs operate under similar pressures to commercial 
financial journalism. However, some networks use speakers in ways that deviate from their 
editorial line or rely on particular groups more than others to project state economic narratives. 
Figenschou’s (2010, 2012) work on AJE suggests that despite the network’s mission to be a 
“voice for the voiceless,” it relies on elites, establishment or otherwise, as well as their own 
editorial staff for most of its regular newscasts. According to my analysis, AJE uses expert actors 
roughly equally to political or economic actors. However, workers, those who are actors in the 
economy but without the power of a manager or CEO, only account for 5.3% of speakers while 
ordinary people account for 14.5% of the sample. In contrast, nearly one out of three speaking 
actors on DW, a network with no stated counter-hegemonic mission, were ordinary people or 
workers.  For example, a story from January 13 featured Sudanese refugee and baker Adam 
Ismail Hussein and his boss to contextualize a larger story about German refugee laws that allow 
newcomers to work for four years. We have already seen a similar story construction with the 
French restaurateur but there are several other examples including stories involving a Mexican 
family who immigrated to Germany. I will return to these possibilities below when I engage with 
the presentation of the state, but these examples illustrate the need to test broadcaster claims 
about their editorial mission against their actual content output.  
In each of the programs analyzed, each IBs’ projection of state narratives depends largely 
on non-governmental speakers. In turn, experts occupy a key role in legitimating strategic 
narratives for the state sponsor by providing independent expertise on economic matters. CCTV 
provided particularly instructive examples given that their programming combines both Chinese 
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and foreign experts. For example, Yang Zhimin of the Institute for Latin American Studies at 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Madhav Das Nalapat of India’s Manipal University.52 
Particularly when those speakers are labeled “economists” they draw on the rhetorical authority 
of that profession to portray state policies or interests as natural and backed by scientific 
consensus (McCloskey 1998). AJE, DW, and CCTV also featured experts, which include: 
business people, consultants, university professors, and analysts for supra-national organizations 
such as the IMF and World Bank. In this way, these three networks conform to the financial 
journalism norms (Corcoran and Fahy 2009; Fahy, O’Brien, and Poti 2010), and they illustrate 
an apparent limitation of IBs in projecting state power. However, there are important differences, 
and RT is a clear outlier, in these networks’ selection practices. While AJE and DW do not use 
independent experts significantly more than any other category of speaker, experts on CCTV and 
RT account for 47.8% and 89.0% of speakers respectively. These numbers reflect both networks’ 
frequent use of their own journalistic staff as interview subjects, with CCTV journalists 
accounting for 14.3% and RT journalists accounting for 31.8% of their respective speaking 
actors. Removing all CCTV affiliated speakers, the number of experts in its coverage drops to 
33.5%, still high compared to AJE and DW but not as drastic. In CCTV’s case, foreign and 
Chinese experts provided knowledge and interpretations that substantively supported Chinese 
policy, thereby lending their own credibility to Chinese policies and interests while avoiding the 
appearance of pure government propaganda, an important goal for CCTV’s managers as seen in 
Chapter 3. RT’s Boom Bust, on the other hand, relies heavily on one kind of expert not 
necessarily seen in other IBs: American university professors account for nearly 22.1% of expert 
                                                 
52 Here again, we see that CCTV devotes sustained attention to the Asian region as its editorial mission 
would suggest. In addition, independent expertise may well signal to viewers that CCTV can operate as a 
trusted source for information on Chinese economic news and policy.  
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speakers and 19.7% of all speaking actors. They are the best-represented group, other than RT 
staff, on Boom Bust. Instead of putting Russian officials or economic actors forward, as one 
might expect (Cull 2009b), RT empowers Americans who occupy an independent elite position 
to disseminate information and project economic narratives. Indeed, RT’s reliance on American 
speaking actors is pronounced when compared to the other IBs. PD literature often assumes that 
IBs privilege the voices of sponsoring state officials as projectors of state narratives.  However, 
AJE features only one Qatari in the programs under review and RT includes no Russian 
speakers. This may be a function of topic choice, because neither IB directly covers national 
economic stories. However, both networks claim to diversify news by providing both agents of 
underreported states as well as showing regions of the world traditional journalism leaves under 
covered. AJE’s use of non-Qatari speakers suggests that if the network promotes state narratives 
and policies it does so by using foreign speakers. In this case, AJE does follow its editorial line 
of “giving voice to the voiceless” as speakers from the global south accounted for 67.1% of 
speakers.53 Unlike CCTV and DW, state policy and narrative projection must be done through 
the voices of non-Qatari’s indicating a potentially different public diplomacy strategy may be at 
play. 
On RT, the results show that 76.9% of speaking actors were American and 5.2% British 
while the remainder’s nationalities could not be determined. This is by far the most limited 
number of nationalities of any network. In part, this can be accounted for by the nationalities of 
the Boom Bust staff, all of whom are American and often serve in a double capacity as journalist 
and interviewees. However, when we take into account that (1) many speakers are university 
                                                 
53 That said, analysis of AJE’s speaking actors demonstrates that the greatest frequency of speakers came 
from the USA (11), the UK (11), China (8), and Nigeria (7). India by way of contrast had four total 
speakers. So when viewed in total the South is widely represented, American and British appear at a 
higher frequency. 
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professors, (2) the show is based in the USA’s Eastern Time zone, and (3) its story focus is often 
on the USA, it appears that the PD strategy of Boom Bust is not to diversify news with wider 
coverage like AJE or to put forward under covered issues like CCTV. Instead, the strategy 
appears to directly address very particular audiences like Americans, British, and Europeans to 
provide them with alternative interpretations of economic news. While similar to AJE’s strategy 
of omitting Qataris, the limited variety of speakers indicate that RT’s narrative projection 
operates not by using a variety but with a deep focus on specific target states.  
Chinese people were the dominant nationality on CCTV coming in at 36.3% of speaking 
actors, followed by Americans (14.4%). Much like CCTV, Germans accounted for the highest 
percentage of DW speakers’ nationality (54.7%), followed by Greeks (12.3%). This tracks with 
DW’s editorial focus on the Greek debt crisis, which accounted for 7 individual news items or 
11.4% of the total, more than any other individual story. These two broadcasters, therefore, 
conform more readily to PD theories. Likewise, each broadcaster illustrate counter-hegemonic 
qualities in different ways that suggest states may utilize diversification of news in ways that 
serve state interests. 
The analysis thus far leads to some preliminary conclusions about the use of counter-
hegemony to project state interests. Figenschou (2010) operationalized counter-hegemony in 
terms of geography and speaking actors. In the first category, a channel that covers the Global 
South more was more counter-hegemonic. Likewise, non-governmental figures and non-elites as 
speakers suggested that channel was counter-hegemonic. DW and CCTV, despite divergence in 
their journalistic traditions and legal frameworks for their broadcasters hew closely to 
expectations of IB content in terms of promoting and projecting the state as well as expectations 
for financial journalism in relying on elites. However, RT’s divergence suggests a few 
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conclusions that challenge expectations. First, in the strictest sense, Boom Bust empowers a 
group not often present in newscasts or economic news, even though most of those speakers are 
American or British. Second, RT’s lack of Russia coverage could be interpreted in the same way 
as AJE’s, as proof of a truly global and altruistic editorial line or a strategy to avoid criticizing 
the sponsoring state. However, Pomerantsev (2014) suggests that RT’s original strategy of 
broadcasting programs about Russian culture in a positive light yielded low ratings.54 Their new 
strategy is to “climb inside existing Western ideological narratives,” and promote narratives 
hostile to Western hegemony in general and US hegemony specifically (2014, 19). The 
programming analyzed here supports this assertion given its overwhelming focus on the USA 
and Europe and the specific topics of many stories. Boom Bust covered topics such as, oil, 
currency, the Greek Crisis, and US Federal Reserve policy that all other networks covered. 
However, they also covered stories no other program covered such as sport economics, bitcoin 
(repeatedly), drug legalization, Bernie Sanders’ candidacy, data encryption, and even reader 
mail. Using experts with institutional authority such as academics means Boom Bust’s narratives 
“climb” inside the legitimation narratives of the West by accessing traditional intellectual elites 
from one of its main geostrategic rivals, the USA. This is a strategy very unlike that of CCTV,55 
which empowers Chinese people to speak for China and about other countries in a way that, 
presumably, normalizes Chinese economic policy.  
Before moving to the next sub-section, I need to analyze the place of activists in 
economic news, especially given AJE and RT’s editorial promise to cover news outside the 
                                                 
54 Both CCTV and DW employ this strategy in addition to covering hard news, going so far as to connect 
people to language instruction. Activities such as these fall under Cull’s (2009b) categories of “cultural 
diplomacy” and “exchange”, which promote the sponsoring nation’s cultural achievements and encourage 
interaction across borders between citizens.  
55 Sponsored by a state that also has geostrategic conflicts with the United States. 
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mainstream and counter-hegemony’s potential to undermine Western rivals. In terms of featuring 
grassroots political activists, no network can truly claim to be counter-hegemonic in featuring 
independent political voices; however, the networks also did not serve as a platform for 
government officers of the sponsoring state, indicating they do not merely serve as platforms for 
unfiltered government speech.56  CCTV featured activists such as John Christensen of the UK 
based Tax Justice Network57 and AJE showed activists from Frack Free Somerset and Global 
Justice Now, but grassroots political activists remain almost invisible in IB content with few 
being shown by the other two networks.  
Conforming to patterns identified in financial journalism more broadly, IBs typically 
feature elites in their economic news. (Fahy, O’Brien, and Poti 2010) (A. Robertson 2010). 
However, speaking actors rarely worked directly for the sponsoring government. In the case of 
CCTV, we can account for the prevalence of political actors as part of the station’s editorial 
mission to cover Chinese news and timing of the Two Sessions. The prevalence of other 
speaking actors showed more variation, with RT relying almost exclusively on experts and 
specifically Americans and British and DW and CCTV relying on their own nationals and a 
more even distribution of speaker types. RT’s deviation from this norm is particular noteworthy 
as it supports scholarly and journalistic charges that their programing empowers “fringe” figures 
in the West while cloaking itself in the language of subversive and hard hitting journalism 
(Nimmo and Eyal 2016). As a tool of PD, RT shows that IBs can project state interests and 
narratives while eliding criticisms of the sponsoring state.  
                                                 
56 Chapter 6 takes these findings and applies media studies literature on news protest reporting.  
57 That CCTV featured protestors and activists at all may surprise those who feel that the network is 
merely a mouthpiece of the CPC (Nye Jr. 2013; Rawnsley 2015b).  Chapter 5 shows that CCTV, like RT, 
is more than capable of covering activism, but only in as much as it accords with their state interests or 
undermines geopolitical rivals.  
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4.1.3 News Norms – How we do Things Here 
Speaking actors on the news are eyewitnesses to events, or experts with the credibility to 
comment on them, and provide the viewer with the sense of being there (Zelizer 2007). As news 
organizations, international broadcasters need this credibility to avoid being perceived as 
propaganda. Cull argues that the “most potent element of IB has been its use of news, especially 
when that news is objective” and the “entire practice of IB with the ethical culture of domestic 
broadcast journalism, and turned IB into a mechanism for diffusing this culture” (2009b, 21). 
However, Chapter 3 showed that the media systems of each state shape the journalism culture of 
their international broadcasters. Put another way, the news norms of each state influence the 
ultimate form of news content on a broadcaster.58 To examine the different news norms of each 
network, I coded the reporting style of each news item: did the item use in studio or onsite 
reporting, interviews in studio or on site, or some mixture of these categories. Onsite items are 
physically close to the location of the news issues, while in studio reporting stays in the main 
studio. Interviews are similarly divided but focus exclusively on interviews with individuals (see 
Appendices A and B)). As with speaking actors and geographic focus, the networks’ show clear 
differences in their news norms. RT and AJE are almost polar opposites in their news norms. In 
contrast, DW and CCTV focus more on their domestic economies and utilize a wider variety of 
reporting styles.  
                                                 
58 The presumption here, based on Chouliaraki’s (2006b, 2010b) studies of mediated suffering, is that on 
site reporting and interviews with average people living through the news event invite greater viewer 
identification with those depicted. However, as Robertson (2010) notes, there are different levels of 
engagement that news reports can provide. Verifying that an onsite report, as opposed to a studio item 
with archival footage, increases the “moral imagination” of a viewer requires audience centered research 
methods and is thus beyond the scope of this dissertation.  
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Table 4.4 Newstype Frequencies 
 Studio Site Studio 
Interview 
Site 
Interview 
Roundtable Mixture N =  
AJE 0.0% 47.4% 24.6% 0.0% 15.8% 12.3% 57 
CCTV 33.9% 23.7% 2.0% 2.0% .1% 32.0% 738 
DW 5.0% 55.0% 1.7% 5.0% 0.0% 33.3% 61 
RT 20.8% 1.0% 60.4% 3.9% 2.4% 11.6% 207 
 
As seen in Table 4.4, AJE and RT reflect notably different news reporting styles. More 
than any other network, RT relied on studio-based interviews, in studio one on one interviews, 
(60.4%) followed by in studio news items, items which to not leave the television studio 
(20.8%). In contrast, AJE reported on site 47.4% of the time. Because onsite reporting typically 
includes interviews, AJE’s reportage connects viewers with local political speakers, economic 
speakers, ordinary people, and workers. A report from Nigeria on energy, for example, featured a 
mother and son watching television and enduring a blackout bringing home the personal 
struggles of individuals dealing with poor governance. In this case, credibility relies on literally 
being there. RT’s reliance on expert opinion and studio interviews means they derive their 
credibility via the studio and questioning of RT staff. In the process, Boom Bust offers a 
constrained source of news, which limits the possibly of contention in their content, meaning that 
the program can project consistent strategic narratives of their geopolitical rivals.59 Though state 
control is still a factor in editorial decisions, AJE, by contrast, adheres to British journalistic 
traditions, brought to the network by the many transplants from the BBC. It therefore depicts 
multiple sides of issues via onsite reporting, increasing the likelihood of contention in its content. 
Neither AJE nor RT features citizens of its sponsoring state, suggesting that the PD role of each 
network does not build their credibility depicting the sponsor or its representatives directly. This 
                                                 
59 Contrast this with CCTV’s addition of live studio interviews and on site coverage as a means of gaining 
credibility with Western audiences as seen in Chapter 2. 
139 
 
necessarily complicated our understanding of IBs as projectors of state narratives by calling into 
question their chosen credibility building techniques.  
DW and CCTV both use onsite (stories from the location of the events depicted) and in 
studio reporting, frequently mixing them to cover domestic issues. Made in Germany features 
onsite reporting in 60% of its domestic news items. Since site reporting typically includes onsite 
interviews, often with economic experts, DW’s reporting style seems to invite viewers to engage 
directly with people, and particularly economic actors based on the numbers of business people 
interviewed. Reflecting Germany’s free press tradition, speakers also represent different 
opinions. DW stories typically begin with individuals, visually focusing on them at work or 
home, the narrator mentioning them by name in the first sentence of the report and then 
discursively linking them to the larger topic of the story. The tugboat captain in the introduction 
is one such example, as are a young Greek and an Italian woman starting new jobs at the ECB in 
Frankfurt. DW’s credibility building relies on a tightly focused onsite depiction of speakers, 
often Germans themselves. Stories then return to the studio for expert analysis. Often the 
speakers are members of elite think tanks such as the German Institute for Economic Research or 
academics from Cologne or Hamburg University.  
CCTV follows a similar pattern, combining mixed style and onsite reporting in the 
majority of new items in domestic and intersectional items. The key difference is that CCTV 
items typically begin with a focus on governmental policy or larger economic trends, like the 
CPC’s authorization of three free trade areas (FTA) or the growth of ecommerce and online 
payment methods in China. A typical story, for example, examined economic slowdown in 
Northeastern China, which was introduced in studio, and found Chinese economic actors, in this 
case a car wash owner and the co-founders of a magnesium foundry, to describe their recent 
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difficulties. The foundry owners blamed a lack of government oversight and regulation of State 
Owned Enterprises in the area (SOE) as well as a lack of market mechanisms to signal when 
decisions and plans should be changed to reflect new conditions. This kind of report exemplifies 
the Chinese model of journalistic criticism by censuring local or regional governments and 
subtly suggesting to the central government that it has a responsibility to correct the problem 
(Zhao 2012). While this story did not continue in studio, CCTV favors expert speakers to all 
other types and uses them both on site and in studio to provide context and analysis. In this way, 
CCTV combines elements of Chinese journalism, eschewing direct criticism of the CPC and 
state, with Western onsite reporting and interviews, sometimes with foreign experts. This 
suggests that CCTV melds Western and Chinese news norms to build credibility via independent 
experts to project narratives and explain Chinese economic news.  
The ways in which international broadcasters present the news, onsite or in studio, expert 
interviews or onsite interviews, shapes the ways that a network builds credibility as well as the 
way it projects state narratives. While DW and CCTV used mixtures of reporting styles to 
project their sponsors, AJE and RT occupy opposing ends of a spectrum of onsite reporting. 
Robertson (2010) and Zelizer (2007) demonstrate that onsite reporting is a key means of 
depicting news events and people who live through them, and thus building credibility with 
audiences. Boom Bust’s almost exclusive use of studio items and elite experts means their 
projection of state narratives occurs in a narrower range of possible journalism norms. News 
norms, geographical focus, and speaker selection form the basic contours of IB content and each 
IB demonstrated divergences from PD theory and from previous scholarship on counter-
hegemony. DW and CCTV projected their sponsors routinely, while AJE and RT did so 
indirectly. Some, like AJE and CCTV drew from a wide range of speakers and nationalities, 
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while RT demonstrates a myopic focus on Americans. It is within these contours that specific 
strategic narratives work and attempt to influence foreign publics.  
 
4.1.4 Self-Presentation – I think what the Government Meant to Say Was… 
Scholars of strategic narratives, soft power, and public diplomacy suggest that IBs are a 
key tool through which states may project particular narratives about the world system that bind 
the actions of other actors. Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle, for example, argue that 
“strategic narratives are a tool through which states can articulate their interests, values and 
aspirations for the international order,” and “attempt to overcome… domestic and international 
institutional constraints” (2012, 3). I examine narratives of the international system in Chapter 5. 
Here I examine national identity narratives understood as tools that “set out who… actors are, 
what characterizes them, what attributes they possess, what actions they take, and what motivates 
them” (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2013, 32). Miskimmon, et al. (2013) suggest that 
the international system is composed of actors who inhabit particular identities as states, such as 
great powers, normal powers, and rising powers.60 When a state accepts a particular 
characterization of its international status that identity limits its scope of action. In Chapters 2 
and 3 we saw how the proliferation of IBs often derived from a sense of grievance on the part of 
states who felt their views of the international system were elided in traditional global news 
channels. We should therefore expect to find that the news agenda of each IB, to a certain extent, 
conforms to the economic policy agenda of the sponsoring state as a corrective to perceived 
Western biases. While journalism norms, public diplomacy definitions, and the global news 
                                                 
60 Its complete listing includes those three as well as the unipole/hegemon, great power, and weak/rogue 
states. There are other non-state actors in the system of course but those do not concern us here.  
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cycle likely constrain the freedom of action of an IB, the editorial remits of each channel suggest 
their management have a keen understanding of their role in PD practice. I use this framework to 
ground my analysis of each network’s presentation of its sponsoring state. Because RT and AJE 
devoted no or little attention to their sponsoring state, I examine the narratives applied to their 
rivals and explore possible reasons, benefits, and costs in the next subsection. CCTV and DW 
economic news content, however, indicates that both networks project narratives that arguably 
conform to the image their foreign and economic ministries promulgate independently. In 
addition, I also examine specific issue narratives as a sign of editorial concern with that specific 
policy.  
Miskimmon et al. suggest that rising power narratives entail either an aggressive or a 
peaceful attitude on the part of the rising state,61 and CCTV’s presentation of China conforms to 
their view. As a peaceful rising power, CCTV’s key domestic economic issue is China’s ongoing 
efforts to improve and expand its economy through state-guided reform. The study period 
coincided with China’s “Two Sessions,” a time when the Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC) and the National People's Congress (NPC) meet to propose new national 
legislation (BBC 2015a). Not surprisingly then, CCTV coverage paid a high degree of attention 
to the Chinese economy, and more specifically the role of the Chinese state in shaping it. Several 
leading stories examined CPC policies designed to reform economic sectors including: taxation, 
stock markets, free trade zones, steel production, tax evasion, and fostering the “innovation 
economy” among several others. Reporters were never critical or skeptical of these reforms, as 
literature on the Chinese media system suggests (Zhao 2012). Furthermore, the coverage 
                                                 
61 They also explore scholarship that defines China as a “normal great power,” and this is one narrative 
that China watchers and the Chinese state put forward. But as we shall see below most Global Business 
coverage of China does not deploy this narrative.  
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conformed to stated Chinese policy. The Communique on the Ideological Sphere, for example, 
states, “the people’s faith in China’s economic prospects has risen. In an effort to improve the 
people’s livelihood, we are putting forth new measures to benefit the people so they may look 
forward to a better future” (ChinaFile 2013). In this way, CCTV coverage conformed both to the 
CPC’s vision of a benevolent state guiding economic progress and functioned within the 
parameters of the Chinese media system.  
This focus on the Chinese economy and the Chinese state during the Two Sessions period 
was not an anomaly; it was also a topic in CCTV’s World Economic Forum coverage and 
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) coverage in January, Boao 
Forum and AIIB coverage in March, and G20 coverage in February. While Chinese economic 
clout may scare some, the CPC continually propagates slogans such as “peaceful rise” or 
“China’s Peaceful Development Road" to emphasize their benign intentions (Shambaugh 2013, 
218). While I discuss China’s views of the international system in Chapter 5, it is important to 
underscore the ways reporters presented China as an international actor as they reflect the state’s 
peaceful rising identity narrative. Chinese sponsored events like the Boao Forum, presented as an 
“Asian version of the Davos World Forum” (Sutter 2010), highlighted China’s multilateralism. 
In all, reporters covered the Boao Forum in five items at the end of March 2015, often as the 
leading story. Speakers included several foreign and Chinese experts, many working for large 
Western investment firms, thereby providing a non-governmental source to bolster the credibility 
of the item. Likewise, five stories examined the CELAC forum with Latin American nations, 
featured foreign experts, and emphasized the benefits of Chinese economic multilateralism. 
Finally, the benefits of trade with China was a clearly salient topic for the program, as when a 
series of items showcased China-UK trade deals, one featuring a short interview with then 
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British Prime Minister David Cameron.62 Other stories emphasized the value of China’s rise to 
other economies. The clearest example of this pattern comes from several items in mid to late 
February during the annual Spring Festival, also known as the Chinese New Year. Global 
Business confronted viewers with the holiday’s vast scale,63 but also its multinationalism and 
depicted celebrations of the holiday in the USA, UK, South Korea, and Japan. Items further 
show the increasing numbers of Chinese traveling abroad to places like Belgium, the USA, Hong 
Kong, and Australia. Global Business news items, therefore, showcased the CPC as a benevolent 
guiding hand in economic reform, conforming to expectations seen in Chapter 3, as well as a 
responsible stakeholder in the international system whose rise was mutually beneficial to China’s 
partners.  
In contrast to the Chinese approach, DW journalists adopted a narrative that 
simultaneously holds up German ingenuity and artisanship as a defining feature of their economy 
historically and contemporarily while also suggesting that its economic and cultural traits are 
worth emulating, particularly for other Europeans. In addition, Silcock (2002) suggests that DW 
producers filter story selection through a mythic past,64 which means current news stories are 
read in historical terms that Germans use to negotiate their national identity. At the same time, 
Miskimmon et al. (2013) suggest that Germany increasingly sees itself as a normal power, 
grounding its policy in self-interest within the overall process of European integration. All of 
these features were present in DW coverage. We have already seen the prevalence of ordinary 
                                                 
62 It should be noted that many of these items actually feature David Cameron being directly interviewed 
by a CCTV correspondent and do not use press conference footage that would be available elsewhere. 
While not the relevant topic here, there is an intriguing possibility that political figures who are not from 
the sponsoring state can use IBs to reach the sponsoring state in some way.  
63 Indeed it is the largest annual human migration in the world.  
64 This mythic “Past” contextualizes and frames Germany’s relative youth with its heritage of cultural 
achievement. The term in German is “Vergangenheitsbewaltigung” which means, “managing the past.” In 
its current form, it also includes German war guilt and helps Germans to negotiate that guilt. 
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people and workers as speaking actors on Made in Germany and that these speakers extol the 
virtues of German modeled capitalism. Another example followed Wolfgang Durheimer, the 
new German CEO of Bentley. In an item from late March, DW journalists examined changes at a 
Bentley factory in the UK and featured workers pleased with the infusion of cash from German 
firm Volkswagen. A similar item framed the sale of a German motorcycle manufacturer to 
American Warren Buffett in terms of German economic growth, and thus German strength. The 
combination of the social market economy with economic liberalism is a constitutive part of 
German economic policy (see Chapter 3). DW items on the minimum wage, quotas for women 
in business, and labor union rights, for example, gave journalists and speakers an opportunity to 
engage in debate about the social dimensions of the German economy and tended to emphasize 
conflict. Taken together, DW journalists framed Germany, or rather Germans specifically given 
the relative absence of the state, as a desirable destination for immigration, economically 
dynamic, and responsible in their business practices. CCTV and DW’s coverage projected state 
interests to a degree, but reflect differing approaches to journalism with differing degrees of 
press freedom. Similarly, coverage of specific Chinese and German issue narratives also reflect 
state interests and narratives.  
CCTV’s journalists routinely emphasized the market reforms undertaken by the CPC 
including the internationalization of the currency, reform of state-owned enterprises (SOE) and 
the fostering what they call “mass innovation society.”65 The Chinese state is guided these 
reforms to shift its economy from manufacturing and exports to service and consumption. In 
                                                 
65 An interesting facet of CCTV coverage is their use of terms like “mass innovation society” or 
“entrepreneurship culture” or “belt and road initiative.” They have occasionally used a graphic called 
“Hot Words in New China” that explains these terms to viewers. The use of these graphics, and the many 
verbal asides by hosts to explain what Chinese politics entail, gives their reporting an educational quality 
not seen in other networks.  
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turn, Chinese deregulation of stock markets, foreign ownership, and ecommerce signal the 
CPC’s insistence on economic reform (Xinhua 2015). Fourteen news items directly addressed 
economic reform as their main topic, and several more addressed CPC reforms indirectly, 
showing that program producers devoted sustained attention to the reform program. Frequently, 
particularly during the World Economic Forum summit in January where the Chinese premier 
made a major policy speech, CCTV journalists questioned foreign experts about their views on 
Chinese economic policy. For example, CCTV interviewed Nariman Behravesh,66 chief 
economist of IHS Inc., who says that Chinese plans will improve their quality of growth and that 
the reforms introduced by the state are a positive sign. Taken together, the news items analyzed 
here suggest that CCTV does project state narratives, notably those of China’s peaceful rise and 
economic reform. The use of foreign experts, especially those working in high finance, allowed 
CCTV journalists to operate in a Western framework of journalism by seeking outside and, thus, 
potentially more credible, analysts. At the same time, journalists do not seriously question the 
CPC’s program, and conform to the Chinese model of journalism. Effectiveness aside, CCTV 
programing seen here may “shape the terrain on which policy discussions take place” 
(Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2013, 7). Programming does so by aligning with the 
preferred narratives of the Chinese state, supported by the norms of Chinese journalism, and 
presenting both Chinese and foreign experts as means of credibility building.  
CCTV programming examined a series of current events in the news cycle to project 
preferred CPC narratives of China as a state and the legitimacy of their policy programs. In 
                                                 
66 Other interview subjects in this item included: Abadul Aziz Al Ghurair CEO of Mashreq Bank who 
said that he thinks China has a plan to continue growth even if its not as fast and that the impact on the 
rest of the world is very important, Edmund Phelps 2006 economic Nobel winner who liked the 
reemphasis on turning China into an innovative nation, and Philipp Gerbert Snr. Partner Boston 
Consulting Group who also approved of the focus on structural reforms. 
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contrast, DW wrapped current events in the mythic “Past,” and used German history to explain 
Germany in the present, highlighting the ways in which journalistic norms help to shape IB 
coverage. One episode, for example, on the city of Hamburg began by emphasizing the city’s 
historic mercantile status before moving on to its major economic sectors. On another episode 
economic historian, Werner Abelshauser, spoke of Germans’ historical penchant for saving in 
terms of deeply rooted cultural biases against speculation and the “British speculative stock 
market model,” which in turn explains current German policy towards Greece and undermines 
Syriza’s challenges to austerity policy. Made in Germany maintained the pattern of historicizing 
and then explaining issues across news items. Similar patterns were present in several stories 
including one on the origins of “German frugality” and in a series of news items that focused on 
small German companies that produced luxury items.  
At the same time, intersectional DW news items tended to promote German economic 
policy as desirable for Europe, the region that received the most attention by far. The Greek 
Crisis, Greek Elections, or the possibility of Grexit accounted for sixteen percent of news stories, 
indicating the importance attached to Germany’s neighbor. While the standard news cycle might 
account for this, and surely plays a role given the overall amount of coverage these events 
received in the sample, Greek outcomes directly affect German interests and we should interpret 
DW content through that lens. Recall that the German policy is to pursue “structural reform” of 
the Greek economy through austerity. In addition, German leaders claim these policies are 
simply what had been agreed to by member states and that Germany itself had previously 
pursued similar reforms (Merkel 2012). Journalists reporting on the ongoing Greek debt crisis 
highlighted the tensions between the Greek and German governments. While DW reporters 
interviewed Syriza supporters and protestors, they would balance these with interviews featuring 
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Greek business people who expressed a desire to stay in the Eurozone and German experts who 
urged Greece to adopt “reform” measures while characterizing the Greek government’s position 
as “far-left” or “brash.” Expert guests, typically Germans, routinely called for structural reforms 
of the Greek economy as the only solution to the crisis. As if to highlight the prosperity the 
German model provides, at least four items demonstrated the desirability of German economic 
attitudes by showing immigrants, a Frenchman, a Greek, a Sudanese, and a Mexican, who had 
adapted to their new home. The data support both Silcock’s and Miskimmon et al.’s views on 
DW as a projector of national myth and Germany’s move to a self-interested normal power. 
However, the guilt Silcock identified as a key component of the myth is not present. Instead, 
news items historicize German economic success while also implying that it is a model other 
states should emulate. In these ways DW both follows the German model of journalism by 
providing alternative views, but also supports German national interests by probing the German 
mythic past as a model worthy of emulation that also closely aligns with German policy towards 
Greece.  
Both DW and CCTV project preferred state identity and issue narratives. In this sense, 
both conform to strategic narratives expectations that states use IBs to project preferred 
narratives in an effort to manage the global information environment (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, 
and Roselle 2013). DW’s journalists framed the Greek crisis, for example, in terms similarly 
seen in German government speeches and documents. Likewise, speaking actors, including many 
Greek small business owners, undermined Syriza policy proposals. While the program covered 
opposing views, as an understanding of the German media system suggests they would, Made in 
Germany’s journalists projected a narrative in line with German policies. CCTV reporters, 
operating under a media system where journalists defer to the state, also aligned their coverage 
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with Chinese policies and narratives. Both DW and CCTV roughly conform to our expectations 
of financial journalism as well, given that this particular journalism relies on elite voices and 
typically undermines rhetoric that questions the legitimacy of capitalism (Lee 2014). 
Nevertheless, these two channels present and project the sponsoring state, as can be expected 
given their respective editorial missions and the role of international broadcasters in strategic 
narrative projection and public diplomacy more broadly. The other two networks’ economic 
coverage eschews examination of the sponsoring state, and therefore suggests different models 
of strategic narrative projection.  
 
4.1.5 Opposing Power Narratives – Or watch out for the Other Guy 
It is clearly more difficult to state definitively that RT or AJE economic news presents a 
national identity narrative. Unlike DW and CCTV, whose selection of geographical focus, 
speaking actors, and news norms suggest that the channels conform to existing understandings of 
international broadcasting; AJE and RT operate differently. Counting the Cost is invariably 
present at the site of stories, even when they combine the item with a studio interview. Boom 
Bust goes in the other direction, essentially never reporting onsite and operating in the studio 
with expert figures providing an air of authority for the projected narratives. Because RT and 
AJE do not focus attention on Russian or Qatari economic news,67 the programming analyzed 
here focuses on geostrategic rivals and attempts to undermine their policies. Using the issue and 
geography variables indicates what nations are of most interest to a program’s editorial staff. If a 
                                                 
67 There is one exception, a story on low oil prices and their effect on the Russian economy. That item 
was an in studio interview where the guest was economic strategist Marin Katusa. The item grappled with 
the larger question of dropping oil prices and Katusa claimed that falling prices were the result of a Saudi 
plan to weaken ISIL, Iran, and the USA. Russia, the guest assures us, will weather the storm because of 
its cash reserves and Chinese energy imports.  
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Qatari rival, for example, pursues policies the Emir opposes, Al-Jazeera’s content should reflect 
negatively on that specific state.68 In addition, just as IB content projects the identity narrative of 
the state on CCTV then the identities of rival states are arguably not ones Qatar would assign to 
itself. I examine how each network frames the international economic system in Chapter5, but in 
this section I use the sources on the economic policies of Russia and Qatar seen in Chapter 3 to 
examine the extent to which their respective broadcasters project those policies. As the following 
section will demonstrate, the dominant news narratives embedded RT and AJE coverage target 
rival states and policies by suggesting ulterior motives or incompetence on the part of those 
states. 
Russia grounds its broader foreign policy in terms of “sovereign democracy;” Russia, and 
only Russia, can define its governance norms (Ziegler 2012). The Kremlin thus routinely 
questions  prevailing international norms, including the economic system, and particularly 
Western dominance of it, as we have seen in Chapter 3 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013). 
Practically, the Russian Federation wants Western sanctions lifted (Lavrov 2015) as well as 
greater economic integration with Eurasian states (Dutkiewicz and Sakwa 2014). Energy policies 
are particularly significant as gas exports account for 68% of Russian GDP (US Energy 
Information Administration 2014). While Boom Bust rarely addresses Russian economic news, 
the program tacitly mirrors Russian foreign policy goals by adopting different narratives that 
emphasize the perfidy, incompetence, or maliciousness of the West, particularly the USA, EU, 
and UK. During the period under review, several news items, for example, focused on how 
central bank policies will lead to “currency wars.”69 The currency wars narrative reflects a sort of 
                                                 
68 See Chapter 3 for a thorough examination.  
69 The concept of currency wars comes from Jim Rickards, a strategist for West Shor Funds, and a 
frequent guest on the program.  
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inverse great power narrative, which Miskimmon et al. (2013) suggest frames powers as both 
independent to pursue action but also responsible to other, weaker powers. In a typical example 
from a January episode, Boom Bust host and producer Edward Harrison explained that as the EU 
engages in quantitative easing to try and solve the financial crisis there, the USA wants to raise 
interest rates leaving it “alone” and potentially leading to “currency wars.” These arise from the 
“policy divergence” between the USA, EU, Canada, and other developed nations and will “roil 
markets” until the USA shifts its policy and, Edward promises, RT will continue to watch the 
“policy war.”70 When these international actors pursue policies designed to improve domestic 
economic health, they weaken other economies by “stealing growth” from their neighbors. 
Another example comes from an interview with Axel Merk of Merk Investments who suggests 
that the EU would be better off lifting sanctions against Russia to increase economic growth than 
engaging in monetary policy. At the very least, this narrative frames the USA and EU, as well as 
other advanced economies, as self-interested and shirking their responsibilities as great powers 
(Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2013). At worst they are predatory, where great powers 
are meant to be responsible leaders of the international system, the USA and EU pursue policies 
that benefit only them and will bring about international conflict. Ultimately, these findings 
support scholars such as Pomerantsev (2014) and Price (2014) who argue that RT’s strategy is 
less about making Russia look good than about making its rivals appear hypocritical and self-
interested. It is also worth noting that RT overwhelmingly airs independent elites from the USA 
and UK, who would potentially have more credibility with Western publics. In this way, RT 
appears to be giving a platform to experts expressing a learned opinion instead of a platform for 
                                                 
70 The use of inclusive language, like the host promising that they will continue to monitor a situation for 
“you” as in the audience is a common linguistic trope in the RT programming analyzed here. It invites the 
audience into a personal relationship with the hosts and guests and precludes the possibility of seeing 
economic news and policy on the ground as we do in the other networks.  
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the interests of the Russian state and its leaders. That the key hosts are also Americans means the 
Boom Bust’s presents Americans speaking to American about American issues in several items. 
RT’s economic news content, therefore, does not project Russia so much as it projects the 
“Russian view” (“About RT” 2016) that the Western dominated economic system is a threat to 
Russia specifically and to the sovereignty of states broadly.  
AJE follows a somewhat similar strategy, eschewing coverage of Qatari affairs in favor 
of covering underreported regions and giving “voice to the voiceless.” This editorial line also 
supports Qatar’s broader foreign policy goals based on shared interests between states (Powers 
2012). As outlined in Chapter 3, Qatar’s new Emir wants to shift Qatari foreign policy away 
from its previous openness; and Qatar currently has several rivals on opposite sides of the Syrian 
Civil War. Journalistic accounts suggest energy politics drive Qatar’s involvement in the 
conflict. Syria rejected plans to build a gas pipeline through its territory via Turkey and on to 
Europe, which would have bypassed Iran and Russia, undercutting their stakes in the European 
gas market (Orenstein and Romer 2015).71  Scholarly (Samuel-Azran 2013) and journalistic 
(Booth 2010; NDTV 2010; Fahmy 2015) evidence suggests that the Qatari government uses Al-
Jazeera channels contingently to undermine the legitimacy of their geopolitical rivals and the 
data point to one particular state as a target in economic coverage.  
During the study period, AJE covered Russia in 5.3% of its news items. The overall 
narrative AJE provides both undercuts Russia and Vladimir Putin, while also showing European 
states alternative energy projects, which would free them from Russian supplies of gas. 
Examples of the former come from items that examined the overall health of the Russian 
economy and Russia’s gold buying. In contrast to the RT narrative where the Global North were 
                                                 
71 A trend which Europeans may welcome given the continent’s reliance on Russian energy (Ahmed 
2013).  
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the villains, AJE’s narrative of Russia paints Putin as a feckless and deluded leader who “won’t 
get away with” annexing Crimea and whose presence in Ukraine led to an IMF bailout and 
Western sanctions. In the February 26 episode, for example, three stories appeared to directly 
challenge the Russian “currency wars” narratives and frame Danish plans for energy 
independence as a viable path forward. In the first item, during an interview with David Marsh 
Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum (OMFIF) on central banking, the host, 
Kamal Santamaria, directly queries whether we will see a currency war. Marsh responds that it is 
unlikely and argues that interest rate policies can have a positive effect on economies, a point 
that RT guests continually deny. In the next item, Danish Foreign Minister Martin Lidegaard 
suggests that Danish energy policy gives Denmark more freedom of movement should Russia 
cut off energy supplies. In another news item the host interviews Bill Browder, a hedge fund 
manager who has accused Putin of attempts on his and his lawyer’s lives (Harding 2015). 
Finally, AJE reported on site in Moscow to show Russian shoppers buying goods before their 
currency loses value against the Euro because of sanctions. To the extent that these items created 
a narrative, they paint Russia as a rogue state that bucks the norms of the international system 
(Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2013), suggesting that AJE allows Qatar to “leverage the 
network’s credibility for public diplomacy purposes in times of crisis” (Samuel-Azran 2013, 
1307).  
While AJE’s reporting parallels RT’s economic news by avoiding domestic coverage, it 
also differs in specific ways. Unlike RT, which uses citizens from rival nations to criticize 
economic policies, AJE did not interview a single Russian, interviewing Ukrainians, Danes, and 
British instead. Likewise, the host Kamal Santamaria, of New Zealand, likely reflects the larger 
negative views of Russia RT was initially meant to address. Second, AJE did not focus 
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exclusively on Russia or Iran, but covered a wide variety of states particularly those of the 
Global South suggesting that factors other than geopolitics inform editorial decisions, potentially 
the interests and training of their locally hired journalists. These considerations on the part of 
editorial staff may have long-term effects on network credibility, though further study is required 
to determine this. Counting the Costs news items, therefore, support Qatari interests not by 
depicting Qatari policy as legitimate, but by depicting Russia and its leaders as incompetent and 
malicious.  
RT and AJE’s omission of domestic news items represents a departure from what the 
academic literature would lead us to expect. The USA founded Voice of America, for example, to 
project American journalistic values and promote American interests and policies while 
undermining rival states (Heil 2003). In addition, states founded the post 9/11 broadcasters such 
as France 24, Press TV, Telesur, and Russia Today with the understanding that traditional global 
news channels omitted their national perspectives. As such, IBs exist, within the limits of their 
respective media systems and their legal and editorial mandate, to project the sponsoring state. 
We should see Russia in RT and Qatar in AJE, but do not. The absence of sponsors is, thus, 
unexpected. However, there are several possible reasons for state absence as well as purposes it 
might serve for the state.  
Avoiding domestic stories may serve these broadcasters by diverting attention from their 
sponsors’ lack of press freedom. Indeed, Russia Today rebranded itself into RT in 2009, when 
editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan said “‘Who is interested in watching news from Russia all 
day long’” (quoted in von Twickel 2010). Similarly, AJE’s founder initially sought to segregate 
the English and Arabic branches of the channel, though this ultimately did not come to pass 
(Powers 2012). State sponsor absence in this case would be a means of eliding any potential 
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charges of propagandistic intent or credibility damaging associations with the sponsor. Absence, 
then, would not be a failure of the broadcaster’s PD potential, but a possible strength derived 
from disguising the channel’s origins and relationships.  
State sponsor absence may also bolster the activation role of a given broadcaster. As 
Samuel-Aran (2013) and Price (2014) have suggested, IBs may serve a state’s interest by 
operating as a BBC style news channel, then being activated by the state to aggressively shape 
issue or system narratives to the sponsor’s advantage. Certainly, the data suggests that both AJE 
and RT project state narratives, but subsequent analysis of RT will show that the channel’s 
editors obsessively focus on the USA and UK in economic news content.72 Meanwhile, Counting 
the Cost and AJE do cover a wide array of issues and states. While they may not be the “voice 
for the voiceless,” coverage does follow the economic news cycle. This being the case, future 
studies should question which model builds credibility and with which audiences.  
Finally, state sponsor absence does not appear to undermine the ability of a broadcaster to 
project state narratives or interests. RT content shows remarkable consistency in its anti-Western 
message, even if the speakers’ draw their ideological critique from different ends of the political 
spectrum. That message apparently resonates with many in the West given its 2 million 
subscribers on YouTube and on regular cable services in place likes the UK (Bullough 2013) and 
German politicians’ criticisms of the channel (Amann 2016). AJE may follow the regular news 
cycle, and does provide a fair amount of coverage of the Global South, but as this section has 
demonstrated it also acts to directly undermine Qatari rivals, as in the case of Russia. Each 
channel thus supports state narratives and policies, just not in the uniform way that the majority 
of academic literature suggests. Media systems norms inculcated in journalists help to explain 
                                                 
72 Chapter 5 shows that RT’s regular newscasts cover a similarly constrained set of states. However, items 
do cover Russian affairs.  
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these differences, but financial journalism, specifically its deference to market based values also 
shapes IB economic news content.   
 
4.1.6 Neoliberalism in the Narrative – Markets and the State 
As suggested in Chapter 1, international broadcasters’ economic news coverage is torn 
between two poles. One is the basic requirement to serve its sponsoring states interests, either by 
bringing new and different information to global audiences like AJE or undermining rivals’ 
policy narratives like RT. The other is the generic conventions of economic news, which tend to 
reflect the worldview of business and political elites. While many of the networks here claim to 
diversify global information flows, more voices does not mean more perspectives: “An interview 
with an Indian businessman may not offer a significantly different vision on the importance of 
free market policies to that of a Wall Street banker” (Painter 2008, 24). Processes of media 
globalization and the increase in 24-hours news as well as dedicated financial media are in part 
the result of a neoliberal policy framework adopted by many nations and supra-national 
organizations alike (McChesney 2004). As such, the issue I address here is the degree to which 
network content either supports or undermines neoliberal ideology, understanding that neoliberal 
ideology works as a constraint on possible strategic narratives on the economy. I adopt Harvey’s 
argument that neoliberalism is a “political project” and a political economic theory that holds 
economic prosperity can be secured through liberating “individual entrepreneurial freedoms… 
within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, 
and free trade” (2007, 2). The hallmarks of neoliberal policies, such as austerity, private 
property, the valorization of business and capital, lack of government intervention in the 
economy, and greater importance for finance as an area of economic activity are signs of a 
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neoliberal tone to coverage. Those hallmarks need to be contextualized in terms of each state’s 
stated economic vision and policy goals in order to make sense of the content I have already 
analyzed.  
Recall that each state analyzed here has enmeshed itself, to varying degrees, in global 
capitalist activity. Ong (2006), however, argues that each state engages and incorporates 
neoliberal policies in unique ways that reconfigure the limits of acceptable economic policy and 
state behaviors. Of the states analyzed here, only China’s policy documents give a clear 
indication of the regime’s orientation to neoliberalism by name. As seen in Chapter 3, a recent 
Chinese communiqué on the “ideological sphere” clearly stated that neoliberalism is a Western 
inspired ideology that aims to “change our country’s basic economic infrastructure and weaken 
the government’s control of the national economy” (ChinaFile 2013). Despite signs of 
ideological retrenchment for the CPC, it is also clear that the Party endorses greater 
marketization and greater foreign investment (T. Zhang 2016). Therefore, while the Party 
officially rejects neoliberalism, they appear likely to continue piecemeal implementation of 
neoliberal policies. Russia, likewise, needs access to global markets to export oil and gas and 
generate reserves of foreign currency. However, Russian policy documents indicate that the state 
is resistant to Western capitalist norms embedded in the global economic system (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2013). Meng and Rantanen (2015) have demonstrated the value of comparing 
Russia and Chinese media, and here too comparison reveals states that act under similar 
capitalist pressures but privilege a central role for state action in contravention of neoliberal 
theory.  
Germany and Qatar also engage in capitalist activity. Left-wing critics have accused the 
German government, especially, of a neoliberal austerity agenda designed to discipline socialist 
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parties and policies in Greece and the EU (see for example Allen 2012; Kontochristou and 
Mascha 2014). Indeed, German government policies do show an inclination towards fiscal 
discipline that aligns with the neoliberal outlook on budget balancing and private economic 
activity (Merkel 2012; Schauble 2015). So while the social market economy may moderate these 
sorts of policies, German governmental policy and politicians invoke neoliberal ideas and clearly 
seek greater economic growth through trade and lowering trade barriers (Mahnkopf 2012; 
Stanzel 2016). Qatar, involved in both the global oil economy and the stationing and sale of 
American weapons, remains enmeshed in global capitalist economic systems and arguably enacts 
neoliberal policies, especially on the movement of labor, money, and energy (Hanieh 2014). The 
al-Thani family continues to use its oil wealth to build a Western knowledge based economy 
reliant on Western university professors (Abduljawad 2015; Salama et al. 2016) in accordance 
with neoliberalism’s emphasis on increasing commodification of social activities previously 
dominated by the state (Tyfield 2010). In all four cases seen here, the state plays a clear role as 
facilitator of capital, given their reliance on trade and investment, but the state may be a guider 
of capitalism and resistant to neoliberalism, as in China, or arguably a clearly neoliberal state, as 
in the case of Germany.  
At the core of neoliberal theory is the view markets and private property create economic 
prosperity and that states play a detrimental role in this process. In addition, private economic 
actors, following their self-interest, are the real creators of economic growth, not states. That 
said, China and Russia exhibit openly hostile stances to the USA led international order 
influenced by neoliberal theories while Germany and Qatar are invested in it. Therefore, we 
might expect that CCTV would feature political actors at higher rates than other channels and 
would highlight the role of the state in economic activity. As we have seen, we can answer 
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negatively to the first proposition and positively to the second. CCTV relied more on experts 
than other channels but did not show Chinese political actors at a substantially higher rate than 
AJE. However, on CCTV the state is almost omnipresent, even if its members are not. Gains in 
particular sectors of the Chinese economy featured in stories on internet banking depicting 
customers and small economic actors are the result of state deregulation designed to open up the 
economy to more citizen participants. Partly because the study period contains both the WEF and 
Two Sessions, Chinese political leaders were regularly seen giving interviews or at press 
conferences explaining government measures to guide the Chinese economy towards greater 
marketization. Intersectional news items, those that cover China’s relationships with other states, 
also emphasize the positive aspects of government stewardship of economic development. 
However, Chinese government documents and independent scholarship both indicate that the 
Party State sees its role as primary over the market (ChinaFile 2013; Rawnsley 2015b; 
Shambaugh 2013). Therefore, while Chinese policies parallel neoliberal policy prescriptions 
prima facie, on CCTV the state facilitates and fosters the market for the benefit of the Chinese 
people and foreign investment. This illustrates the limits of neoliberalization, especially in the 
case of states that are openly hostile to those policies. This is not to say, however, that neoliberal 
policy proscriptions do not appear in the data set.  
On RT, by contrast, the market and economic actors are essentially absent. Rather, 
governments engage in economic activity through central banks and policy. In addition, RT 
devoted barely any time to economic actors, preferring experts almost exclusively. The overall 
focus on economic actors can also be accounted for given the subject of these news items (i.e. 
economics and business). Often studio guests critiqued these policies, as when David Beckworth 
of Western Kentucky University claimed that EU stimulus policy would exacerbate the 
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continent’s economic crisis and implied that the ECB is willingly damaging countries like 
Greece and Spain. Interestingly, Boom Bust does not appear to be concerned with the actual 
people affected by these policies, undercutting its counter-hegemonic potential, as items remain 
focused on elite action. Boom Bust’s guests, coming from both the academic left and elite 
business, tend to pull the show’s items in different directions. Guests such as Victor Matheson, a 
sports economist from Holy Cross University, questioned the tax breaks and governmental 
support sports teams receive; while Ron Johnson, from the Institute for New Economic 
Thinking, suggests that central bank policies mask the more efficient operations of markets in 
allocating resources. On RT, governments, particularly developed ones, are predatory or 
incompetent, and guest selection, as other analyses have shown (Nimmo and Eyal 2016), draws 
on “fringes” from both the left and right. If some advocate for greater marketization, this does 
not necessarily reflect Russian policies or preferences, merely their PD goal of undermining 
narratives of Western legitimacy.  
AJE and DW are not influenced by the Chinese state led model of journalism, or Russia’s 
political goal of undermining American hegemony, and are actually invested in the global 
capitalist system. In turn, both networks are more clearly neoliberal in that they interview 
economic actors and tend to cover businesses in a positive way. However, both networks reserve 
a role for the state as the progenitor of reform and security. AJE portrays the relationship 
between economies and the state as one where the state has a role in fostering infrastructural and 
economic development, such as the item on Nigerian or Danish energy where the state’s role is 
to secure and plan for the nation’s energy needs. Presumably, such state action is to the benefit of 
the economic actors from the global south that form a large part of their speaking actors, but the 
use of ordinary people suggests a degree of editorial concern for the effects of these policies on 
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citizens over economic actors. Like AJE, DW depicted the German state as a progenitor of 
reform at home and abroad, but smaller scale economic actors overshadow the state as a site of 
economic activity. When DW reporters address states it is often in terms of reforms or 
development. On DW, the state bears responsibility for increasing internet connectivity for 
example, or the Greeks and the French need to implement “unpopular reforms” as Germany did 
in 2010 to improve economic growth. Nevertheless, the state is not the enemy of the market as 
seen in American or British business media from the 1990s or 2000s (Fairclough 2009; Frank 
2000). 
In Chapter 2, I posited that neoliberalism would form a sort of outer boundary of 
international broadcaster’s economic coverage, that a state would be less likely to project 
messages that would jeopardize their attractiveness to capital. However, the data does not 
support this hypothesis. CCTV follows traditions of Chinese journalism, aligns with the stated 
interests of the CPC, and follows at least some conventions of financial journalism without 
suggesting that markets should have primacy over the state. In contrast, Boom Bust arguably 
does project neoliberal policy ideas when it undermines US and EU central bank policies. 
Nevertheless, RT speakers frequently drew upon left wing or socialist theories of economics as 
well as neoliberal theories to undermine USA and EU policies, the ideological content of the 
message apparently being less important than the target of the message. DW journalists and 
guests frequently admonished Greece on the need for “structural reform” just as Germany’s 
ruling government does and, thus, they may be the most clearly neoliberal in their content. 
However, the relationship between neoliberalism, an ideology that holds the state in contempt, 
and international broadcaster’s economic news is clouded. Any clear connection between the two 
appears moderated by state interests and ideologies as well as the media systems from which the 
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broadcaster arises. Because of these factors, the homogenizing or Americanizing effects of 
greater marketization and financialization feared by scholars such as Thussu (2007a) and 
McChesney (2004) are not manifest in international broadcaster content. While Americanization 
may occur in networks operating according to the profit motive, the evidence assembled thus far 
suggests that state interests and journalism norms remain paramount in determining IB content, 
even in the sphere of economic news.  
 
4.2 Conclusion 
The findings presented here suggest that there are different types and styles of 
international broadcasting. AJE and RT differ from CCTV and DW in their omission of their 
state sponsor, while AJE, CCTV, and DW distinguish themselves from RT in their use of onsite 
reporting and interviews juxtaposed with in studio analysis. In addition, networks varied 
substantively in terms of geographic focus, those who speak on the news, the framing of the 
sponsoring state, and preferred reporting formats. As such, we see a glimpse of how IBs project 
state narratives, presumably in an effort to establish their identities, preferred policies, and shape 
the grounds on which states debate pertinent issues. In each case, international broadcasting 
content did underscore state issue narratives, and in the case of two broadcasters, CCTV and 
DW, with state identity narratives. The other two broadcasters did not directly address their 
sponsoring state, but their content did conform on issue narratives in at least some cases. And 
yet, no channel could simply be labeled “propaganda.” Instead, journalism norms informed by 
respective state’s media system and the norms of financial journalism itself appear to mediate or 
moderate any simple projection of governmental voices. My focus on economic news was meant 
to test the boundaries of state narratives on the assumption that the hegemonic power of 
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neoliberal ideology would delineate the limits of acceptable discourse for the business elites who 
presumably form the core of each program’s audience. Given that all state sponsors seen here are 
enmeshed in capitalist activity, I also suggested that the networks would likely use some content 
to show the state sponsor as a desirable site for investment. While the clearly demarcated 
ideological conflicts of the Cold War are not to be found, capitalism itself appears to be a 
valuable site of inter-state conflict, just within the bounds of capitalist thinking. That said, 
several examples show that neoliberalism’s dismissal of state guided or led economic activity is 
not a component of state economic narratives. In short, the evidence suggests that even with 
differing norms on the role of the press and different definitions of PD, each broadcaster reflects 
and projects particularistic state narratives. In turn, media systems, definitions of PD, and 
newsroom cultures shape the contours of coverage but apparently not the purpose of content that 
addresses issues of explicit concern to the state.  
  Theoretical considerations of international broadcasting tend to focus on the use of 
sponsored networks to improve a state or policy’s image for foreign publics. As such, we would 
expect to see the state and it policies presented in news coverage. While CCTV and DW did 
portray their sponsoring country, RT and AJE did not, instead favoring radically different 
approaches to covering economic news. AJE conformed to expectations based on previous 
research in that they did not cover Qatari affairs but covered a wide range of developing nations 
(Painter 2008; Sakr 2007). RT seems to follow a similar strategy as AJE in not covering 
domestic affairs, at least in this sample, but their laser like focus on the USA and EU suggests a 
different set of priorities at play for the Russian channel. If AJE is “counter-hegemonic” because 
it covers the under covered south, RT is counter-hegemonic because it covers the already 
covered north in ways that deviate from normal economic news coverage. These findings suggest 
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both that counter-hegemony can be operationalized in different ways and that public diplomacy 
strategies can incorporate international broadcasting without much coverage of the sponsoring 
state. RT’s high audience reach and social media presence suggest, in turn, that audiences are 
using RT content not to learn about Russia, as one might do with DW for Germany, but to find 
different types of coverage on the USA and EU. 
Public diplomacy theory suggests that IBs can serve as an advocacy platform for 
sponsoring state officials to reach foreign publics (Cull 2009b). In addition, studies of IBs and 
private economic news suggest that political leaders and economic elites should be more 
prevalent in the sample than workers, academics, and ordinary people (Fahy, O’Brien, and Poti 
2010; Figenschou 2010). My findings suggest that the networks here are different from specialist 
economic news given their use of independent experts, small-scale economic actors, and in the 
case of DW ordinary people. As such, the programming analyzed here does not conform either to 
PD or economic news studies. Again, this suggests varied strategies for engaging with foreign 
publics by showing non-political speakers. Reception studies are needed to fully flesh out if 
audiences view these speakers differently or if their presence affects the credibility of the station.  
Work on strategic narratives emphasizes IB’s potential to disseminate narratives and 
narratives about states are present in the data set (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2012). 
Like the findings on geographic focus, the strategic narratives present in the data work in 
different ways, with DW and CCTV providing narratives of their respective state and AJE and 
RT provided narratives of geostrategic rivals. The narratives seen here suggest that international 
broadcasters can and do contextualize sponsoring state’s and their policies for foreign publics but 
also that erasing the sponsoring state from coverage, in favor of rivals, is a viable strategy. It 
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remains to be seen what benefits this might have for the network or its individual program 
editors.    
Finally, no network promoted a clearly neoliberal narrative. Instead, each broadcaster 
framed the relationship between the state, markets, and people in different and complex ways. 
Neoliberal discourse here is not like the valorization of the market and finance seen in economic 
news. More analysis is needed but I would like to suggest that the unique ways in which media 
marketization have unfolded in each of the sponsoring states shapes the contours of economic 
news coverage seen in the broadcasters. Furthermore, each state’s engagement in capitalistic 
activity did not preclude narrative conflict on economic issues; it merely constrained it and 
undermined the possibility of truly debating the capitalistic basis of the global economy.  
This complicates academic understanding of international broadcasting by showing the 
variety of methods and techniques of news production that constitute a given network’s content. 
In addition, while the broadcasters all engaged with some level of state narrative projection, they 
did not have a completely free hand to do so being constrained by financial journalism norms 
informed by capitalist practice. Yet, we saw in Chapter 3 that a variety of actors question the 
foundations and role of the global capitalist system. Those criticisms often operate at a level 
above any given individual state and all networks devoted attention to events outside their 
borders, which is the topic of the next chapter.  
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5 INTERNATIONAL VISIONS OF ECONOMY 
In 2015 longtime leader of Singapore, Lee-Kwan Yew passed away. His death 
represented a chance for news outlets to explore the economic and political development of the 
tiny city state, which had emerged in the post-war world as a beacon of financial clout and good 
governance, if not political freedom. King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia also died in 2015, 
prompting journalists to ponder the future of the oil rich kingdom seemingly beset on all sides by 
rival states. In Ukraine, a simmering, protracted conflict weakened the economy prompting the 
official government in Kiev to request emergency IMF assistance. Economic difficulties were 
not limited to war torn regions as China’s economy continued to slow and the CPC met in their 
annual political sessions to agree on a variety of reforms. These events are unrelated in 
themselves but all received some coverage from the broadcasters analyzed in these pages. In 
these disparate stories, we see how these channels cover global events that may or may not 
directly be of interest to the sponsoring state because broadcasters must function as news outlets 
as well as projectors of state narratives. It is in how networks cover and analyze these events, 
related or unrelated to the sponsor, that we can see their potential to project state narratives by 
diversifying news flows and how their dual role as a news outlet constrains their ability to project 
state narratives. 
Using the same variables as in Chapter 4, this chapter explores how IBs cover 
international news. I examine how each broadcaster deploys (directly or indirectly) narratives 
and frames surrounding the role of its respective sponsoring state within the international 
economic system. Strategic narrative theorists suggest that actors craft and disseminate narratives 
in order to constrain or enable certain behaviors by other actors at three interrelated levels: world 
system, nation/identity, and issue (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2013). Examining each 
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network’s geographic focus, speaking actors, and news norms demonstrates the form IB content 
takes when it projects state narratives of the international system. To test the extent to which IBs 
disseminate these state sponsored narratives, I examine two issue narratives: the development of 
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the January 2015 election of the Syriza 
party in Greece as a way to examine the larger narratives of the world system IBs project. These 
specific news events speak to the structure of the international economic system and state efforts 
to transform it or solidify it given their direct implications for state sponsors and the global 
economic system as a whole.  
My analysis of narratives also has implications for work on contraflow and counter-
hegemony and eyewitnessing. Contra-flow theorists often assume that media flows originating in 
the East and South would have inherent counter-hegemonic qualities by virtue of their 
oppositional flow. Rantanen (Rantanen 2007) and Thussu (2007a), for example, have both 
suggested that RT and CCTV represent potential for contra-flows capable of weakening the 
Anglo-American monopoly on global news. However, few have tested this assertion by 
examining IB content. IB potential for counter-hegemony is all the more important when we 
remember that three of the networks couch their editorial mission in the language of counter-
hegemony. AJE’s first station manager, Nigel Parsons, claimed the network was an opportunity 
to create news “not filtered through the lens of the West” (as cited in Powers 2012, 19). 
Similarly, CCTV materials claim the network is “China's contribution to greater diversity and 
wider perspectives in the global information flow” (CCTV 2010). RT also promised to cover 
news outside the mainstream (“About RT” 2016). In turn, the ability to witness news events 
marks the journalist’s authority and credibility (Zelizer 2007). These statements show that some 
international broadcasters use the language of counter-hegemony to establish their identity and 
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purpose in international news flows by showing audiences news they might not otherwise see. 
Furthermore, this suggests that some states view their IB’s role as being counter-hegemonic in 
the service of projecting the sponsoring state. By witnessing news events CNN and BBC ignore 
or omit, new IBs can create a space in international media that may subsequently support the 
interests of their sponsor. Analyzing geography, speakers, and news norms allows us to see the 
extent to which a channel is in fact counter-hegemonic compared to established global 
broadcasters. In addition, understanding the form IB content takes allows me to determine the 
ways broadcasters project preferred state narratives of the international system. We have seen 
that IBs project state narratives of domestic economic news and, thus, attempt to legitimize 
particular policies and identities for the state sponsor. How IBs choose to constitute that 
authority in international news, and the degree to which international items conform to state 
policies indicates how the broadcasters legitimizes or delegitimizes global economic issues and 
which vision of the world system the state sponsor projects. Economic discourses are particularly 
important as they are subject to a well-developed global governance regime that faced sustained 
criticism from activists (Steger, Goodman, and Wilson 2013) and particular states such as Russia 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013) and China (ChinaFile 2013). In turn, networks like RT and 
CCTV may project narratives of the global economic system that legitimize their own particular 
visions of it and do so by building their journalistic credibility through specific reporting styles. 
I begin by analyzing the geographic focus of each network i.e. the single states and larger 
world regions most commonly depicted in news items. Next, I examine the types of speaking 
actors each network uses as well as the network’s news norms or journalistic style, such as onsite 
reporting or studio items or reliance on interview. These variables permit me to test the extent to 
which each network conforms to previous scholarship on global news. Given the data seen in 
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Chapter 4, I expect each channel to continue to project state economic narratives via their 
editorial decisions of which states they cover and who they empower to speak. Unlike the 
domestic coverage examined in Chapter 4, which I had expected to project the sponsor state 
itself, international news can project narratives to undermine rivals and the international 
economic system as a whole. However, stories about Lee-Kwan Yew and IMF bailouts, for 
example, indicate that a broadcaster cannot simply project state narratives. As news channels, a 
broadcaster must be responsive to the economic news cycle and within that framework 
disseminate state narratives. Examining how a broadcaster deploys eyewitnessing of particular 
states and people provides a means to test the extent to which it conforms to scholarly 
expectations of counter-hegemony and determine the extent to which that broadcaster uses 
counter-hegemonic news as a tool of state power. Finally, I examine strategic narratives seen in 
the news items themselves and analyze how neoliberal policies are present within them. I argue 
that neoliberalism represents an outer limit of discourse as each state sponsor operates within the 
global capitalist system. Within those limits, I test the degree of narrative conformity to state 
interests and goals.  
 
5.1 The World System and its Discontents 
As in Chapter 4’s analysis of domestic news coverage, in this chapter, three variables 
provide the means to test the form each broadcaster’s content in terms of its geographic focus, 
speaking actors, and news norms. These variables serve as an indication of the relative 
importance station manager’s place on specific world regions and which kinds of people become 
the face of international news. These items may or may not involve the interests of the 
sponsoring state, and potentially reflect the financial news cycle. For example, as outlined in 
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Chapter 4, CCTV coverage examined China’s relationships to neighboring states in 28.7% of 
news items,73 indicating China’s specific interests in the Asia-Pacific region. CCTV’s managers 
also want the channel to at least appear to conform to traditional Western station formulas in 
order to be more palatable to international audiences (Jirik 2005; Zhu 2012), suggesting that the 
channel will cover international news stories not directly related to Chinese interests. At the 
same time, CCTV brands itself as a station that diversifies global news flows by covering stories 
not typically seen on Western stations. An IB’s international news coverage represents a 
negotiation between the demands of the international economic news cycle, state interests, and 
media system norms, each of these influence which regions receive coverage, who can speak on 
the news, and the framing of that news should state interests be implicated. I address the actual 
narratives later in this chapter. This section focuses on geography, speaking actors, and news 
norms and style to determine the contours of IB coverage. Doing so allows a detailed analysis of 
IB content and the degree to which it aligns with traditional news and if counter-hegemony is 
instrumentalized for state economic interests.  
 
5.1.1 Geography – Where is the Other Guy’s Country? 
Networks’ geographical focus in economic programing suggests the prioritization of 
certain regions by station managers and may reflect sponsoring state’s interests. CCTV coverage 
of Japan, for example, can project Chinese views of Japanese policy, potentially shaping 
narratives of Japanese policies in ways that benefit China. For channels such as AJE and CCTV, 
                                                 
73 Statistic counts all news items that included the following states: Japan, South Korea, India, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Hong Kong, Australia, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Thailand. While Russia may not be culturally 
Asian, geographically it extends to Asia and it shares a border with China. Several states that could have 
been included, for example Vietnam, did not appear in the data set.  
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geographical focus may reflect broadcaster claims to provide coverage of underreported regions, 
such as Africa or Asia. In this sense, channels such as AJE and CCTV have the potential to 
represent a contra-flow from East to West or South to North and diversify global news content 
(Thussu 2007a). Such diversification, however, is relevant to this study only to the extent it 
reflects a broadcaster’s editorial mission or a state’s specific economic interests. As with 
speaking actors and news norms, geographic focus serves as an indication of the 
instrumentalization of counter-hegemony.  
Table 5.1 shows each network’s varying levels of attention to their sponsoring nation 
using the geography variable, which coded whether items focused on the state sponsor, the 
sponsor and another state, or only non-sponsor states (see Appendices A and B). Most of Al-
Jazeera English and Russia Today news items focus on events outside the sponsoring state 
(98.2% and 96.1% respectively), while China Central Television and Deutsche Welle exhibit 
greater balance between domestic and international news coverage and frequently highlight the 
implications of international news events for their domestic economy through intersectional 
news items. 
Table 5.1 Geographic Frequency 
 AJE CCTV DW RT 
Domestic 0.0% 31.1% 51.7% 1.1% 
Intersectional 1.8% 32.0% 31.7% 2.8% 
Outside 98.2% 36.9% 16.7% 96.1% 
N =  57 738 61 207 
 
While DW and CCTV are more likely to present intersectional stories, each exhibits clear 
geographic biases.  In other words, they are more likely to report on regions where they have 
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specific interests such as Europe and East Asia. To illustrate the geographic focus of each 
network, I coded each news item for its focus on the Global North or South, where state in the 
North include Western Europe, USA, Canada, Japan, South Korea, and Australia and New 
Zealand (see Table 5.2 and Appendices A and B), and for the names of each country featured in 
the report. This scheme was inspired by Cohen and Atad’s (2013) method of coding news items 
for the primary country seen in the lead of the item first and then coding for each subsequent 
state discussed in the item. 
Table 5.2 Northern versus Southern Focus by Network 
 AJE CCTV DW RT 
North 21.1% 23.6% 85.0% 69.3% 
South 56.1% 44.0% 3.3% 7.3% 
Mixed 22.8% 32.0% 11.7% 10.7% 
Total Items 57 738 61 207 
 
As Table 5.2 shows, each channel focuses on the North or the South to different degrees, 
suggesting their relative focus on and prioritization of different regions. AJE’s Counting the 
Cost, as predicted by previous research (Figenschou 2010), focused on the Global South in over 
half of its news stories (56.1%) and a mixture of North/South states in an additional 22.8%. 
These distributions of coverage conform broadly to AJE’s editorial policy of reporting on the 
Global South and providing coverage of under covered regions of the world. CCTV 
demonstrated similar patterns: 44% of its news items focused on the Global South and an 
additional 32% examined both North and South states. Because I coded China as part of the 
Global South, I attribute CCTV’s geographic focus to its relatively high level of domestic news 
items. DW and RT are on the other end of the scale with only 15.0% and 18.0% of items 
focusing on the South respectively. Program coverage of specific countries and regions may 
indicate the relative prioritization each program and/or network gives to that region or country; 
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but it may also reflect the relative capacities of each network in the form of local journalists or 
bureaus, which I discuss in more depth below.   
Not surprisingly then, CCTV and AJE featured the most items covering Asia while DW 
and RT focused primarily on Europe or North America (USA) respectively. CCTV showed 
particular interest in East, South, and Southeast Asia featuring frequent reports on Japan, 
Australia, India, Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, among others. The data suggests that 
CCTV does in fact examine Asia in accordance with its goal to emphasize “events taking place 
in Asia” (CCTV 2010). Doing so gives China the ability, even if not always exercised, to project 
state narratives on East Asian economic issues. Indeed, Global Business devoted regular 
coverage to the Japanese, South Korean, and Australian economies and China’s relationship to 
them. Asia-focused items also serve Chinese interests as their regional economic policy 
emphasizes what President Xi calls the “Asia-Pacific Dream” (Xinhua 2014) or a deepening of 
economic connections between Asian states designed to reduce the power of the USA in the 
region (Tiezzi 2014). CCTV, in this way, directly covers countries of particular interest to the 
Chinese state. However, CCTV did not cover African or Middle Eastern countries with greater 
frequency, as we might expect given Chinese investment and interest in the African continent 
(W. Robertson and Benabdallah 2016; Shambaugh 2013). The lack of Africa coverage might be 
accounted for by the fact that Chinese investment accounts for only 3% of all non-African FDI in 
Africa (Dollar, Tang, and Chen 2015). Other CCTV content may focus on African nations more; 
however, dedicated economic news does not.  
AJE included more coverage of Asian and African countries, with Iran, India, Japan, 
Nigeria, Nepal, Ukraine, Bangladesh, and Kenya receiving the most individual news items. 
However, there are not more than three items per state. This certainly owes to the relatively 
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lower number of episodes in the sample, but indicates that AJE covers the Global South with 
more breadth than depth.74 In these ways, CCTV and AJE do follow their editorial policies by 
providing greater geographical variety in their coverage. This suggests that CCTV and AJE, with 
their focus on Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, do provide coverage that operates as a contra-
flow bringing information from under covered parts of the world to the Global North (Thussu 
2007a).  Both of these networks appear to diversify global news flows, and in the process 
arguably weaken Western hegemony over the global flow of information, a stated interest of the 
Chinese state (Zhao 2012). In contrast, DW and RT remained focused on the Global North.  
DW reported mostly on European states such as Greece, Italy, Norway, Switzerland, and 
the UK and then usually only in terms of that state’s relationship with Germany. RT covered the 
USA, Greece, Germany, and the broader European Union most often, but also routinely 
mentioned single nations as part of broader economic trends. When reporting on oil prices, for 
example, hosts discussed states such as Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Iran, UAE, as well as the USA 
and European Union. However, as seen in Chapter 4, this should not be mistaken for depth of 
geographic coverage as the most common states in news items remains Russian geopolitical 
rivals such as the USA and UK. Even in those stories where RT journalists mentioned states 
from the Global South there was little sustained attention. As such, neither DW nor RT economic 
news content is geographically dispersed in the ways AJE and CCTV are and when viewed in 
terms of other features coded in the sample neither channel engages with international economics 
news in a sustained way. Their content choices intimate that the developed West is a singularly 
important area to cover. Digging deeper, however, indicates that all of the broadcasters may 
operate in a journalistic framework that elevates the West as a site of coverage. 
                                                 
74 In addition, AJE reporting potentially follows  similar patterns of coverage as Western journalistic 
enterprises (Ozohu-Suleiman 2014), as seen in subsequent subsections and Chapter 6. 
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AJE and CCTV covered the Global South with greater frequency and more depth with 
their use of onsite reporting and local speakers than DW or RT. As Sakr (2007) suggests, 
however, simply meeting the threshold definition for a contra-flow is not the same as being 
counter-hegemonic (i.e. providing information that challenges existing power structures). Table 
5.3 shows that specific countries, notably the USA, China, Greece, Japan, Switzerland, and 
Russia, actually receive the most AJE and CCTV coverage in terms of total amount of news 
items.75 I based these figures on the “geography” variable that coded for the verbal and visual (in 
words) of individual states (see Appendix A and B). 
Table 5.3 Top Three Countries Reported 
AJE CCTV DW RT76 
China (7) USA (43) Greece (6) USA (66) 
USA (5) Japan  (26) USA (3) Greece (17) 
Russia (3) Greece (15) Switzerland (2) Switzerland (6) 
 
This may be a function of global economic events during the study period: news events 
themselves constrain and enable coverage of particular parts of the world. Networks gave the 
Greek Crisis, for example, ample coverage. The crisis was an ongoing story with conflict and 
importance to business audiences in addition to the implications it had for Germany and Russia. 
Similarly, stories on the deaths of Lee Kwan Yew and the Saudi king, oil prices, and Federal 
Reserve policy received coverage. The news cycle accounts for at least some of this attention. 
Nevertheless, the news cycle does not seem to be able to account for AJE’s frequent reports on 
China or CCTV’s regular economic reporting on countries such as Australia, South Korea, and 
                                                 
75 Switzerland may seem to be an outlier given its relatively small size. However, the coverage seen in RT 
and DW stems from moves by the Swiss banking authorities that “unpegged” their currency from the 
Euro, a move that drastically increased its value in a short period. These stories were therefore event 
driven as opposed to necessarily reflecting a deeper commitment to covering Swiss affairs.  
76 Russia Today devoted substantial coverage to what could only be coded as “European Union” given the 
new items focus on the broader governance of the European Union itself. These stories often combine 
coverage with the Greek Crisis given Greece’s membership and reliance on bailout funds from the EU.  
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Japan, none of whom were undergoing crises or policy shifts during the study period. Editorial 
interests, for example CCTV’s claim to be a “link to Asia” and DW’s commitment to present 
Europe play a part. Unlike domestic coverage, where state projection plays a direct role, news 
cycles appear to interact with state interests to influence the geographical focus of coverage.   
While key players in geopolitics and the global economy draw network’s geographical 
focus, meaning that Western nations received the majority of coverage, we can see that each 
network has particular geographic emphases. In this sense, there appear to be countervailing 
pressures on news item selection. On the one hand, following the broader news cycle potentially 
signals that the broadcaster should be taken seriously as a news outlet because it does not avoid 
important stories. On the other, a network must still, in some way, fulfill its state mandated 
editorial position. These facts call into the question the real potential of these channels as 
potential contra-flows simply based on geography when editorial line and news cycles influence 
coverage.  
5.1.2 Voices of the World Disunited 
All of the broadcasters analyzed herein have some degree of international news coverage, 
though AJE and RT have significantly more. International news coverage can serve an editorial 
goal, like CCTV’s coverage of Asia, or follow the international news cycle, as when three 
networks covered the death of the Saudi king. As in Chapter 4, broadcasters empower speaking 
actors featured in international coverage to frame news and project narratives. Unlike domestic 
news, there is no clear presumption about which speakers networks would feature. International 
news can surely serve some state interests, but the impetus to feature nationals of the sponsoring 
state as advocates for that state (Cull 2009b) does not apply here.  In its place, editorial mission, 
journalism norms, as well as state interests seem the most likely pressures informing speaker 
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selection. Because the programs under analysis in this dissertation are oriented towards 
economic elite expectations, knowing who is empowered to speak is critical: who gets to explain 
and eyewitness economic activity in global news is a critical part of shaping the news agenda 
(Zelizer 2007). In other words, who has the credibility to explain global economic activity, who 
is affected by the policies of states, and who are the heroes and villains of state narratives. 
Ideological considerations may also play a role in speaker selection, particularly in outlets such 
as RT whose coverage almost exclusively examine the developed West. Examining the extent to 
which speakers counter trends documented in global news is particularly important because three 
of the four networks under review, CCTV, AJE, and RT, claim an editorial mission of 
diversifying global news content. Beyond public diplomacy considerations, speakers selected 
from underreported regions or non-mainstream views represents the possibility of both contra-
flow and counter-hegemony in global news content in service of state interests.  
Perhaps the most notable finding is the apparent network consistency in speaker selection 
practices across domestic, intersectional, and outside world news items. As demonstrated in 
Chapter 4, only DW and CCTV conformed to predictions by scholars such as Cull (2009b) that 
IBs privilege the voices of domestic speakers. It also showed that DW, with no counter-
hegemonic mission, depicted workers and ordinary people at higher rates than any other network 
and that RT used experts almost to the exclusion of other speaking types. AJE and CCTV 
speaking actor selection fell in between these two poles. The types and numbers of speaking 
actors remains relatively constant across reporting, owing I suggest, to the particular news styles 
each network employs. RT’s near exclusive use of studio items and interviews mean their 
journalists are unlikely to interact with ordinary people and workers. This stylistic choice 
necessarily precludes people who are not political, economic, or experts. In contrast, exclusively 
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on site reporting means working journalists can interview ordinary people and workers in 
addition to elites. Choosing studio reporting does not need to constrain the nationality of 
interview subjects, but in the case of Boom Bust producers have apparently chosen to use 
American and British males to the exclusion of almost all other nationalities.7778 As seen in 
Chapter 4, RT continued its practice of using experts, speakers who provide analyses of news 
item, to testify to the corruption or incompetence of the managers of the global financial system, 
while AJE continued to select equal parts experts and economic actors, following by political 
figures, and lastly workers and ordinary people on site. DW used more ordinary people, speakers 
who are citizens on the street, and workers while CCTV uses experts to a greater degree but not 
as much as RT (see Appendices C and D).  
Table 5.4 Speaker Frequency by Nationality 
AJE CCTV DW RT 
USA (10) USA (175) Greek (27) USA (133) 
UK (10) UK (69) UK (8) UK (9) 
Chinese (8) Greek (63) Polish (7) Greek (5) 
 
Speaking actor variables show a consistent use of type across international and domestic 
stories, but when we examine these numbers by nationality, claims of contra-flow and counter-
hegemony on the part of networks appear much weaker. Recall that nationality was determined 
by features such as whether or not the speaker worked for particular governments, or secondary 
sources and reportage, which pointed to their place of birth or identity. As seen in Table 5.4, 
when we exclude nationals of the sponsoring state networks featured Americans and British with 
                                                 
77 Greeks, who accounted for five speakers on RT, really amount to one individual. Yanis Varoufakis, 
former Syriza Finance Minister and professor of economics, frequently appeared on the program and 
hosts called him “friend of the show.”  
78However, this does not mean that audiences engage with speaking actors in the same ways they would 
with those same actors in domestically oriented stories. How they would receive these messages and react 
to them is a matter of speculation.  
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greater regularity than any other nationality.79 Speaker selections like this illustrate both the 
dominance of the USA and UK in international finance, but also the importance networks place 
on reaching out to English speaking audiences. AJE, despite its use of onsite reporting and high 
number of items from Asia and Africa, routinely featured Americans and British for analysis 
interviews, as did CCTV. Because speakers witness and build credibility for a network (Zelizer 
2007), CCTV’s selection of foreigners reflects the broadcasters efforts to appear more Western 
to increase its international appeal (Zhu 2012). AJE’s selection process is more opaque, but may 
reflect its roots in British journalism. As such, even though both networks depicted under 
reported parts of the world, the analysis of those events comes from people who commonly 
appear in Global North news content. DW’s high frequency of Greeks stemed from their 
reporting on the Greek debt crisis. As we shall see in the subsection below on the strategic 
narratives themselves, many of these Greeks were small business owners who express fears 
about the Syriza government’s policies and a potential exit from the euro. I have already 
discussed RT’s use of American university professors in Chapter 4, but it is also worth noting 
that Americans and British were still the primary, in fact only, speaking actors on stories that do 
not cover the speakers’ country of origin. As such, each broadcaster selected Westerns to speak 
and thereby eyewitness news and build credibility. In the process, channels that claim to 
diversify news do not live up to that promise in terms of speaker nationality. DW, however, is an 
interesting exception whose choice of Greek speakers serves German narratives about the Greek 
Crisis. Again, counter-hegemony appears weak in terms of guest nationality and suggests that the 
broadcasters follow traditional selection practices.  
                                                 
79 AJE’s ten direct reports from/on China account for the relatively high number of Chinese speakers. DW 
featured its seven Polish speakers in reports on Swiss currency, and RT featured fifteen speakers whose 
nationality could not be identified. 
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While speaking actors provide analysis and credibility, journalists themselves are the 
sluice through which news depicts non-journalistic speakers. Therefore, it is important to 
consider the identities and depictions of IB journalists, where they are from, what expertise they 
bring to news content, the newsroom cultures in which they operate. AJE is already known to 
prefer hiring local journalists to report on events in their own countries or regions, even if behind 
the scenes staff are often drawn from the developed world (Figenschou 2010; Powers 2012; Sakr 
2007). Hiring international and diverse staffs is not limited to AJE as CCTV’s economic news 
content features a variety of journalists from different countries. For example, Brit Jack Barton, 
lead European affairs correspondent, and Greek Filio Kontrafouri reported on the Greek crisis 
live from Athens. Shweta Bajaj, an Indian woman with 10 years reporting experience there, 
appeared in onsite reports from India (CCTV 2014). While I will cover this in more depth when I 
examine the news style each network uses, the use of local journalists to report on their countries 
of origins does diversify news content and potentially means that IBs likes CCTV and AJE 
depict economic news in ways that challenge traditional international news gathering. Local 
hires such as these may also guide story selection as these journalists pursue stories of personal 
and professional interest to them. This suggests a mutually constitutive relationship between 
reporting style and contra flow in which hiring practices diversify news speakers while also 
building credibility for the network and thereby by the capacity of the network to project state 
narratives.  RT and DW do not follow local hiring practices in economic news. Boom Bust 
features only American journalists and (as seen in Chapter 4) rarely reports on site. DW’s 
reporting style also eschews depiction of journalists. Although many reports are on site, 
journalists rarely appear on screen and sometimes do not narrate the story. 
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 Each network has a particular style or pattern of guest selection, consistent with patterns 
seen in Chapter 4, suggesting that the factors that influence speaker selection in domestic news 
also shape selection in international news. All networks relied on expert opinion, but RT relied 
on it almost exclusively and thus their economic news separated viewers from people who 
experience the economic malfeasance their guests denounce. AJE, despite arguably being 
counter-hegemonic, rarely features workers or ordinary people. Finally, despite some networks’ 
stated desire to diversify global news, each feature American and British speakers at higher rates 
than other nationalities. This data leaves networks’ claims of diversity in global news speakers 
suspect. In terms of state power and narrative projection, adopting the practices of older global 
broadcasters may give networks greater credibility, as CCTV attempted by incorporating guest 
interviews (Zhu 2012) and AJA did in the Middle East incorporating British journalism norms 
(Sakr 2007). In turn, RT’s unique style means that the channel must build credibility through 
different means. In the case of all networks, only RT truly operates counter-hegemonically, by 
selecting academics over other elites. Nevertheless, weak counter-hegemony means that 
networks cannot leverage their differences for greater credibility. 
 
5.1.3 News Norms – Live from… 
Chapter 4 demonstrated that each network’s news norms followed particular patterns; for 
example, favoring onsite reporting versus studio reporting or combining onsite reporting with in 
studio interviews. In that context, where networks cover domestic news, presenting the 
sponsoring state and its policies is the foremost public diplomacy role of a network. Onsite 
depictions of average Chinese or Greeks, for example, creates “proximity between the spectator 
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and the scene” (Chouliaraki 2006a, 262).80 Therefore, when news programming presents people 
in particular social roles, like politician or worker, it makes those people the face of the news 
story. Likewise, Zelizer argues that eyewitnessing embodies the “on-site presence by which 
journalists constitute their authority for reporting events of the real world” (2007, 410). The 
feeling of proximity provided by eyewitnessing is particularly important when the goal of a 
broadcaster is to provide audiences with information content that is typically absent from global 
news flows, for example news from the Global South as AJE claims to provide (Figenschou 
2011) or CCTV’s view from Asia. Showing those who are affected by global economic policy 
living with the results of such policies could be a potent tool for legitimizing particular state 
narratives while diversifying global news in the service of state goals.  
Using the intersectional (sponsor and other state in item) and foreign (only non-sponsor 
states), my analysis suggests widely varying capacities between networks to report onsite and 
different degrees of willingness to allow unscripted interviews. Boom Bust, for example, uses 
Americans and British reporters and guests on and that particular program is headquartered in 
New York City. Their staff is presumably capable of traveling the country and interviewing 
people directly.81 In addition, the program sent its own correspondents to events like the World 
Economic Forum (WEF) in Switzerland or electronic expos in Las Vegas. RT journalists did not 
interview anyone while on location, preferring to do standup interviews with their own 
correspondents. CCTV’s coverage of the WEF, in contrast, interviewed several economic and 
expert figures about the Forum’s agenda generally and about Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s 
                                                 
80 While Chouliaraki’s specifically focused on images of suffering in war, the key idea is that visual 
framing of people can draw the viewer of those images into greater engagement with them. Any actual 
engagement is not the subject of this dissertation but should be part of future research.  
81 Indeed new items analyzed in Chapter 6 indicate that RT coverage of the Greek bailout, Ukraine 
conflict, and Syrian conflict all use on the ground reporting combined with interviews. 
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speech to the forum specifically. This indicates that Boom Bust’s choice of expert speaking 
actors, notably university professors as seen in Chapter 4, and reliance on in studio news items 
does not reflect limitations but rather editorial choice. That choice to strictly limit reporting to 
the studio with interview guests suggests that Boom Bust’s news norms limit potential conflict to 
project relatively narrow economic narratives. 
Table 5.5 Intersectional and International Items by Story Type 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, AJE brings the viewer to the location of events and 
features speakers from a variety of different socioeconomic levels and nationalities. Table 5.5 
shows that AJE does appear to shift the geographical focus of its coverage given geopolitical 
interests, addressed in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, the types of new items Counting the Cost airs 
invariably depicts people directly influencing and affected by the issue in question with 46.4% of 
items on non-sponsor state being solely on location and another 16.1% combining on site report 
with other news styles. RT’s Boom Bust presents economic news from a studio in New York, 
debated by (mostly American, white and male) experts. The global economy presented is 
abstract and abstracted; agents in the economy seemingly never speak for themselves, stories 
presume victims of the Western capitalist system and do not depict them.82 RT’s eyewitnessing 
                                                 
82 Why this should be the case is not especially clear as it would not be difficult to find average people 
exasperated with capitalism, as the 2016 US elections show. The regular news items analyzed in Chapter 
 AJE CCTV DW RT 
 Intersec Internat  Intersec Internat Intersec Internat Intersec Internat 
Studio 0.0% 0.0% 30.8% 45.9% 5.3% 10.0% 0.0% 22.2% 
On Site 100.0% 46.4% 36.4% 42.6% 57.9% 30.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Studio 
Interview 
0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 64.8% 
On Site 
Interview 
0.0% 0.0% 12.4% 0.0% 5.3% 10.0% 0.0% 5.6% 
Roundtable 0.0% 16.1% 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0% 
Mixture   0.0% 12.5% 21.2% 8.2% 31.6% 50.0% 0.0% 7.4% 
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credibility should diminish as the program does not witness anything on site nor did hosts 
interview ordinary people or nationals of the states in the reports. Rather, the data suggests that 
Boom Bust derives its credibility through experts based within the territory of Russia’s 
geopolitical rivals. RT’s reliance on Anglophone experts in international news coverage is so 
consistent, it suggests that editorial choice is the main cause.  
DW and CCTV fall somewhere in between, combining studio stories, interviews, and on 
site reporting. However, they diverge in their use of onsite reporting of international news 
stories, suggesting that CCTV is more capable or more interested in international on site 
reporting. In short, all networks other than RT invest in on site reporting of economic news.  
Geographical focus, speaking actors, and news norms are the form that IB content can 
take: onsite reporting with local people living through economic events or in studio interviews 
with intellectual elites, whatever form it takes a strategic narrative must fit within the form a 
broadcaster selects. Different forms suggest different methods of building credibility for a 
broadcaster as well as the various limitations networks operates under. In the case of 
international news we have seen how broadcasters focus on specific geographic regions, select 
speakers, and use specific news style that may not be counter-hegemonic but do support state 
interests in specific ways. These networks operate as public diplomacy tools in addition to their 
role as news providers. Based on the data seen here and in previous chapters, practical 
limitations and editorial choices shape the ways in which IBs project state and world system 
narratives. To the extent that a given network claims to be counter-hegemonic, that is to diversify 
news and challenge mainstream views of economic policy, it needs to be found in the narratives 
                                                 
6 do depict average people protesting government and capitalism as in their coverage of Greece. Perhaps 
there is something to be said for cloaking oneself in the rational authority of economic expertise, as 
McCloskey (1998) suggested about economists in general, when undermining narratives of the world 
system. 
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themselves. In turn, the possibility that states can use counter-hegemonic news styles to bolster 
state economic narratives must be found in the ways in which networks narrativize specific news 
stories about the global economic system. 
 
5.2 Narratives of the World’s Economic System 
My previous analysis in Chapter 4showed that each network’s domestic coverage 
adopted an overarching narrative for its sponsoring state or, failing that, its geopolitical rivals. 
CCTV depicted China as a peaceful rising power; DW constructed Germany as dynamic and 
worthy of emulation; RT avoided discussion of Russia itself and focused instead on its main 
geopolitical rivals depicted as either sinister or incompetent; and AJE scarcely covered Qatar but 
spent some time on its opponents in the Syrian war, namely Russia who programming described 
as a poorly managed pariah state.  
In this section, I explore world system economic narratives, those strategic narratives that 
describe and thus constrain the behavior of actors, within the global system. The variables above 
– geography, voice, news norms – indicate the various forms that IB content takes. However, the 
main argument I make in this dissertation is that these forms work in the service of state 
interests. The form carries the narratives, and as a result shapes its form and credibility. I explore 
those narratives through two stories that received coverage on most, if not all, channels. These 
stories are the development of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Greek 
debt crisis. The two stories received sustained coverage on most networks, and both directly 
implicated a sponsoring state. Finally, the two stories enmesh national interests, the global 
economic and political systems, and economic forces. As such, they offered fruitful grounds to 
challenge the structure of the world system. 
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5.2.1 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
Founded by China and 73 other states, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) 
is an international lender intended to provide capital to infrastructure projects in the Asian region 
(AIIB 2014; Wong 2016). The Bank’s genesis lay in part with US Senatorial intransigence in 
ratifying changes to the IMF and World Bank governance structure that would have given China 
greater voting rights in those organizations (BBC 2015d). CCTV, AJE, and RT devoted coverage 
to the bank particularly during the last two weeks of March 2015 when several Western nations 
such as the UK, France, and Italy became founding members over American objections. The 
three networks reported on these basic facts but framed them differently and also contextualized 
the AIIB items in ways that reflect different priorities in framing China in general. 
CCTV, RT, and AJE all reported on AIIB with studio items, provided expert 
commentary, and explored the geopolitical dimensions of the bank.83 In addition, all three 
reported specifically on the UK’s membership, highlighting the country’s close relationship with 
the USA. Finally, all three networks reported American resistance to the bank. On the surface, 
reportage on the AIIB appears to be standard financial journalism in that it relied on elite 
speakers, focused on the UK and USA as the lead of the story, and highlighted conflict between 
states. Items also depicted states as the key actor in international economics; private companies 
and market forces remain absent in all three networks’ reporting on AIIB. CCTV, in contrast, 
combined studio items with onsite news reporting, which depicted ceremonies and political 
figures working on the bank and its implementation. All networks used expert commentary, but 
                                                 
83 Made in Germany did not provide any coverage of AIIB, though this does not mean that DW as a 
whole did not cover the bank. We have seen that the program devotes the majority of its items to German 
economic news  
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RT and AJE’s guests, Eswar Prasad and Jack Kingston respectively, are both professors at 
American universities invited to provide analysis. Neither broadcaster featured Chinese or non-
academic speakers on the subject. CCTV featured interviews with several Western and Chinese 
political and expert speakers both onsite and in studio.84 Finally, all three networks covered the 
UK’s membership in the bank, but only CCTV covered several European and Asian states 
joining the bank in subsequent reports. Therefore, while there are similarities across the three 
networks, CCTV’s reportage possessed definitive differences that bring their coverage in line 
with Chinese state interests.  
Each network framed the reason why countries joined, why China wanted the bank, how 
the US reacted, and contextualized the AIIB items in ways that highlight different system 
narratives. Boom Bust host Erin Ade, in the lead item of the March 24th episode, framed 
European motivations for joining the AIIB as a desire for safer investment in Asian countries as 
well as a recognition of Chinese power and stability. While this is a blow to US prestige, China’s 
goals are not “altruistic” but reflect the need to invest in trade given the glut in Chinese 
infrastructure. Similarly, Counting the Cost host Kamahl Santamaria calls the AIIB the “ultimate 
geopolitical power play” that got worse when Western nations “broke ranks” with the US. 
China’s motivation for starting the bank, Santamaria and his guest Jack Kingston tell us, is to 
obtain greater representation in international financial institutions because the US Senate blocked 
the vote to amend the IMF governing structure. European nations, again, desire access to Asian 
                                                 
84 The list is long given that CCTV aired ten stories during the study period, however, it includes: German 
Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, European Parliament President Martin Schulz, Spokesman Chinese 
Foreign Ministry Hong Lei, Country Director Asian Development Bank Hamid L. Sharif; Chinese 
Finance Minister Lou Jiwei, Thai Finance Minister Sommai Phasee, Laotian Vice Finance Minister 
Thipphakone Chanthavongsa; Spokeswoman US State Department Jen Psaki; US Treasury Secretary Jack 
Lew, UK Ambassador to China Barbara Janet Woodward, IMF President Christine Lagarde, President of 
Asian Development Bank Takehiko Nakao, and Choi Hee-nam of the South Korean Ministry of Strategy 
and Finance. This list is not exhaustive.  
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markets and investment opportunities. Despite the differences between each networks’ coverage 
the issue narratives are similar; China wants greater power either in institutions or economic 
profit, the USA feels “threatened” or has lost prestige, and European countries are interested in 
the opportunities the new bank represents.  
CCTV’s narrative of the AIIB varied in several ways and illustrates an alignment of news 
content with the narrative of China’s “peaceful rise” (T.-K. Chang and Lin 2014), thus 
highlighting Global Business’s role as a public diplomacy tool for projecting strategic narratives. 
At the same time, CCTV coverage followed news events in that each story focused on new 
information, specifically states joining the bank as founding members, and thus presented their 
content as part of the regular news cycle. CCTV devoted ample coverage to the AIIB and its 
ever-increasing founding members between March 16 and March 30, 2015. Note also that while 
AJE and RT covered the UK, they did not cover Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, or 
Austria joining the bank. AJE, being a weekly program, has more time constraints, but the daily 
broadcast of Boom Bust could have and did not. This suggests that while the news of increasing 
Western participation developed only CCTV continued to report on it. At one level, the reports 
follow the news; it is arguably newsworthy if several Asian and European countries join the 
bank. On another level, however, reporting on the new members projects the bank as desirable 
and normalizes it while also sidelining American objections. Second, CCTV claimed that the 
AIIB launched in Beijing with “China’s backing,” as opposed to being Chinese led, thereby 
supporting the narrative of China as a responsible stakeholder in the global economic and 
political system seen in Chapter 4 and which parallels China’s policy of increasing the number of 
stakeholders in the global economic system. In addition, the reporting may be a manifestation of 
President Xi Jinping’s recently reiterated directive that state media should serve as a tool for 
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projecting Chinese ideas and supporting Chinese interests (Tiezzi 2016). In turn, CCTV mixed 
content to report in varied geographic locations and uses a plethora of different expert and 
political voices to project President Xi Jinping’s claim that the bank is “consistent with the 
evolving trend of the global economic landscape and will help make the global economic 
governance system more just, equitable, and effective” (Jinping 2016, 2). 
 In one report, the host claimed the UK’s membership has created “concerns” in 
Washington over the role of the IMF and Asian Development Bank. However, the host then 
shows George Osborne, the UK Finance Minister, who assures the audience that the bank will 
complement those institutions and not threaten them. The host supported this line of argument by 
concluding the report saying that the UK will join the other founding members later in the month 
to finalize governance rules. This pattern, reporting on a new member, presenting positive 
comments from members of government or experts, and using both to undermine US concerns 
dominate CCTV coverage of the bank. 
CCTV’s narrative, as seen in the above story, removes China’s particular interests at the 
same time as it undercut American reactions as “concerns” over anger or being threatened. 
Additionally, the host’s positioning of the UK as a founding member negotiating governance 
rules gives the impression of multilateralism instead of the geopolitical confrontation seen in 
AJE or RT. The report suggested that CCTV characterizes the world economic system less in 
terms of conflict and more in terms of cooperation for trade and development in line with 
Chinese calls for greater multipolarity in international institutions (Sutter 2010). In this system, 
states cooperate, or at least can cooperate, to achieve larger goals for international finance. 
Furthermore, CCTV repeatedly used both mainland Chinese and Westerners to support the bank. 
Guests such as the Australian and UK Finance Ministers defended their countries’ decision to 
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join. Expert testimony included Ding Yifan of the Institute of World Development Research 
Center, which is connected to the CPC State Council, and Wang Jianhui of private investment 
bank Capital Securities. CCTV drew these interviews from press conferences, studio and on site 
interviews, and provided some on-site reporting.  
In this way, CCTV projected a narrative that both normalizes China in the international 
economic system and the AIIB as a part of international development infrastructure in line with 
stated policy goals. In turn, the use of pro-bank non-Chinese political and economic actors 
provided wider credibility for the AIIB. While AJE and RT characterized the AIIB as an issue of 
geopolitical power, CCTV used speakers to project a narrative where Western states shared 
American concerns about the bank’s governance, expressed by State Department spokeswoman 
Jen Psaki, but participated anyway to help shape those same governance rules. Chapter 3 showed 
that RT content attempts to pick at the liberal democratic values by empowering “fringe” experts 
(Nimmo and Eyal 2016). However, this does not explain AJE’s similar framing of the AIIB as a 
direct threat to American power, or CCTV’s more conciliatory tone. The regular role of 
unfolding news events help to legitimate CCTV’s coverage of other states joining the AIIB, but 
the data on the Greek elections and bailout, as well as the coverage of economic protest in 
Chapter 6, suggest that direct state interest has a clear, though not quantifiable, effect on 
international broadcaster content. 
 
5.2.2 Narrative Divergence and the Greek Debt Crisis 
All four networks devoted considerable attention to the ongoing Greek debt crisis over 
the course of the study period. In particular, I focus on the period of the Greek election in 
January 2015 when the Syriza party was elected on a platform of debt renegotiation and anti-
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austerity and the negotiations following Syriza’s electoral victory.85 The reporting of each 
network on the Greek debt crisis differs from reporting on the AIIB, in large part due to most 
networks’ use of onsite reporting. While the Greek Crisis is similar to the AIIB in the sense that 
it is technocratic and subject to complex negotiations over economic issues, austerity measures in 
Greece clearly affected the population directly. In addition, the elections that ultimately led to 
Syriza’s rise to power arguably provide an impetus to interview average Greeks. These factors 
may account for the increased usage of onsite reporting on the elections by all networks other 
than RT and each network’s use of economic speaking actors in addition to experts. However, 
economic actors often occupied a petit bourgeoisie role, being the owners of small shops or 
entrepreneurs. Only DW and CCTV interviewed ordinary people during the Greek election 
period.  
Broadcaster narratives of the Greek crisis revolve around two ideas with DW and RT 
operating at opposite poles on this issue. This is, perhaps, the clearest example of IBs projecting 
competing strategic narratives in this entire study. The first issue is the righteousness of the 
German government’s versus Syriza’s positions on austerity, whether Berlin is “punishing” 
Greece as a show of force for greater influence and power in the EU, or is Greece trying to shirk 
its obligations at the expense of European taxpayers. Second, the consequences of a Syriza 
victory for the larger European project, specifically will Grexit lead to the breakup of the larger 
union. In this case, the question is whether Syriza’s proposals for debt negotiations will mean a 
“Grexit” and the overall demise of the euro or will strengthen the Union by challenging 
unchecked power in Brussels. Undergirding all of these issues is the European Central Bank’s 
plan to buy debt from member states, a move that would make the ECB more like the Federal 
                                                 
85 I analyze Syriza’s July acceptance of further austerity measures for additional bailout funds and the 
subsequent demonstrations against those measures in Chapter 6. 
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Reserve, an institution capable of managing the European economy at a macro level by 
controlling debt and the cash supply.  
In various onsite and mixed news items, AJE, CCTV, and DW frame Syriza as a 
“radical” or “far-left” political party who wants to eliminate their debt rather than pay it and with 
few realistic policy proposals to address the crisis. DW provides the clearest example of this 
framing. As seen in Chapter 4, DW projected a narrative of the German economy as model and 
Greece as in need of reform. A particularly interesting example comes from the January 20 
episode of Made in Germany where host Monika Jones juxtaposed a story on German 
“frugality,” as read through the archetype of the Swabian homemaker, with a story on Greek 
business people’s fears of a Syriza victory. Jones introduced the second Syriza item with a quote 
from Alexis Tsipras blaming Angela Merkel for the European crisis, but then states that it is “no 
wonder Europeans are looking wearily” towards the Greek elections. One week later, January 27, 
following Syriza’s election host Ben Fajzullin introduced a report that continued to undermine 
Syriza’s anti-austerity platform, suggesting that European leaders view Syriza’s platform as 
unrealistic. One final example comes in a report on Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis, 
who the program characterized as “preach[ing] his government’s new dogma” while Germany 
has tried “for years” to get Greece to reform its economy. AJE and CCTV maintain the pattern 
seen here, introducing Syriza as fringe or dangerous for Europe and European lenders 
exasperated with their election. On January 18, Counting the Cost reported that Syriza was a far 
left party, as did Global Business on February 2. Even with this framing, CCTV and AJE 
differed from DW in selection of pro-Syriza speakers, in turn suggesting that the first two 
networks were following the news cycle over direct state interests in their reporting.  
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While DW did interview a founding member of Syriza and conducted vox pop interviews 
with average Greek following Syriza’s election win, none of the economic actors interviewed, in 
contrast to AJE, or in the extreme position RT, were pro-Syriza. Experts were typically against 
Syriza as when DW followed one onsite report with an interview with Jorg Rocholl of the 
European School of Management and Technology. In this interview, like many featured on DW, 
the key term is “reform,” which encapsulates policies of privatization of state assets, fighting tax 
evasion to increase revenue (but not raising taxes), and reducing benefits. Economic figures on 
DW, including many small business owners, universally rejected Syriza’s solutions, even as the 
same news items reported that upwards of 70% of Greeks supported Syriza. AJE, likewise, 
features guests such as EU Budget Committee member Siegfried Mureșan who endorsed the 
New Democracy party’s program of privatization, stability, and competitiveness. CCTV, while 
they devoted over thirty news items totaling around 4% of their total items, also featured more 
speakers who opposed Syriza than agreed with the party’s platform. In these ways the coverage 
of the three networks conforms to our basic understanding of how news routines for each 
network operate, and conform to a more neoliberal reading of economics. In turn, DW coverage 
supports the German position that austerity is a necessary policy (Al-Jazeera English 2015) as do 
AJE and CCTV during routine reporting. RT does not follow this pattern. 
RT’s coverage of the election is almost diametrically opposed to the other networks, and 
in challenging EU and German policy broadcaster coverage projects a deligitimization narrative 
of German policy. Instead of on site reporting, Boom Bust used studio items and interviews 
where experts characterized the bailout as punitive and designed by Germany as a power play 
and Syriza policies as a reasonable alternative to austerity. News items on the Greek crisis 
account for slightly over 10% of all RT news items, suggesting the programs editors felt the 
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story deserved sustained attention. Like other items analyzed in Chapter 4 and above, Boom Bust 
uses in studio reporting and featured American and British experts, as well as their own staff, to 
the exclusion of other speakers. Notably, the only Greek who appeared on the program was 
Syriza Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis.86 Other guests included Tim Duy of the University of 
Oregon, Michael Hudson of the University of Missouri, Marshall Auerback of Institute of New 
Economic Thinking, and Mark Weisbrot of Co-Director for Center Economic and Policy 
Research. No guest supports German actions, but they are not ideologically consistent, 
representing extremes pro-market and anti-EU views. However, Boom Bust does not need to be 
ideologically consistent. The purpose appears not to be to promote Russia as a state or member 
of the community of nations. Rather the overarching purpose is to undermine the post-war 
European consensus (Amann 2016; Gummer 2015; Pomerantsev 2014). The narrative, to sum 
up, pits suffering Greeks against a cabal of international creditors, corrupt governments, and 
bullying neighbors.  
RT and DW provide competing strategic narratives that either support or undermine the 
legitimacy of the European project and economic system. In turn, RT and DW’s content 
illustrates the limitations of economics as a ground for competing state narratives. Neither rejects 
capitalism, so the conflict is not over the hegemony of capitalism or neoliberalism but rather 
competing versions of these systems projected with different styles of reporting. This suggests 
IBs build their credibility in different ways and that eyewitnessing news events is not the method 
all networks might take. Boom Bust’s narrative suggests that Greeks are victims, and then does 
not feature Greeks, instead its focus remains on experts. Economic issues, in RT coverage, 
appear inscrutable and they do not depict the real world effects of austerity policies by 
                                                 
86 Varoufakis was a frequent guest on the show in the months preceding the study period, a fact host Erin 
Ade routinely highlights. 
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visualizing workers or ordinary people.87 DW and the other networks also privilege elite figures, 
but do so on site thereby creating a sense of event that studio coverage may not obtain (A. 
Robertson 2015). The coverage of the Greek crisis calls international broadcasters counter-
hegemonic potential into question as it neither seriously challenged German policy nor did it 
support Syriza policy, with the exception of RT. However, RT’s ideological inconsistency 
suggests that their counter-hegemonic potential, laying with guests and narratives over news 
style may also be undermined as the raison d’etre of the channel is not simply to report the 
unreported but use it to undermine geostrategic rivals.  
The network coverage also suggested differing public diplomacy strategies in terms of 
content’s framing of the sponsoring state and the positions of its rivals. A proactive framing, as 
seen in DW and CCTV, placed the state sponsor in the center of coverage, projected nation 
narratives, and promoted state interests and positions. Reactive broadcasters, RT and AJE, 
omitted and mask the state, project delegitimizing narratives of rivals, and undermine rival 
narratives. The AIIB and Greek crisis stories, as issue narratives, provided insight into how each 
network fashions these competing narratives of the world system in a proactive or reactive way. 
CCTV reported on China’s AIIB as a multilateral, though Chinese “backed,” institution Western 
nations seek to join. The US may show “concern” but is not damaged, as it is in RT coverage. 
CCTV reports, when read through this particular program’s coverage, implies that the AIIB is a 
needed part of multilateral global economic system, and those who oppose it are not responsible 
stakeholders. AJE and RT, in contrast, depicted Western nations’ entry into the AIIB as a blow 
to US prestige. The system here is a zero-sum game, a competition for global economic 
influence and power. This is not to say that China does not see itself in competition with the 
                                                 
87 A particularly odd choice on BB’s part given that regular news coverage, as seen in Chapter 6, does 
report live from Athens. 
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USA, it does and is pursuing a policy of deepening trade and diplomatic links with countries 
around the world, particularly in Central Asia, to undermine US hegemony (Shambaugh 2013; 
Tiezzi 2015; Winter 2016). Rather, what the approach taken to AIIB reporting detailed here 
suggests is that CCTV content, in part, is trying to ameliorate that perception.  
Russia’s leadership, similarly, sees itself in competition with the USA and the EU; but 
unlike CCTV, RT’s narrative addresses Western audiences by providing an expert approved 
narrative that undermines rival. Coverage of the Greek crisis seen through DW juxtaposed to RT 
conveys oppositional narratives of the crisis. The scholarship on public diplomacy suggests that 
states will use those assets to influence global audiences to approve the sponsoring state’s policy 
and narratives. In this case, RT projects a different narrative of legitimacy to undermine the 
German narrative, and in doing so, arguably undermines the dominant narrative of European 
unity. What scholarship has left under examined, in this case, is how IBs shape the narrative 
through speaking actors, news norms, and geographic focus.  
 
5.3 Neoliberalism in the Narrative 
As noted in Chapter 2, neoliberalism is a dominant if not exclusive means of 
understanding economic action and policy, hence why the literature on the subject constituted a 
large share of the material in earlier chapters. Harvey (2007, 2016) argued that neoliberalism is 
fundamentally a political project of the transnational capitalist class to undermine state based 
welfare systems, and it is neoliberalism’s character as a capitalist class project, as opposed to say 
a nationalistic one, that makes economic news a valuable site for analyzing state narratives. 
Because neoliberal economic orthodoxy rose to such prominence prior to the 2008 Financial 
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Crisis, and arguably maintains this position though challenged by movements such as Occupy,88 
it limits and enables discourse. In terms of public diplomacy, neoliberalism limits the available 
rhetoric for strategic narratives as each state here remains enmeshed in global financial and 
economic structures and relies on them to maintain economic growth.  
Chapter 3 showed that each state sponsor in this study connects itself to the global 
economy despite differences in political systems, economic power, and geopolitical interests. As 
in the developed West (Aune 2001), neoliberal theory has entered into policy making circles in 
the four state sponsors analyzed here. In brief, China relies on foreign investment and relatively 
open trade to export goods, Germany continues to pursue a strong European economy and 
increased trade between itself and Asia, Qatar seeks to move away from petroleum and to 
diversify its economy into a financial and knowledge hub, and Russia requires oil and gas 
exports to earn foreign currency. These factors intertwine with financial journalism norms (Lee 
2014) and suggests that no network would be promoting the interests of the sponsor state if its 
content was truly anti-capitalist. Yet, the analysis above, particularly in the case of the Greek 
crisis, indicated that networks can project conflicting economic issues narratives. As such, to 
determine the degree to which networks’ content conforms to neoliberal visions of the world 
economic system we should consider the extent to which network content conforms to both 
neoliberal theory and state economic policies. At the same time, AJE and RT, as well as CCTV 
to a degree, all market themselves as broadcasters capable of covering the under covered and 
providers of diversification of global news operating outside the mainstream. These two 
pressures, capital and editorial mission, shape each broadcasters use or misuse of neoliberal 
                                                 
88 For a more complete discussion of post-2008 anti-capitalist and alter-globalization movements, see 
Chapter 6.  
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ideology but ultimately economics serves only a limited role as a site for geopolitical 
contestation as each state accepts the basic norms of capitalism.89  
No networks’ content explicitly undermines capitalism broadly or neoliberalism 
specifically. However, each network does have a different approach to discussing capitalism and 
specific neoliberal policy prescriptions. However, given that two networks are proactive, 
projecting the sponsoring state directly, and two are reactive, with the sponsoring state generally 
absent, the networks’ promotion of state policy operates differently. In the case of DW and 
CCTV, both promote trade, but China promotes a multipolar system of economic governance as 
seen in AIIB coverage and rejects neoliberalism as a Western danger to the Party’s control of the 
state (ChinaFile 2013). Both promote economic reform guided by the state to enhance 
competitiveness and both of their content conforms readily to government policy positions. What 
is interesting is that CCTV must answer to government directives and promote the CPC party 
line and maintain the “media’s Party spirit and social responsibility, and that in political matters 
it must be of one heart and mind with the Party” (ChinaFile 2013). A key feature of the Chinese 
media system is its alignment of media with the interests of the Party so as to promote the state 
(Zhao 2012). Xi Jinping reiterated this view recently, saying the media needs to fashion the 
“Party's theories and policies into conscious action by the general public while providing 
spiritual enrichment to the people” (Xinhua 2016). As such, CCTV promotes government 
economic policies but does so in a media system that expects them to promote social and 
political harmony. DW, on the other hand, is protected by the DW law and is guaranteed 
freedom of expression by Article 5 of the German Constitution (German Federal Republic 2004). 
Yet, DW hosts and guests promote current German policy. Official German policy promotes 
                                                 
89 A channel like Telesúr sponsored by an avowedly anti-capitalist anti-Western government, may be 
different.  
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international trade and development (Połońska-Kimunguyi 2015) in addition to structural 
reforms of European states, as Germany did in 2010, thereby serving as a model for economic 
development (Schauble 2016). As seen here and in Chapter 4, DW guests and journalists 
advocated for Greek structural reforms and presented Germany as a model capitalist economy. 
This suggests two things. First, that DW journalists follow the government line without coercion 
either out of belief or journalistic and media system norms, illustrating the power of journalistic 
norms to constrain the ideological range of economic news. Second, that neoliberal thinking 
about the benefits of trade and markets is present but is also presented in specific ways that 
account for the needs of the sponsoring state. Additionally, DW and CCTV reports fashion the 
state as the handmaiden of markets and as a mechanism of marketization as opposed to its 
opponent, for example when CCTV reports favorably about CPC free trade policies. In these 
cases, the state guides capitalism and neoliberal reforms of welfare, taxation, and trade and 
speakers both foreign and domestic support these policies and provide them with credibility.  
For the two reactive networks, AJE and RT, the picture is more muddled. Neither 
network directly challenges capitalism as a system. However, because the sponsoring states are 
missing from their own content it is not readily apparent when that content supports particular 
state policies. Given the lack of a clearly articulated ideological position, it is difficult to say that 
RT content conforms to Russian state positions. Content undermines geopolitical rivals but does 
not speak of Russian policies. The 2013 “Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian 
Federation” echoes anti-sanction sentiment in Article II paragraph 12 which states “we are 
witnessing imposition of various unjustified restrictions and other discriminatory measures” even 
as states seek economic diversification (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013). That same document 
says Russia’s key goal is rapprochement with the USA and EU, and Foreign Minister Sergei 
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Lavrov promoted “prospects of harmonizing European and Eurasian integration processes in 
order to eventually form a common economic and cultural space from the Atlantic to the Pacific” 
(Lavrov 2015). Certainly, several guest on RT questioned the merits of anti-Russian sanctions.90 
The content, or more specifically the guests’ proclamations, stand in sharp contrast to the 
conciliatory tone seen in official documents or Lavrov’s comments. Some guests argue for 
unrestrained markets and others critique markets from the left and because many guests are 
“fringe” in their views (Nimmo and Eyal 2016) any credibility in the content suggests that RT 
activates previously held biases against particular Western attitudes or policies. Even if the 
content does not expressly analyze capitalism, the critiques seen in Boom Bust bely any 
consistent ideological position on capitalism or alignment with official Russian policy beyond 
West bad Russia (presumably) good by default.  
Likewise, Qatar remains absent in Counting the Cost’s reporting, but the analysis so far 
already calls the network’s counter-hegemonic status in question and thus the ways it markets 
itself. In broad terms, however, the program’s content does seem to support Qatari official 
positions as other studies have shown (Samuel-Azran 2013). Economically, Qatari policy seeks 
to diversify the economy away from oil into a financial and knowledge hub based on deals with 
Western nations and universities (Ibrahim and Harrigan 2012; Vora 2014). As a micro-state, 
Qatar must also align itself with powerful actors for security and needs to avoid antagonizing 
neighbors (Kaussler 2014). These pressures might explain why AJE content does not condemn 
capitalism, as we might expect a counter-hegemonic channel to do, but does not show how AJE 
projects an ideal of the state as guide of development. In their coverage of Nigeria, Nepal, or 
                                                 
90 Note that this is usually in the context of an entirely different story. For example, the host may 
introduce a story addressing Fed policy, but the host may prompt the guest or the guest will comment on 
the ineffectiveness of sanctions seemingly at random.  
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Bangladesh Counting the Cost routinely places responsibility for development on to 
governments just as DW and CCTV do, and draw their credibility from a mix of experts on site 
and in studio. However, the state is not meant to supplant the market, rather the goal is create one 
for the purposes of development. Conversely, AJE portrays the Russian state, as seen in Chapter 
4’s analysis, as corrupt and venal, dominated by a strong man with bad intentions suggesting that 
AJE content can bend to reflect Qatari interests.  
Each network appears to allow state interests to undermine financial news and media 
system norms, but those norms otherwise operate conventionally. Taken together, no network 
challenges or undermines capitalism and all suggest different forms or levels of neoliberal policy 
such as greater marketization and trade to structural reforms of labor and tax codes. These 
endorsements of neoliberalism are not the full-throated ones seen in the American business press 
of the 1990s (Frank 2000). Instead, news norms, media systems, and state interests mediate and 
moderate neoliberal policy positions and thereby construct it into a state specific form, verifying 
in another way Ong’s (2006) view that neoliberalism operates in different ways in different 
places to shape perceptions of right economic action. In this sense, networks who stake their 
editorial identity on diversifying global news and challenging mainstream news coverage cannot 
follow this mission in an economic sense as each state’s reliance on global capitalism limits their 
potential to do so. On the other hand, each network does have the public diplomacy potential to 
project state economic narratives. These two potentialities, economic counter-hegemony and 
state projection, sit uncomfortably together as the former reflects a clearly stated opposition to 
dominant economic frameworks and the latter reflects entities enmeshed in those same 
frameworks.  
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5.4 Conclusions 
I have shown in this chapter that international broadcasters do project state narratives 
concerning regions or issues of interest to the sponsoring state. In addition, it is clear that states 
use international broadcasters to undermine rival power economic narratives, as seen in the 
oppositional coverage broadcast by RT and DW on the Greek Crisis. In this sense, my analysis 
supports the scholars of public diplomacy (Cull 2009b; Nye 2009) and strategic narratives 
(Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2013; Pamment 2014) who argue that international 
broadcasting is a crucial tool for projecting state narratives. As in Chapter 3, IB content 
conformed with state positions on economic issues such as the AIIB and Greek Crisis. At the 
same time, several factors constrain broadcaster’s freedom of action. 
First, the global economic news cycle draws journalists’ attention away from the purely 
sectarian interests of a given state. CCTV, for example, covered the Greek Crisis or Ukrainian 
bailouts, or any story of economic significance, and operated less as a tool of state power and 
more as a news channel. Doing so gives CCTV, with its high levels of government control and 
Chinese journalism norms, the appearance of Western news outlets. Nevertheless, when the topic 
involves state interests, such as the AIIB, CCTV’s coverage conformed to state interests. This 
suggests that states may selectively activate an IB to project strategic narratives as desired.  
However, the stated counter-hegemonic mission of some broadcasters, the goal to 
diversify global news as a means of increasing state power, appears overstated. When the topic is 
the global economic system, only RT directly challenged global powers such as the USA and 
EU. However, those challenges operated within the ideological framework of capitalism and 
never seriously suggested any alternatives. As in Chapter 4, economics discourse does not appear 
to be a valued site of geopolitical contestation as it constrains possible state narratives. That AJE, 
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CCTV, and RT all claim to diversify news or report outside of the mainstream did not affect 
coverage of routine economic news. AJE, for example, despite their claim to represent the 
“people” (Figenschou 2010) as a counter-hegemonic journalistic source privileged the German 
narrative of the Greek debt crisis and had echoes of the Russian narrative of the AIIB. The same 
is true of speaking actor selection as it conforms to expectations based on previous work on AJE 
(Figenschou 2010) and financial journalism (Fahy, O’Brien, and Poti 2010). CCTV may 
arguably be counter-hegemonic in that their reporting on AIIB rejected a confrontation narrative 
in favor of one that emphasize multilateralism and undercut the presence of American anger at 
its allies joining the bank. Taken together, this chapter poses serious questions about the 
possibility of instrumentalizing of counter-hegemony to project state power. 
Where divergence from news norms did occur was when issues directly affected state 
interests. The Greek Crisis, for example, did not lead either AJE or CCTV to seriously question 
Germany’s strategic narrative. However, when RT reported on the Crisis the program’s framing 
and speaker selection provided ample criticism of German and EU policy. Likewise, CCTV was 
the only channel to reject a confrontation narrative on the AIIB in favor of one that attempted to 
co-opt American misgivings about the Bank. As such, state interests are apparently the 
paramount consideration in determining the farming of economic issues. At the same time, 
journalism norms, the news cycle, and media system shape the contours of content. This and the 
preceding Chapter demonstrate that IBs do project state narratives, but also that a variety of other 
structural factors must be accounted for to appreciate the form content takes. One factor that 
remains to be explored, however, is the essentially elite oriented nature of economic news 
content. All content analyzed thus far focused on states and their relationships with each other. 
Action in the global economy remains the reserve of state or economic and political elites. 
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Broadcasters did not depict action from the grassroots, from below elite governing structures. In 
this sense the image of the global economy each broadcaster projects remains incomplete. 
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6 PROTEST COVERAGE FROM THE TOP 
In his book on the history of Voice of America, Heil (2003) begins with the story of how 
VOA reported on the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. He relates a harrowing tale of 
journalists from around the world assembling on the ground in Beijing, airing rigorously checked 
facts, and providing both rural and urban Chinese with needed information. His telling is worth 
quoting at length. He writes:  
The latest news is a lifeline of up-to-the-minute information on the revolution, which 
is centered in this teeming plaza. A reality check. Hourly newscasts chronicle what is 
happening throughout China, and for many right there, what is happening almost 
within their sight, in the square. Around the clock, live reports from VOA 
correspondents in Chinese and English stationed in Beijing surge through busy 
phone lines to Washington. Within minutes, and sometime live in split seconds, they 
speed back around the Earth on electronic wings via the miracle of international 
radio to eager ears at Tiananmen. And America’s Voice… reaches millions more in 
China beyond Tiananmen and around the globe during the Beijing spring of 1989 
(2003, 8). 
 
In 1989, the world watched as student demonstrators were attacked by the People’s 
Liberation Army of China, and in Heil’s account, VOA did its best in impossible circumstances, 
pushing its reporters to the limit without compromising their journalistic integrity. This story 
serves as an example of the power of IBs to provide information to publics otherwise denied 
said information. It also illustrates one of the great values of an IB, to cover dissent and civil 
disorder in rival nations to undermine their government.  
Indeed, Chinese and Russian frustrations with Western coverage of internal discord 
partially motivated the creation of their IBs. Rawnsley (2015b, 276) points to Tiananmen as a 
signal to the Chinese leadership that it needed public diplomacy programs. As Hu Jintao 
proclaimed “We must be sober enough to see that international hostile forces are intensifying 
the strategic plots to Westernize and divide us” shows the sense of being surrounded by 
antagonists in Beijing (cited in Shambaugh 2013, 208). Likewise, Russian PD efforts derived 
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from the perception that their positions were not reflected in Western media after the color 
revolutions (Saari 2014) and their failure to develop a strategy for the Ossetia conflict in 
Georgia leading to media criticism in the West (Avgerinos 2009). 
In short, international broadcasters engage in the documentation and dissemination of 
protests, including economic ones. Harnessing global news’ power of eyewitnessing 
(Chouliaraki 2006b), states can use IBs to both undermine a rival as both Russia and China, 
claim the West did in their moments of crisis. In addition, as demonstrated by previous chapters, 
economic news and events remains a province of elite action and elite opinion, separate from 
workers and consumers, who are routinely left out of coverage, even in the self-proclaimed 
counter hegemonic networks, leaving it an open question as to how networks and journalists 
might leverage this capacity.  
This chapter examines the extent to which coverage differs during times of economic 
crises, in particular economic protests. Chapters 4 and 5 illustrated that IBs’ financial journalism 
broadly conforms to the interests of their state sponsors, but did so only for elite economic 
activity. Economic protests, on the other hand, illustrate economic discourse from below and, 
therefore, illuminate economic conflicts, not between states, but between citizens and states. 
These kinds of conflicts, as in the Tiananmen case, present opportunities for IBs to undercut 
rivals, but also to live up to, and ultimately insturmentalize, their counter-hegemonic editorial 
missions. Likewise, the ways in which an IB frames a domestic protest illustrates the potential of 
a broadcaster to frame internal discontent and potentially sway foreign public opinion to accept 
the sponsor’s views.91 Finally, and as a matter of analysis crucially, there exists a vigorous 
literature on news coverage of protests, called the protest paradigm, which provides a reference 
                                                 
91 Indeed, one wonders what CCTV would have done had it been as robust in 1989 as it is now.  
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for evaluating new IBs’ economic news coverage. Economic protests, therefore, represent a 
useful site for examining the ways in which an IB may directly challenge state rivals, serve as 
platforms for government policy and positions, and the degree to which new IBs in fact diversify 
news.   
I begin this chapter with a brief summary of the ways in which news typically covers 
protests and specifically economic ones. Next, I describe each protest and explain their 
suitability for study. I then examine the content from all four broadcasters’ coverage of four 
different protests, from Greece, Brazil, Germany, and Hong Kong. Analysis indicates that each 
channel, in their own unique ways, undermine protests that challenge the state sponsor or do not 
directly affect the sponsor. Only when state interests are at play do we see divergence from the 
status quo of economic protest coverage. 
 
6.1 The Economic Revolution will not be Televised 
Protests signal to their viewers that discontent is in the air, that the system as it exists 
does not meet the needs or desires of a polity. And yet, protests would have limited impact 
without mediation to carry them further than their immediate locality, hence the sometimes 
outlandish modes of protest seen in media (DeLuca and Peeples 2002). While protests, especially 
economic ones, have arguably increased in recent decades (Steger, Goodman, and Wilson 2013), 
scholarly examination of protest suggests that media typically fails to fully articulate the causes 
and nature of protest movements. In terms of international broadcasting, however, protests 
represent two opportunities. First, to live up to a counter-hegemonic mission statement.. Second, 
to use counter-hegemony as a justification for covering protests to undermine a rival 
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government.92 To contextualize my findings, we must first examine the ways in which media 
cover or fail to cover protests to provide a baseline for content comparison.  
After 2008, there has been a renaissance of scholarship on economic protests, as austerity 
arguably opens up spaces for political action (Giugni and Grasso 2015). In particular, Occupy 
Wall Street and related movements addressing wealth inequality, tax evasion, and banking have 
received ample attention from a variety of perspectives. However, scholarly analyses of 
economic protest news coverage indicate that networks typically framed economic discontent as 
political discontent, with concerns about economic systems or morality typically subordinated 
(Boykoff 2006; Skonieczny and Morse 2014). Such coverage conforms to the “protest 
paradigm,” a package of news tropes that marginalize protest movements and frames them as 
deviant or outside of the mainstream. If a broadcaster were to live up to a counter-hegemonic 
mission statement it, ideally, would not marginalize protestors and their grievances.  
A prescient example of the protest paradigm comes from the Arab Spring. Western media 
coverage of these events favored technological and political factors as the cause of the protests 
(see for example Gustin 2011; Marzouki and Oullier 2012).93 However, even if economics was 
not the primary cause of the Arab Spring, it is also clear that economic stagnation and dominance 
of economic activity by state elites in places like Tunisia and Egypt fostered anti-government 
resentment in those populations. As Joffé argues:  
Ever since the debt crisis emerged in the developing world in the wake of the global 
oil price shock of the 1970s, all three [IMF, World Bank, and EU] have tried to 
prescribe economic development policies based on neoliberal economic principles, 
                                                 
92 Whether this was the actual case, China’s government perceived VOA coverage of Tianamen and the 
start of Radio Free Asia as direct threats to the regime’s stability and legitimacy (Price, Haas, and 
Margolin 2008). 
93 Subsequent articles sometimes questioned the role of technology in the Arab Spring (Beaumont 2011). 
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associated with the ‘Washington Consensus’ and designed to improve general 
levels of prosperity (2011, 509).94  
 
These policies, however, did not lead to economic growth and youth unemployment remained 
high even in rich states like Saudi Arabia, thereby fostering resentment towards the state 
(Partridge 2011). As such, Western reportage showed a tendency to elide the various and 
complex causes of these revolutionary movements, particularly the role of Western backed 
economic policies in youth unemployment. This is all the more curious when one considers that 
a fruit seller sparked the Tunisian unrest when he immolated himself after a state official 
attempted to extort him. In other words, news content decoupled the economic sphere from the 
technological and political spheres of Arab life; this chapter takes these insights and examines 
the extent to which IBs replicate pattern. While not a perfect example, the Arab Spring illustrates 
the ways in which media often overlook the causes of protest movements and rely on tropes over 
on the ground reporting in their reportage.   
However, the protest paradigm is only important for this study to the degree it allows us 
test the projection of state narratives and to see the extent to which IBs conform to those 
narratives. In some ways, international broadcaster may already be contributing to increased 
information about economic protests. Russia Today received an International Emmy nomination 
in 2012 for their coverage of Occupy Wall Street. In 2011, as the network’s web page tells it: 
“RT begins its intrepid coverage of the Occupy Wall Street protests while they are still largely 
ignored or dismissed by the mainstream media” (“About RT” 2016). Given the content analyzed 
in the preceding Chapters, RT’s early and sustained attention to Occupy presumably serves the 
                                                 
94 This pattern, where debts to large international creditors came due in the 1970s, were not repaid, and 
required further intervention by international lenders was repeated in various African and Latin American 
states and according to Prashad (2008) signaled the end of any kind of cohesive socialist Third World 
Development project.  
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channel’s mission of damaging the image of the West. However, even if we might impugn the 
motives of RT, especially in light of the coverage analyzed thus far; there is an element of truth 
to the statement. Many news organizations cover protests poorly and belatedly if they receive 
any coverage at all, and sometimes they elide the causes of said protests. For our purposes then, 
we should test IBs counter-hegemony in terms of their deviation from the protest paradigm and 
then examine the degree to which state interests may or may not have influenced that content. 
 
6.2 Protests on Global Television: Victims of Circumstance and Routine 
Protests present opportunities for IBs to frame citizen discontent in rival states, as VOA 
did for the Tiananmen Square protests, and these opportunities appear to be increasing in many 
regions of the world. At the same time, three networks – RT, CCTV, and AJE – promote their 
networks as alternatives to mainstream Western news, in Thussu’s words as counter-hegemonic 
(Thussu 2007a). As such, its here where counter-hegemony comes to the fore in my analysis as 
IB’s coverage of protests represents a chance to live up to stated editorial missions to diversify 
news as well as a prospect to underline discontent in rival states. The key issue, then, is whether 
IBs depictions of protests diverge from Western norms and if state interests influence the nature 
of that coverage.  
Unfortunately, for those who had hoped these new channels would break with Western 
traditions, the three weeks of coded newscasts and my subsequent analysis of their framing and 
narratives of protest suggest that each network dissociated economic protests from economic 
causes (for comprehensive description of these categories see Appendix E). In addition, when 
news items did cover protests their framing tended to undermine and marginalize protestors’ in 
line with predictions of the protest paradigm. In this sense, my findings support Skonieczny and 
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Morse’s (2014) argument that there is “remarkable consistency in media portrayal of social 
movements and protests to the detriment of the various causes and in support of the status quo” 
(2014, 676). The exception, and an important use of IBs in public diplomacy, was when the 
protests directly involved the sponsoring state’s interests, as the Umbrella protests do for China 
or Greece does for Germany and Russia. In these cases, networks offered alternative framings 
that either undermined the protest or supported as interests dictated. 
Table 6.1 shows the distribution of news sections in the coded data and shows that 
economic news encompassed approximately one tenth of all stories for all four networks in their 
regular newscasts. These are stories where the anchors lede emphasized business, finance, or 
economic data (see Appendix E for a complete description of each type). This value is higher 
than seen in previous research by Figenschou (2010) who found that nine percent of AJE news 
items were devoted to economic coverage or Robertson (2015) who found that AJE and RT 
economic crisis coverage accounted for three and six percent 
Table 6.1 News Section Frequency 
 
of crisis headlines respectively. Robertson’s work did not find such high levels of economic 
news, however, the economic focus of my study periods probably accounts for this discrepancy, 
though further analysis is needed to verify this. In addition, my own coding scheme places a 
majority of all news items in the “world/politics” category, meaning that the news item led with 
 AJE CCTV DW RT 
Art/Culture 2.9% 6.3% 6.5% 1.8% 
Economics 10.5% 13.8% 13.0% 9.4% 
Media 1.3% 2.1% 0.0% 5.3% 
Politics/Domestic 0.3% 13.2% 0.7% 1.2% 
Politics/World 66.9% 59.3% 55.8% 77.6% 
Science 3.5% 5.3% 3.6% 4.1% 
Sport 14.1% 0.0% 0.7% 0.6% 
Total 311 189 138 170 
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the work of government and politicians at an international level as opposed to domestic level. 
Figenschou’s coding scheme for newscasts included a category for “armed conflict,” which 
accounted for one fifth of all AJE stories in her data while Robertson had similar findings for 
AJE and RT. When I examine the main topic of each story, I found that common stories included 
events of terrorism, conflicts in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria, and the multilateral conflict against 
ISIL. These types of stories accounted for between 16.7% of DW’s items to 23.8% of CCTV’s 
items. The coding scheme employed here was not explicitly designed to detect stories of war or 
armed conflict, but the results tentatively correspond to previous studies of AJE and RT.95 
As seen in Table 6.2, at least one network covered each protest though broadcasters did not cover 
the protests equally, suggesting that practical capabilities, like journalist access to protest sites, or 
a lack of editorial interest limit IB coverage of economic protests. In turn, fewer news items 
meant fewer speaking actors as well. The broadcasters devoted the majority of their coverage to 
the Umbrella and Greek protests, with thirty-seven and eight news items respectively. The low 
number recorded for the Greek protests reflects the coding scheme’s attention to protest 
specifically i.e. the Greek crisis itself received a great deal of attention, but the actual strikes and 
protests after the Greek Parliament’s acceptance of bailout terms were not as widely reported. 
The complete lack of CCTV Greek protest coverage is the result of an apparent programming 
change on the network’s part during the period between March and July of 2015. The network 
changed the programming at 7:00PM CET from the Global News to Asia Today; and this data 
was not immediately available. Nevertheless, Umbrella as a protest movement and the Greek 
Crisis as a news event were covered the most by each network, with Brazil and Blockupy 
                                                 
95 To date, there have been no comprehensive studies of DW or CCTV content and so comparison here is 
not possible. However, given that the differences seen so far are slight, it is possible to speculate that DW 
and CCTV would be similar in their story focus to AJE and RT. In turn, this suggests that the real 
differences between the networks lay in their actual discourse and narratives.  
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receiving less coverage during newscasts, possibly due to the relatively brief nature of the 
protests themselves. Other programming could have covered these events so we cannot conclude 
that they were unimportant to the broadcasters. Consequently, Greece and Hong Kong will 
receive the majority of my attention. Table 6.2 illustrates these features using speaking actors 
(discrete individuals speaking in news items) and news items (discrete stories signaled by the 
first few sentences of a report by and anchor), which I define further in Appendices A and C.  
Table 6.2 Speaking Actors and News Item Frequencies 
 Blockupy Umbrella Brazil Protest Greece Protest 
 Speaking 
Actors 
News 
Items 
Speaking 
Actors 
News 
Items 
Speaking 
Actors 
News 
Items 
Speaking 
Actors 
News 
Items 
AJE 3 1 21 11 0 2 4 1 
CCTV 0 0 21 16 0 0 0 0 
DW 0 1 4 5 0 1 7 3 
RT 2 1 0 5 0 0 14 4 
Totals 5 3 46 37 0 3 25 8 
 
In the rest of this section, I examine the speaking actors seen in protest news coverage 
and find that elite voices remain dominant in the news items. Networks particularly used 
governmental voices as seen in other studies of protest news coverage (Boykoff 2006; Brasted 
2005). Protestor voices are seen in items but they are often marginalized, ironically, they are 
often counter-protestors airing their grievances against disturbance to the status quo.  
 
6.2.1 Institutional Voices and Protest Opposition – or Only Those Approved 
We have already seen that economic news coverage broadly conforms to financial 
journalism norms and privilege political, expert, and economic voices over those of ordinary 
people or workers. However, when an international broadcaster covers an incident of economic 
protest, as with all news coverage, they select specific individuals and provide them with a 
platform to analyze and contextualize the protestors and their grievances. Given the counter-
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hegemonic mission of three of the broadcasters, economic protest coverage arguably should 
highlight protestor voices, and yet this is not the case. Deeper analysis undermines the claims of 
AJE, RT, and CCTV to diversify the voices in the news broadly or in protest coverage 
specifically. In turn, the potential of states to use a counter-hegemonic news strategy to project 
strategic narratives also appears weak. Journalists routinely undermined protestors’ voices and 
privileged elites, similarly to norms seen in dedicated financial journalism. Only in instances 
where a state’s direct interests are affected do broadcasters break with the protest paradigm. In 
short,  the broadcasters’ economic protest coverage conforms to previous studies of economic 
protest that demonstrate consistent undermining of protestors and their grievances (Brasted 2005; 
Xu 2013). In turn, we can conclude that IBs do project state narratives, but only in as much as 
they directly affect the sponsoring state. 
Despite AJE’s promise of counter-hegemonic journalism, the network consistently 
undermines protestors’ positions and grievances in each of the protests under analysis.  During 
March 18 coverage of Blockupy, for example, framed the protestors as ineffectual and 
unreasonable, similarly to framing of anti-globalization protestors in the late 1990s (Rauch et al. 
2007). A reporter interviews the male protestor, unnamed in the report, who claims that that ECB 
is a symbol for monetary policy and power politics of capitalism and that it is important that 
people from different countries get together to fight against these policies. Subsequently the 
reporter, Dominic Kane, attributes these views to “some” protestors and then shift to a press 
conference in the new opened ECB with Mario Draghi, the bank’s president, claiming it “has 
always been understood” that austerity is the fault of individual nations’ decisions. The story 
concludes with a short standup interview with Kane who references Draghi’s position that 
money should be spent on building the European economy, but “this isn’t enough for the 
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protestors” whose protest was fruitless. AJE’s framing of the Blockupy protestor conforms to the 
protest paradigm in framing activists as a “deviant group of outsiders” (Brasted 2005, 387). At 
the same time, institutional voices, in the form of Draghi and the reporter, suggest that the 
protestor is unreasonable given the common understanding of who is at fault for the European 
Crisis or their unwillingness to listen to Draghi. Kane, therefore, sided with elite interpretations 
of events of the protests, indicating a potential drive in newsroom culture to conform to standard 
Western reporting practices. In addition, these specific protests do not directly affect Qatari 
interests and thus do not present an opportunity for AJE to project a strategic narrative. 
Another example comes from an October 2 report on Umbrella, Divya Gopalan 
interviewed Jesse Chu, a self-described protestor who says that he wants the protests to “go 
further” with actions such as building occupation. The news item intoned that enhanced protest 
could lead to violence, thereby suggesting that the protestor is either for violence or callous to its 
potential effects. Similar coverage of Greece features an interview with “Stella,” who is again 
undercut by the reporter saying that the protests are noisy but unattended by unions who could 
have mobilized more people. As such, a channel that promises to be the “voice of the voiceless” 
grants protestors space to speak but then undermines their messages by following more 
traditional patterns of protest coverage.  
The protest paradigm predicts that media frame protests in terms of disruption or 
unreasonable demands as a means of marginalizing the protest. Xu, for example, found that New 
York Times and USA Today coverage of OWS emphasized lawlessness, used official sources, 
and highlighted public disapproval of the protests thereby marginalizing the protestors 
messaging. Therefore, it is unsurprising that many stories feature counter-protestors. On AJE, 
216 
 
coverage of Umbrella featured Leticia Lee of the Blue Ribbon Campaign.96 In the interview, Lee 
castigates the protestors as anti-democratic in their unwillingness to engage in dialogue with C. 
Y. Leung, the Chief Executive of Hong Kong, and encourages the “silent majority” to speak out. 
CCTV similarly uses counter-protestors to undermine the Umbrella movement. On the October 2 
newscast, an unseen reporter interviewed an unnamed “HK resident” who says the protestors do 
not know the law and not “even the color of the cover of the law book.”97 The counter-protestor 
continues, saying the protestors want democracy but are not qualified for it, and concludes that 
they are being used, but does not say by who. Another interviewed HK resident says that the 
protestor were “rational” at first but now are unruly and that she is protesting to stop there 
“disorderly conduct.” A final example on CCTV comes from a social media figure named 
“Worried HK Uncle,” who claims only people who want instability would support protests. 
CCTV aired his video subtitled where Uncle says, “your parents and family want you home and 
are worried about you.” Worried HK Uncle may be an odd outlier, in addition to be genuinely 
odd he is the only social media sourced information in any reporting on Umbrella in any 
network. Nevertheless, the use of counter-protest voices in networks that are counter-hegemonic, 
AJE, as well as those with a stake in undermining the protests, CCTV, illustrates the consistency 
of the protest paradigm in international broadcasting, complicating comparative analyses in other 
studies which showed the protest paradigm had limited applicability outside the USA (Ghobrial 
and Wilkins 2015; Shahin et al. 2016). These speakers also illustrate how following the protest 
paradigm can project state narratives as when CCTV privileged official voices or AJE provided 
                                                 
96 The Blue Ribbon Campaign is the name given to those who protested the Umbrella Movement, the 
latter of whom wore yellow ribbons (Liu 2015). 
97 This is a reference to the Basic Law, the legal framework for the one country, two systems model of 
Chinese government in the HK Special Administrative Region.  
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balanced interviews. Both CCTV and AJE followed the protest paradigm, but only in CCTV’s 
case did it project state interests by undermining the protestors.  
As examples, these leave aside other networks and protests but in the other two networks, 
we can clearly see a privileging of political or economic figures as expected in the literature. In 
these cases, following the protest paradigm model of coverage also serves state interests by 
undermining protestors who critique the sponsoring state’s policies. In the Greek case, DW 
interviewed a shop owner named Klonos Nikos in his shop as he watches images of the riots on 
television on their July 16 broadcast. Nikos says he is angry but not at the current reforms but 
with the previous government that created the situation. This simultaneously undermines Greek 
anger at the reforms, while also privileging an economic actor, similar to DW’s framing of 
economic news seen in Chapters 4 and 5. As with CCTV interviews of Umbrella counter 
protestors, DW’s interviews with economic actors opposed to Syriza policy allows Made in 
Germany to project narratives that delegitimize the Greek position and support Germany. In this 
way, following the protest paradigm can support state interests by undercutting protestors’ 
grievances. The reporter concludes the item, saying that on the streets, tensions are high and 
there is anger and disappointment with the “heavy clashes between police and demonstrators”; 
but Nikos and shop owners have resigned themselves to situation.  
AJE and CCTV also featured economic actors in their coverage of Umbrella. For 
example, AJE interviewed Simon Wong, a restaurant owner, while CCTV interviewed a jewelry 
shop owner as well as a pharmacy owner. Economic actors, when featured at all, are most 
common in Umbrella coverage, possibly due to the decreased tourism from mainland China the 
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protests precipitated.98 Interviewing economic actors who are negatively affected by the protests 
follows the protest paradigm, but it also supports Chinese policy on Hong Kong. What does not, 
however, is AJE’s use of economic actors. Both broadcasters, therefore, followed the protest 
paradigm. However, when CCTV follows the paradigm, they utilize a ready-made formula that 
undermines the protestors, which also serves China’s direct interests. While it is possible that 
Qatar simply did not want to anger China, we’ve also seen that Qatar has been accused of using 
AJA and AJE as a public diplomacy tool for delegitimizing rivals such as Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia (Booth 2010; NDTV 2010; Fahmy 2015). Al-Jazeera’s flirtations with direct 
propagandization in the Middle East notwithstanding, it appears that when its direct interests are 
not at stake, the network follows the traditional Western journalistic modes as seen in its 
conformity with the protest paradigm. Whatever the case, each economic interview subject, even 
if they considered the protestors work important and necessary, decried the disruption of their 
incomes, thus undermining the protests.  
Likewise, experts played an oppositional role on most networks but appeared on AJE and 
CCTV in reference to the Umbrella protests most often. This is possibly due to the protests 
continuing for the whole week of the sample, giving the opportunity to the channels to secure 
interviewees. While this is true for all for networks, DW and RT did not feature expert 
interviews; and in fact, only DW interviewed anyone related to the Umbrella protests. CCTV, 
unsurprisingly, featured experts who decried the protests as “illegal,” which turned into a 
recurring trope during their coverage. Raymond Yeung, Senior Economist ANZ Banking Group, 
suggests that interviews with businesses indicate that there have been drops in sales during the 
                                                 
98 Reports coded suggest that late September to early October are particularly busy times for mainland 
Chinese tourism in Hong Kong. Only AJE reports that the CCP banned travel to Hong Kong by mainland 
tourists while CCTV and all other networks ignored this information.  
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protests. As the new item continues, the reporter suggests that investors are also concerned as the 
Hang Seng Stock Exchange99 has dropped in value and Merrill Lynch estimates economic loses 
around $500 million. David Lau, Managing Director JP Morgan, claims the protests are 
undermining the fundamental assumption that rule of law can function and claims the protestors 
are violating the law, even as polls show Hong Kong residents are against the protestors. In 
addition, CCTV coverage uses foreign media and academic sources such as Martin Jacques of 
the Guardian and Miguel Alfredo Velloso of the University of Salvador. Both of these men 
undermine the protests, Jacques by pointing to the undemocratic British history in Hong Kong, 
and Velloso by emphasizing the increased wealth and status the island gets through its 
association with the mainland. In this case, as with AJE coverage of Umbrella, the experts tend 
to be economic thinkers, and as we shall see this is the means by which Umbrella is constructed 
in economic terms in all news items that do so. The consistency seen in speaking actors across 
type, going from ordinary people, to protestors and counter-protesters, to economists and other 
experts persists across all networks excluding RT.  
Shifting focus back to Greece and Blockupy and to DW, political actors come to the fore 
and continue to undermine protestors. For example, when DW covered the Hong Kong protests 
they only featured three speaking actors in total, and two times this was C Y Leung’s, Executive 
of the SAR, press conferences. DW’s Greece coverage features several political figures, most 
notably Alexis Tsipras, President of Greece.100 In press conferences, the President made clear 
that he did not like the bailout deal but also stressed that there was no other choice. Many of 
                                                 
99 Hong Kong Stock Exchange. 
100 This not to say that there were no other political actors. As noted previously all networks except CCTV 
covered the Greek bailout negotiations and subsequent parliamentary votes, in the case of DW showing at 
least a surface level of balanced reporting. However, this reporting did not engage with the protests or 
strikes following the vote. They contain useful context, but are not directly coded as having the presence 
of the event.  
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Tsipras’ own Syriza party members, such as former Finance Minister refused to vote for the deal, 
leading Stavros Theodorakis of the allied River Party to proclaim that the Hellenic Parliament 
had “political conspirators, populist and rats, who conspire against you [Tispras].” AJE, for 
example, featured figures such as Chinese president Xi Jinping, Chinese foreign ministry 
spokeswoman Hua Chun-Ying, and ECB President Mario Draghi in their reports. CCTV showed 
press conferences form C Y Leung, Hua Chun-Ying, and HK police officials Cheung Tak-Keung 
and Hui Chun-Tak in their reports. 
RT has not figured prominently in this sub-section for the simple reason that they used 
very few speaking actors overall, particularly compared to AJE or CCTV. However, RT featured 
figures like Tsipras as well as the aforementioned German politicians seen on DW, but also left 
wing Greek politicians, angry unnamed Greek protestors, at least one member of Golden Dawn, 
the quasi-fascist party elevated to Greek parliamentary seat holders over the past five years 
(Smith 2015). Indeed the Greek Crisis contains all of the coded speaking actors for the protest 
events. The network featured no interviews during Umbrella or Brazil, and only two political 
figures during Blockupy.  
Despite the relative lack of speaking actors in RT and CCTV’s programing change 
leading to no relevant coverage of Greece, the data here shows remarkable consistency. Some 
networks depicted protestors for purposes of balance as in the case of AJE, or depicted 
oppositional voices in politics like DW’s Greek coverage. However, each network undermined 
protest positions through juxtaposition with other speakers or with contextual details provided by 
the reporters. CCTV’s coverage of Umbrella fits expectations for how the CPC would use the 
network to present official government positions to global audiences. However, AJE and DW, in 
line with the predictions of the protest paradigm, also undermined the protests, potentially a 
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reflection of a professional culture that question protestors and their activities. At least in terms 
of speaking actors, these results suggest that typical reporting practices internalized in global 
newsrooms undermine protests while states can still use IBs as political instruments to project 
government narratives when the protest directly implicates the sponsoring state’s interests. This 
evidence further suggests also that global news networks cannot simply be viewed as neutral 
eyewitnesses, if such was ever done, but cannot likewise be seen as simply counter-hegemonic or 
not because states may activate the network to support their interests. Nevertheless, scholarship 
on the protest paradigm also suggests that journalists themselves undermine protestors through 
framing that removes protestors’ grievances thus making them appear out of touch with the 
mainstream. 
 
6.2.2 Protest Frames, Justifiable Protest, and Activated Narratives 
So far, each broadcasters’ content has followed the protest paradigm model of coverage; 
undermining protestors and framing their grievances as unreasonable. Broadcasters followed this 
model when the protest did not implicate direct interests, as in DW coverage of Umbrella, and 
when the protestors challenged state policies, as in DW’s coverage of Greece or CCTV’s 
coverage of Umbrella. In the end, following the paradigm appears to function as a standard 
approach to protest coverage as well as a tool to undermine oppositional protestors. In addition, 
broadcasters typically did not frame protests in economic terms. This serves to elide the 
economic concerns of protestors and thus undermines criticism of economic issues. In short, IB 
content either follows the protest paradigm when protestors do not follow state interests or when 
protestors challenge the sponsoring states. However, only one example in this data set involves 
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protestors challenging a sponsoring state’s rival and this shows that IBs can, and do, frame 
protests in ways that undercut rival states.  
Both DW and RT, as parties interested in the ultimate shape and dimensions of the 
European project, presented the Greek protests as economic in nature, but radically diverged in 
their framing of the protests and strikes following the vote, in turn making RT the only network 
to operate outside the protest paradigm. Alternatively, when DW and RT reported on Umbrella 
they put the protests into political terms and gave less attention and time to them. RT did not 
even send a correspondent, which would seem to be within their capabilities. CCTV took a much 
different approach to Umbrella as we shall see, but they are not averse to covering protests 
directly, as when there were routine reports on protests against amending the Japanese 
Constitution in July of 2015.101 Ultimately, the data analyzed here suggests that economic 
framing, and thus opening a space for discussion of protestor grievances, is dependent on the 
nature of the protest itself, but is also subject to the particular interests or narratives of the 
sponsoring state. 
First, we should test the extent to which CCTV, AJE, and DW followed the protest 
paradigm in their coverage. Following the paradigm, arguably, would include overlooking the 
economic origins of the protests. Economic framing is most prevalent during the Greece protests 
with all networks framing the bailout negotiations, subsequent demonstrations, and 
parliamentary votes in Germany, Greece, and France in economic terms. CCTV provided sparse 
coverage of Greece in July but other items found in other study periods show that CCTV devoted 
copious coverage to Greece. AJE ran eight items during the week of the bailout negotiations in 
                                                 
101 The particular issue in question involved amending Article 9 so as to allow Japanese deployment of 
military assets abroad, a controversial decision of the Abe government both in Japan and China (ABC 
2015).  
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July, all of which framed it in economic terms, though still conformed to the protest paradigm. 
The AJE newscast on July 13, for example, lead with a story on the successful negotiations 
framed in terms “marathon talks” leading to a bailout deal; in return, Greece must “reform” with 
privatization, liberalization, pension, and labor market measures. On July 15, the date of strikes 
and protests, AJE led their newscast in the same way, political debate over economic policies, 
the results of which are unavoidable given the political calculus of the Greek Parliament. The 
view that austerity was inevitable marginalizes protests by giving an official account at odds with 
protestor positions, as seen previously. This is when reporters interviewed Stella the protestor 
and subsequently undermined here position as shown above. In addition, the report featured 
Panos Skourletis, Greek Minister of Labor, and George Petropoulos, member of the Public 
Sector Union, both of whom suggest that austerity for bailouts was an unescapable outcome. As 
such, AJE contrasts protestors with official and institutional voices who accept the policy, even 
as they decry it. In this instance, the reporter followed the protest paradigm suggesting that 
standard Western journalistic practices were operating over specific state interests. Reporter 
Mohammad Jamjoom, in a standup interview discussing the protests, claims that real “question” 
of the protests is if they will grow given anarchist involvement, but he intones, “there is anger 
but also weariness.” The implication Jamjoom makes here is that increased violence is likely to 
occur with the addition of anarchists who arguably fall in the deviant or freak frames seen in 
previous studies (Boykoff 2006). By marginalizing protest voices, emphasizing institutional 
political voices, framing austerity as inevitable and connecting anarchists to protestors ultimately 
marginalizes the protestors even as the economic dimensions of the protest remain at the 
forefront. Importantly, following the paradigm allowed DW to challenge protestors’ specific 
anti-German grievances and thus challenge an oppositional narrative.  
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In contrast, RT coverage of the Greek protests and Blockupy is unambiguously in favor 
of the protestors. We’ve seen throughout, Russia routinely suggests that it wants greater 
cooperation with the West, but their PD efforts typically present a fragmented and refracted 
vision of its Western rivals including Germany (Amann 2016). Likewise, DW has an obligation 
to present Germany and German policy in a positives light (Połońska-Kimunguyi 2015). In this 
sense, both RT and DW address the Greek crisis and these protests according to their respective 
state interests, illustrating the value of IBs as a tool of narrative projection. I have discussed how 
DW covered both in the speaking actor section above and therefore will examine RT in more 
depth here. Analysis shows that RT does not use the protest paradigm and instead focuses on the 
division between state actors while emphasizing the damage done to Greece by austerity. In their 
lead news story from July 12, RT’s Richard Hawkins is live from Brussels reporting on bailout 
negotiations. The report itself is characterized by frequent use of opposing opinions expressed by 
European leaders including those of France, Germany, and Greece as well as lead EU figures 
such as Martin Schulz and Jean-Claude Junker. RT emphasized the divergence of opinion among 
European elites and the report gives space to figures such as Lode Vanoost, former speaker of 
Belgian Parliament who claims “ideologues are willing to put the EU at risk just to make a point 
about countries staying in line with their vision of EU.” Others included anti-EU UKIP politician 
Ray Finch. Hawking concludes the report saying “amongst political posturing the Greek 
situation is worsening with banks shut and capital controls in place.” As seen in Chapters 4 and 
5, RT places its attentions on state actors, while emphasizing conflict and questioning their 
motivations so consistent as to indicate a pattern in RT’s approach to Russian rivals. 
Nevertheless, we should also consider Abby Martin’s claim that she worked with “passionate 
American journalists,” who, “can speak out against different things that other corporate entities 
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can't speak out against that are beholden to their advertisers or parrot the establishment line” 
(Mayer 2014).” Certainly, Russia may benefit from undermining the legitimacy of rival’s 
policies, but they have also, arguably, hired journalists whose work suggests they feel strongly 
that German policies are in fact damaging Greek quality of life.  
On July 15 and 16, RT reported on the bailout deal, parliamentary vote in Greece, and the 
strikes and protests for approximately half of their newscast.102 In what is the only clear 
deviation from the protest paradigm in the sample, RT mounted a concerted attack on the deal, 
featuring fiery denunciations of the deal from Greek politicians and protestors alike, as well as 
guest experts like Michael Hudson, Professor of Economics at University of Missouri, and Ann 
Pettifor of the New Economics Foundation.103 All of these speakers are, without exception, 
against the deal and, Hawkins reports that “some people” are saying the deal is fascistic and that 
Germany has a “colonial policy” towards Greece.104 An unnamed male protestor shown on the 
streets proclaimed that the EU is “not a home of the people it is a prison for workers right.” The 
language of colonialism, prisons, and fascism are a common feature here, but directed against the 
EU and Germany. Unlike any other network, RT shows opposition to the deal uncritically. Given 
this evidence, and other insights (Borchers 2011), the conflation of Russian geopolitical rivals 
with fascism appears to be a common trope when Russia’s direct interests are threatened.  
If the examples of RT coverage provided here appear extreme, it is because in many ways 
they are. No network sampled here goes to the extent of calling its rivals, or using proxies to do 
so, fascists. Nevertheless, it does show that state interests influence the tone and style of protest 
coverage. Another way of seeing this kind of interest, or lack thereof, in action is in RT and 
                                                 
102 This is actually a common pattern in both RT and CCTV newscasts and economic programming. 
103 RT uses these last two expert speakers frequently on Boom Bust. 
104 On a side note, a March 18 report from RT addressed Donald Trump’s stated desire to run for the 
Republican nomination.  
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DW’s coverage of the Umbrella protests, which closely followed the protest paradigm 
privileging official sources and framing the protestors as ineffectual or deviant. RT coverage is 
perfunctory at most, staying in studio, paraphrasing official government statements concerning 
the illegality of the protests, and devoting little time to reports before moving on to other items. 
It is only when state’s direct interests are involved, as with Russia in the Greek protests, does a 
network go against the protest paradigm. RT’s support of the protestors, then, undermined its 
german rival while also serving its larger economic interests by calling the EU’s motivations into 
question. DW’s coverage, though on site in some reports, likewise airs official positions over 
protestor positions. Most importantly, the grievances of the protestors are limited to politics, and 
in the case of RT are not actually stated in reports.  
In terms of the Umbrella protests, AJE and CCTV provide the richest data, showing both 
the persistence of the protest paradigm in the former case, and the influence of state interests in 
the latter. Both networks mixed political and economic stories on the protests, though in both 
cases the economic dimension serves a disruption frame that marginalizes protestors. In AJE’s 
case, their reporters are simply following the protest paradigm: showing disruption, 
marginalizing protestor rhetoric through oppositional interviews, and airing official positions. 
The network newscast aired one story per day on the protests. In this sense there is little to 
suggest that AJE was counter-hegemonic towards China, though their use of protestors and 
onsite reporting means that they did effectively witness the protests themselves. 
CCTV, as a channel whose sponsor has a clear interest in public perception of the 
protests, did none of these things, suggesting that the channel was “activated” in the way Price 
(2014) suggests, as noted in the introduction. Specifically, examination of the frequency of 
reports during the study period indicates that CCTV steadily increased the number of stories on 
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the protests. From two on September 30 to a high of six on October 3. This suggests that as the 
protests continued, and international media coverage increased, CCTV acted to promote their 
own version of events.  
CCTV covered the protests, as noted, but did not visually depict them as DW or AJE do. 
Instead, their imagery consisted of reporters in studio, video of official press conferences, 
shopping districts denuded of customers, and concurrent National Day celebrations. Instead of 
relatively peaceful occupations, viewers witnessed economic hardship, calm government 
officials, and patriotic celebrations. On October 4, Chief Executive Leung, and often the news 
anchors themselves, decried protestor caused violence and implored protestors to “see the big 
picture and stop rallies,” and claimed the government must restore order. The news anchor in this 
item concluded that if the protests continued they will spiral out of order, instead the right way to 
solve disputes is through rationale communication and not in the streets. These examples show 
that CCTV used the protest paradigm, but also appear to actively desire to counter the protest as 
it continued, and doing so allowed it to subsume economic concerns into a disruption framework 
and elide a potent rationale for the protests. 
 
6.3 Conclusions: Economic Protests and the Blindspot 
We saw in Chapter 2 that scholarly attention and analysis of international broadcasters 
rose commiserate to their increased prevalence. However, Chapter 3 and 4 illustrated that IBs 
typically conform to state strategic narratives, calling their editorial independence into question, 
as well as their potential to diversify news flows. While those finding show the IBs do work to 
project state narratives, the data in this Chapter fundamentally undermines particular network’s 
claims to diversify news and offer alternatives to mainstream Western news. The economic 
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dimensions of protests are typically lost when either the protest is not explicitly economic or 
when attention is merely perfunctory or in keeping with the global news cycle. The only 
exception to these findings comes from RT’s coverage of Greece protests in July 2015. The 
factor that most readily accounts for this exception is Russia’s specific interest in undermining 
the EU to remove them as a potential rival for influence in Eastern Europe. In RT coverage, the 
protestors are right and the EU is a quasi-fascistic and unelected organization that punishes 
Greeks while benefiting the rich.  
 It is unlikely that any outlet would wholeheartedly endorse a protest in their sponsoring 
state, but the likelihood rises when the protest happens in a foreign country, and potentially rises 
even higher when a direct state interest in a rival is present. Projection of preferred state 
narratives is one of the key purposes of public diplomacy generally and international 
broadcasters specifically, and it is, therefore, not surprising that we should see it here. 
Nevertheless, the prevalence of the protest paradigm and apparent role of state interests in 
influencing coverage indicates that the counter-hegemonic potential of international broadcasters 
is weaker than previously thought and that newsroom cultures in IBs may be more homogenized 
than editorial statements suggest. While these networks do provide greater variety for 
international news consumers, the possibility of truly challenging both traditional journalism or 
capitalism as currently practiced remains elusive, suggesting that in the end international 
broadcasters are more tools of the state than vectors for challenging journalism. 
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7 THE TWILIGHT OF WORLD ORDER 
In mid-March 2015, Russia Today’s Anissa Naouai concluded her program with a short 
editorial statement on the possibility that Donald Trump would run for President of the United 
States. She stated that Trump’s grasp of foreign and domestic affairs, including his analysis that 
Putin had “eaten Obama’s lunch,” qualified him for President. While no more than an anecdote, 
the election of November 2016 put Naouai’s editorializing into a far different light than when I 
viewed this clip in a Stockholm office in March 2016. In some ways, it is easy to dismiss RT, a 
channel that seems almost a parody of news rather than the real thing, and yet Donald Trump 
won the 2016 election. Despite international broadcasting’s apparently low ratings or limited 
reach, Trump’s election, Brexit, and the political transformation of the last two years show that 
how and where we get our information is one of the most important drivers of political and 
economic change. Russia, China, Germany, and Qatar all recognized this essential truth and used 
their considerable resources to strengthen their position in the global media system through 
international broadcasting; it is likely that conflict between these state based outlets over the 
hearts and minds of publics around the world will only continue. This dissertation was a 
contribution to our understanding of this phenomenon.  
In this concluding chapter, I draw together the various threads of my data to illustrate the 
broader significance of my dissertation. While my evidence shows that IBs can function as tools 
of state power, they do not do so in the same ways. Instead, their “news norms” – the ways in 
which they cover news with interviews, on site reporting, and speaker selection – vary widely 
and indicates that each network uses different norms to project state narratives. In addition, while 
state sponsorship influences content, several other factors such as domestic media system, 
journalistic training, and editorial positions shape IB content. All of these factors taken together 
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show that scholar cannot dismiss IBs as government mouthpieces, even should they come from a 
state with thorough control of media like China. The variations seen here suggest that we should 
begin a typology of international broadcasting to improve our ability to analyze IBs, their 
content, and their relationship to state sponsors.  
I begin this chapter with a summary of my dissertation, the literatures I draw from, my 
methods, and expectations. Next, I describe my findings and their significance for the fields of 
international relations and global media studies. I conclude with recommendations for future 
research, limitations, and concluding thoughts. 
 
7.1 International Broadcasting: State Tool, Media Outlet 
My purpose for this project was less to prove a specific argument than to test a set of 
theoretical assertions about international broadcasting as a tool of state power projection. In 
short, scholars theorize international broadcasters exist to project the state and its interests, 
though there had been little analysis of the actual broadcaster content. Through a thoroughgoing 
comparative case study that drew upon the complementary, yet often disparate, literatures of 
public diplomacy, strategic narratives, contra-flow, and global media studies (broadly 
conceived), this dissertation examined the degree to which IBs projected their state sponsor’s 
interests. I also examined the degree to which these theories accurately appraised IBs 
characteristics and purpose. The first group of literatures composed of strategic narratives, public 
diplomacy, and contra-flow scholarship, accentuates the role of states as agents in the global 
system. The second group is a loose confederation of theories that position IBs within the 
broader global media system. These thinkers emphasize the ways in which global media can 
eyewitness distant events, build cosmopolitan identification, or the extent that specific networks 
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operate outside journalism norms and expectations. The first group’s emphasis on states 
presumes that IBs support state interests, but provides little insight into what forms and kinds 
such support may take. However, given their relative lack of content oriented analysis, do not 
specify the methods and forms of international broadcasting, their particular function as 
journalism outlets, or the ways in which coverage of specific nations or people may or may not 
support state interests. The second group of literature, on the other hand, focuses on IBs status as 
journalistic outlets in the context of global media. IB’s role as state actor is not the focus of their 
analyses. The second group elides the role of the state and omits what the first would argue is the 
key feature of international broadcasting as a media phenomenon, its role as a state tool. My 
dissertation addressed these shortcomings in the literature by asking a simple set of questions. 
Does international broadcaster content support state interests and policies? In addition, what 
journalism techniques do international broadcasters use in their content and how do such 
techniques ultimately present the state sponsor?  
To answer these questions, however, I wanted to avoid the more common news beats and 
genres scholarly inquiry explores, namely political conflict, elections, or armed conflict. While 
worthwhile subjects in their own right, they have also seen sustained attention and, in any case, 
provide no clear limits to the content states can, in theory, project. Economics, specifically its 
hegemonic neoliberal variant, provided those limits. While its dominance has come under 
increasing scrutiny since the 2008 Great Recession, neoliberal economic ideology contributed to 
a reshaping of global financial, business, and political norms for states both large and small. At 
the same time, states, including those in the current study, implemented capitalism internally and 
engaged to ever-increasing degrees with global markets from the 1980s to the present day. All of 
them have acquiesced, to some degree, to global capitalism and, therefore, cannot fundamentally 
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question its premises. Even the three broadcasters with stated counter-hegemonic missions – 
AJE, CCTV, and RT – must confront the limits imposed by neoliberal economic doctrine. 
Economic news, therefore, provides a boundary against which state discourses must push against 
to be counter-hegemonic but also can serve state interests by making the sponsor appear more 
attractive to capital. 
To bring the two groups of literature – in IR and global media studies – together I 
developed a mixed methodological approach using content oriented studies developed by 
Figenschou (2010) and Robertson (2014, 2015) and combining them with critical discourse 
analysis derived from Fairclough (1989, 2010). The results of coding the news items indicated 
specific patterns in coverage, such as the degree to which broadcasters presented their state 
sponsor, and then guided a deeper discourse analysis. My discourse analysis answered whether 
or not IB content supported state economic policies and interests, but it was also attentive to 
questions of power exercised via language to support state and/or economic interests. Combining 
the rigor of content analysis with the CDA’s attentiveness to power allowed me to see both the 
form of content, its use of on site or studio reporting, invited speakers, and journalism style, as 
well as how news items framed economic news.  
Given previous research and the particulars of my methodological approach, I had several 
specific expectations for the results of my analysis. First, I expected IBs to support their state 
sponsors, the question that remained was how. Would broadcasters use onsite reports and in what 
proportion to other kinds? Would broadcasters give their country’s nationals prominent roles 
political figures, independent experts, or common people, and which would appear with greater 
frequency? What would be the balance of domestic to international news? Given the record of 
several broadcasters founding, such as RT or CCTV, it was clear that grievance against the 
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Western dominated global media was a powerful motivation in creating IBs and broader public 
diplomacy strategies. In this context, supporting the state seemed axiomatic as the motivation for 
founding the IB directly related to a perceived invisibility of the state sponsor, a condition a 
broadcaster had the potential to rectify. As such, my second expectation was that the state 
sponsor would be present in economic news content. Certainly, there was precedent for the 
opposite as AJA was known to omit Qatari affairs in its coverage (Sakr 2007). Nevertheless, it 
seemed more likely that IBs, especially those charged with correcting an unequal global news 
coverage or presenting their nation to the world, would at some level need to show their state as 
a rational, righteous actor.  
My third expectation, and a key rationale for selecting economics as my subject, was that 
both financial journalism as a specific form of news production and the state sponsor’s 
capitalistic commitments would limit ability of broadcasters to contradict the principles of 
capitalist activity. However, these commitments would not necessarily preclude the IB from 
criticizing the policies and international role of other states, so long as it was within the 
framework of capitalism. Again, it was not clear how states with clear counter-hegemonic 
missions would respond to criticisms of the capitalist system. Similarly, coverage of economic 
protest defied easy predictions. Its incorporation was meant to check the elite driven economic 
news programs by illustrating different kinds of economic activity. At the very least, it should 
have varied by broadcaster; DW should have been free to criticize capitalism but was embedded 
in neoliberalism. RT and CCTV, in contrast, illustrated a geopolitical contradiction as Russia and 
China both tacitly rejected communism but have emerged as crony capitalist states while 
concurrently we are looking at a period of Soviet and Chinese nationalist nostalgia. As Chapters 
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4, 5, and 6 showed, the content met many of these expectations but not without important 
exceptions. 
 
7.2 International Broadcasting: Projecting Domestic Media 
 My findings reflect the variety of scholarship that informed this dissertation. 
While I do not upend the arguments of IR scholars who contend that IBs function as tools of 
state, or global media scholars who question an IB’s place in the global media system, I do 
complicate both literatures through comparative analysis of content. In the following 
subsections, I detail my findings and their significance for scholars of strategic narratives, public 
diplomacy, contra-flow, and global media studies. I also take these findings and propose a 
typology of international broadcasting taking into account the variety of factors that influenced 
IB content like journalism norms, media systems, and state interests.  
 
7.2.1 International Broadcasting: Different Strategies of State Projection 
Literatures that analyze IBs as tools of state power formed a constitutive part of my 
research given its direct analyses of IBs’ purpose as a tool of state power projection. At the most 
fundamental level, my analysis verifies that IBs do indeed project states, their interests, and 
policies in ways that appear to mirror sponsor rhetoric and policy. For those scholars interested 
in international relations, this dissertation illustrates that the news norms IB content take reflect 
domestic media structures, professional  norms (both national norms and professional ones), and 
the news cycle itself. In short, IBs do serve states but not necessarily under conditions of their 
own choosing and most definitely not in a uniform way, indicating that IBs can be sorted into 
various types.  
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Table 7.1 shows the varying strategies, interests, and news reporting patterns of each IB. 
Of the four networks, CCTV and DW operated as traditional public diplomacy instruments, 
projecting their sponsoring states in news items in positive ways and using items and guests to 
air particular strategic narratives. DW’s economic news concentrated on Germany and its 
relationships to other states (51.7% and 31.7% respectively); while CCTV’s coverage was more 
balanced (31.1% and 32.0% respectively). Both used combinations of onsite reporting (47.4% 
for CCTV and 55% for DW) and studio interviews or items, theoretically building credibility 
with audiences through eyewitnessing and authoritative testimony. AJE and RT operated 
differently, eschewing domestic reporting and focusing on foreign news (reported foreign news 
98.2% and 96.1% respectively). However, these two networks diverged in their reporting styles 
and invited speakers; AJE relied on reporting onsite (47.4%) and used a relatively even grouping 
of experts (29.8%), political figures (21.4%), and economic actors (29%) while RT relied on 
experts (89%) more than any other network and almost never reporting onsite (only 1%). In 
addition, AJE spread their stories around the world, covering Asia and Africa with some 
frequency, while RT covered Europe and the USA to the exclusion of other countries. All four 
networks spent more individual items on the biggest economic actors including the USA, EU, 
UK, Germany, and China as well as states where economic events elicited coverage such as 
Greece, Switzerland, and Singapore.  
 
 
 
 
 
236 
 
Table 7.1 Summary of New Techniques 
 
 AJE CCTV DW RT 
Geographic 
Focus 
China, USA, 
Russia, Asian 
and African 
nations 
intermittently  
China 
(intersectionally), 
USA, Japan, 
Greece, EU, and 
S. Korea 
Germany 
(intersectionally), 
Greece, USA, 
Switzerland, and 
EU 
USA, UK, 
EU, Germany, 
and Greece 
Common 
Voices1 
Evenly 
distributed 
between 
economic and 
experts, small 
amount of 
workers and 
ordinary people; 
Americans and 
British, , notably 
no Germans 
despite reporting 
on Greece 
Mostly experts 
followed by 
economic and 
political figures; 
mostly mainland 
Chinese, 
followed by 
Americans, 
Germans, 
Greeks, Hong 
Kongers, 
Australians, and 
Japanese1 
Mostly economic 
figures, high 
presence of 
workers and 
ordinary people; 
mostly German 
followed by 
Greek, Polish, 
and British 
Experts 
especially 
university 
professors of 
economics; 
mostly 
American or 
British 
Style of 
Reporting  
On site reporting 
combined with 
interviews in 
studio 
Mostly studio 
items balanced 
with on site and 
mixture items, 
small number of 
interviews 
On site combined 
with interviews 
and studio 
analysis 
Studio 
reporting and 
interviews, 
separation 
from events 
on the ground 
Common Story 
Topics  
Various national 
economies, 
Greek crisis, 
AIIB, housing, 
oil and 
commodity 
prices 
National 
economies, 
currency, Greek 
crisis, Two 
Sessions,1 and 
World Economic 
Forum 
Greek crisis and 
elections, various 
national 
economies, oil 
prices, and Swiss 
franc 
Greek crisis 
and elections, 
EU policy, oil 
prices, gold 
prices, World 
Economic 
Forum, and 
technology 
Characterization 
of Global 
Economic 
System 
Seen through 
events in 
individual 
nations, rarely 
characterized 
directly, requires 
governments and 
entrepreneurship 
to improve 
Prosperity 
increased with 
development and 
trade; states 
needed to 
manage 
economies, 
China is 
responsible 
stakeholder  
System fair but 
needs innovation 
and 
entrepreneurship 
to grow and 
adapt to 
globalization, 
Germany serves 
as model of 
economics 
Dominated by 
powerful, 
though 
incompetent 
governments 
& central 
banks, 
especially the 
USA, 
Germany, and 
UK 
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Features  such as speaking actor selection, on site reporting, in studio interviews, and 
geographic focus mean that all of these networks operate as public diplomacy tools, projecting 
narratives about the state or its rivals, but that they do so in their own ways, informed by their 
media systems and editorial positions (see Appendices A and C). However, counter-hegemony, 
as theorized by scholars (A. Robertson 2014; Sakr 2007; Thussu 2007a), is not apparent in 
geographic focus or speaking actors, and is uneven in news norms. Instead, counter-hegemony 
appears in the narratives themselves, but only when direct state interests are at stake. Several 
examples illustrate this. 
Take, for example, coverage of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). AJE 
and RT’s coverage emphasized the potential damage to American and Western hegemony the 
Chinese led project represented through its provision of alternatives to the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Their framing of the AIIB underscored state rivalry over the 
structure of the global economic system. CCTV broke with this narrative by stressing 
cooperation and potential rapprochement with the USA instead of conflict narratives. America 
had “concerns” about the bank, CCTV’s journalists told us, but news items scrupulously avoided 
saying or implying that the AIIB represented a threat to US interests. The total number of items 
CCTV aired on the AIIB (11 compared to the single item each for AJE and RT) also shows that 
presenting the bank as a multilateral and well governing institution was a priority for CCTV’s 
editors and producers. In this example, CCTV’s coverage directly underscored the Chinese 
leadership’s view that the AIIB was a complement to Western dominated structures rather than a 
threat.  
The ongoing reporting on the Greek crisis, both in the economic news programs and in 
protest coverage, and each networks’ coverage of the Hong Kong Umbrella protests also 
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demonstrate the apparent influence of state interests in determining the tone of IB content. 
Indeed the Greek protests indicated that the only time a broadcaster broke with the “protest 
paradigm,” the collection of news tropes that undermine protesters and their grievances and thus 
preserve the status quo, was when said broadcaster’s strategic interests could be served. While 
DW’s coverage of the Greek crisis and protests undercut opposition to Germany’s austerity 
policies, RT directly challenged EU economic policy and clearly articulated support for Greek 
protests in opposition to German dogmas by featuring oppositional voices like Yanis Varoufakis, 
Tim Duy of the University of Oregon, Michael Hudson of the University of Missouri, Marshall 
Auerback of Institute of New Economic Thinking, and Mark Weisbrot. Likewise, CCTV covered 
Umbrella with content that directly undermined the protestors’ grievances. In addition, CCTV 
coverage escalated over the course of the protests (16 total over the course of that week) and 
never directly interviewed or depicted the protestors themselves, as other networks’ coverage 
did. RT, DW, and AJE all covered the protests, but instead of CCTV’s direct assault on protestor 
positions, these three networks fell into a simple pattern of covering the disruption of the protests 
as well as their economic costs. In the end, these patterns support Price’s (2014) argument that 
broadcasters may function as, more or less, typical global news outlets that then get activated 
when specific state interests are at play. While these broadcasters did support state interests, they 
did not do so independently of other factors like domestic media systems or editorial positions. 
While I have verified IRs basic argument that IBs exist to support the state, I have also fruitfully 
complicated it by illuminating other relevant influences on IB content. Given these newly 
described features of broadcasting, we can begin to outline how differences between IBs can be 
systematically catalogued.  
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7.3 Protests and State Relations 
This chapter includes a comparative analysis of four economic protests, one each from 
Germany, China, Brazil, and Greece.105 While I described my methodological procedure in 
Chapter 2, in this section I examine each protest in terms of its causes, economic dimensions, 
duration, tactics, and suitability for analysis. In particular, each protest has specific connections 
with each state sponsor, thereby allowing me to test the extent to which state interests influence 
content.  
Blockupy is a pan-European anti-austerity movement that seeks to challenge the capitalist 
structure of the European Union (Blockupy 2015). It includes over 90 organizations ranging 
from anarchists to more traditional left-wing political parties (Sky 2015). The March 2015 
protests were part of a larger and ongoing campaign to reverse austerity policies around Europe, 
but were notable specifically for their specific targeting off the inauguration of the new European 
Central Bank headquarters in Frankfurt, Germany. In addition,, this particular event received 
media coverage from several media outlets including IBs like DW, RT, AJE, CCTV and Telesúr 
(see for example AJE 2015; CCTV 2015b; Drozdiak and Sloat 2015; Roos 2015; Sky 2015; RT 
2015). Blockupy organized protests continue in many European cities. 
The Umbrella Movement is an ongoing student led protest that seeks to ensure Hong 
Kongers, instead of Beijing, can select their own candidates for their Legislative Council 
elections. Starting in late 2014, the protests were shut down by police in early 2015 and have 
proceeded intermittently since then (BBC 2016b). As we shall see, the movement used 
                                                 
105 This chapter relies on data drawn from the coding of 807 total news items. I followed the same 
analysis procedure as in Chapter 4 and 5, coding each episode as described in Chapter 2, making minor 
modifications to code for the news “beat” of the story such as science, domestic, world, or arts/culture. I 
also coding for common metaphors, arguments, visuals, and discourse in each item.  
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occupation of public spaces like Occupy Wall Street and this allowed them to receive sustained 
media coverage, which some studies suggest could potentially provide more opportunity for 
media to report on them with depth and nuance (Gottlieb 2015; Rauch et al. 2007).  
In Brazil a series of pro and anti-government protests in March 2015 are, like Blockupy, 
singular protests, which drew international news attention. During this week, allegations of 
political corruption and manipulation of state oil firm Petrobras led to dueling protests in Sao 
Paolo and Rio that were widely reported in international news (Arvanitidis and Ford 2015; 
CCTV 2015a; Deutsche Welle 2015b). President Rousseff was subsequently impeached under 
murky circumstances that some have called a “coup” and so this situation is ongoing (BBC 
2016a; Boadle 2016; Eakin 2016; Gallas 2016; Trevisani and Lewis 2016).  
Finally, the Greek protests of July 2015 were a reaction to the Syriza party’s acceptance 
of new bailout terms offered the European Central Bank and Germany to Greece. This specific 
protest gained media attention because of its proximity to those bailout negotiations (BBC 
2015c; Oyedele and Udland 2015; Triandafyllou and Tagaris 2015). Nevertheless, the specific 
events analyzed here are merely one in a series of anti-austerity protests in the country stemming 
from the European Debt Crisis. As with the Brazil protests, the political and economic issues 
underlying the events have not been resolved.  
These four protests provide fertile ground for analysis for several reasons. First, the 
Greek and Umbrella protests are part of long lasting protest movements while Blockupy and 
Brazil occurred on one or two days of activity. Differences in the length of protests lead to 
differences in total amount of coverage, in turn, allowing us to see how narratives of protest 
movements take shape under different conditions, as long term protests like Occupy or the Arab 
Spring fall into different narratives over time (Gottlieb 2015). While Blockupy and Brazil 
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protests reflect long present socioeconomic and political divisions in their respective societies, 
the actual events of civil disorder and protest occurred so quickly that new narratives arguably 
could not take shape. These conditions are important limitations on news discourse, which often 
changes and molds itself to events over time. 
Second, the protests are geographically dispersed, in some cases directly affecting 
sponsoring states as with the Greek and Umbrella movement for Germany and China 
respectively. In other cases, sponsoring states are connected indirectly or obliquely to protest 
events; for example, Greece to Russia and the Brazilian protests to all sponsoring states. They 
also reflect a spectrum of economic development with Greek and Blockupy protest action taking 
place in the developed world and Umbrella and Brazil in developing though emerging 
economies.  
Third and most importantly, each has a clear though often underreported economic 
dimension. The Greek protests and the Blockupy protests are the most directly economically- 
based protests in the sample. Blocupy’s stated mission is “to connect our struggles and powers 
beyond nation-state lines. Together we want to create a common European movement, united in 
diversity, which can break the rule of austerity and will start to build democracy and solidarity 
from below” (Blockupy 2015). In addition, they direct their protest against an official symbol of 
international finance, the European Central Bank. The Greek Debt Crisis is also directed at 
economic institutions like the IMF and ECB, but is also directed at the current German 
government (Kutter 2014).  
Brazil’s recent and ongoing political turmoil, though often framed in terms of political 
corruption, reflects class divisions within Brazilian society. While some Western outlets suggest 
that anti-government protestors grievances lay in corrupt use of funds from state firms like 
242 
 
Petrobras to finance political candidates (BBC 2016a). At the same time, some protestors cite a 
recent recession and weakening economy as the cause of their anger (Watts 2016). Meanwhile, 
Rousseff’s draws protest support stems from the trade union networks and groups sympathetic to 
her Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) who protested in “defense of democracy and the rights of the 
working class” (Douglas 2016). As we will see in the analysis, the colors protestors wore to 
rallies carry symbolic power as Rousseff’s supporters wore the red of the labor movement and 
her opponents wore the yellow of the national flag.  
Likewise, the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong reflects overlapping layers of 
grievance on the part of protestors, though there are competing interpretations. For example, Li 
writing in the Washington Post argues that the “central theme” of democracy in the protests is 
misguided as the region has greater representation than the mainland. Instead, he suggests that, 
“General discontent has provided fertile soil for this movement, and the sources of that 
dissatisfaction have nothing to do with imaginary diktats from Beijing. Hong Kong is going 
through a tough period of economic and social dislocation” (2014). In contrast, Cheung writing 
in the Diplomat argues the protests are a “warning of the comprehensive breakdown of 
confidence in Hong Kong’s governing institutions – it reflects growing public disillusion with 
the institutional means of making their voices heard” (2014). At the same time, those same 
governing structures reflect the collusion of Hong Kong’s wealthiest with the Beijing leadership 
to maintain both stability and economic growth. As David Zweig of the City University of Hong 
Kong observes, “The conservatives, the tycoons, the business elite can really control the 
legislature and prevent any kind of social welfare policy… Beijing has to realize that they have a 
social problem—it’s not just a political problem” (quoted in Schroeder 2014).  
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Each of the four protests – Blockupy, Umbrella, Greece, and Brazil – embody economic 
conflict between the grassroots and national, sometime supra-national, elites. However, despite 
clear economic dimensions, no IB economic news program devoted any coverage to them. While 
previous scholarship suggests that financial journalism would be unlikely to cover protests in 
general (Lee 2014), three networks have a stated counter-hegemonic mission suggesting that 
their journalists would devote some time to protests. Instead, factors like the protest paradigm 
and state interests indicate that simple counter-hegemonic goals are no guarantee of protest 
coverage. As the analysis below illustrates, state interests are likely the paramount consideration 
in terms of protest news content. 
 
7.3.1 Proactive or Reactive: Towards a Typology of International Broadcasting 
The patterns seen here – presence of state sponsor in content, adherence to journalism 
norms in coverage (protest paradigm), and divergent narratives in content directly related to state 
interests suggested, ultimately, the beginnings of a typology of international broadcasting. Table 
7.2 breaks down several factors that influence IB coverage. Rather than being simple 
mouthpieces for government propaganda, IB content reflects a variety of influences, divided here 
into three factors – internal IB factors, media system factors, and international journalism factors. 
I do not want to make a claim that any one factor is necessarily more important than another, but 
rather that all of these factors need to be accounted for in an analysis of international 
broadcasting. Based on my findings and these factors I want to begin to schematize a typology of 
international broadcasters that will be of use for future researchers in the field. 
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Table 7.2 Typology of International Broadcasters 
 
Factors in International 
Broadcaster 
Media System Factors International Journalism 
Factors  
➢ State – Broadcaster 
Relationship  
➢ Legal Framework of 
Founding 
(constitutional 
protections) 
➢ Degree of Sponsor 
Presentation  
➢ Degree of Rival 
Presentation 
➢ Editorial Mission 
➢ Political/Social 
Exigence of Founding 
➢ Journalist Sourcing 
and Hiring  
➢ Mass Circulation 
Press 
➢ Political Parallelism 
(Advocacy v. 
Neutrality) 
➢ Journalistic 
Professionalism 
➢ State Interventionism 
➢ Transitioning State 
➢ Anglo-American 
Model of Journalism 
(CNNI and BBCW) 
➢ Journalism Genre 
Norms (i.e. Finance, 
War, Politics) 
➢ News Events and 
Cycle 
 
 
I divide these four broadcasters into two broad categories based on the presence, or lack 
thereof, of their state sponsor. AJE and RT do not present the state, or at least do so without 
sustained attention to domestic political or economic coverage; I call these reactive broadcasters. 
In contrast, DW and CCTV consistently, and presumably consciously, devote substantial 
attention to domestic news; I call these proactive broadcasters. My findings illustrated a 
bifurcation in this most basic sense, some IBs present the state, how they do so is not relevant 
right now, and others do not, or at least omit their sponsor from serious coverage. Sakr (2007) 
suggested, now ten years ago, that AJA’s omission of Qatar could be seen as an attempt to 
increase credibility by removing the possibility of hypocrisy on the part of its journalists. 
Reception studies are required to illuminate this possibility, but we can see that omission of the 
sponsor is one method of projecting specific strategic goals and narratives.  
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While neither AJE nor RT present their state sponsors, at least in the content analyzed 
here, this does not mean they are alike in their approach to supporting their sponsor. AJE, for 
example, operates as a global news channel, dispersing its coverage and following news events 
just as the BBC does; I call this neutral in the sense that news cycles and media system norms are 
the dominant factors shaping coverage. RT, on the other hand, has an obsessive focus on 
Russia’s geopolitical rivals in Europe and the USA; I call this a Rival Targeter given that news 
cycles and Russian media norms, which support the state directly, do not shape coverage as  
much as state interests. These facts suggest another layer of the typology, that even if editors and 
journalists omit the sponsoring state they still must choose where to focus their coverage. 
Speculatively, these divergent approaches may yield different benefits in addition to removing 
the sponsor from news content. What I call “neutral” reporting potentially appeals to audiences 
that desire news, which does not diverge from global norms as crafted by CNN and BBC. 
Coverage appears to follow news as it happens and builds credibility through a variety of 
speakers and journalism norms. In contrast, RT’s editors and journalists narrowly cover rivals 
and build credibility through experts from those rivals, typically Americans. In this case, network 
credibility is authoritarian, using “fringe” speakers from rival states to craft an alternative 
narrative that is unresponsive to contradictory evidence or arguments. Importantly, both can 
serve the interests of their sponsors, as we have already seen, but they do so in different ways. 
Likewise, CCTV and DW cover their sponsors in divergent ways. DW, at least on the 
surface, follows the German model of journalism and provided two or more sides to a given 
economic dispute (even if the actual structure of the item ultimately supports the interests of the 
German state). CCTV’s approach to domestic and international news, however, constrains 
possible debate. Even with the use of live interviews, previously not present in CCTV content 
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(X. Zhang 2011), economic news uncritically supported Chinese policies, framing them in ways 
that underplayed potential conflict or incompetence on the part of the CPC, as in their frequent 
coverage of the many CPC led economic reforms in the beginning of 2015. While the end result, 
based on my findings, is the same in that both networks supported their state sponsors’ policies, 
they also differed in how they attempted to do so. Different media system norms most readily 
explain the divergence and, in turn, serves to illustrate that while IBs do support the state, they 
do not do so in the same way.  
Table 7.3 Typology of International Broadcasting 
Proactive (CCTV, DW) – Depicts the 
sponsor in coverage 
Reactive (AJE, RT) – Does not or rarely 
depicts the sponsor in coverage 
Chauvinist (CCTV) – 
Uncritically supports 
sponsor in coverage  
Neutral (DW) – 
Provides apparently 
balanced coverage of 
sponsor 
Rival Targeter (RT) – 
Tightly focused on 
geopolitical rivals to 
undermine their 
credibility  
Neutral (AJE) – 
Provides broad 
coverage of many 
areas, can be 
activated to support 
state interests 
 
Table 7.3 provides a preliminary schematic of my typology with names and descriptions. 
It is at these two most basic levels, presentation of the sponsor and the modes in which it is done, 
that the four broadcasters differ. However, the common feature of all four was their general 
adherence to projecting their state sponsors’ interpretation of economic policy and support for 
their sponsors’ policies. While other factors like media systems and journalism norms influence 
IB content, they do so within the bounds of state sponsorship. This central fact shapes IB content 
to such a degree that broadcasters’ status in the global media system, particularly in terms of 
their capacity to diversify global news, requires reexamination.  
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7.3.2 Counter-Hegemony in Question 
While my contribution to global media studies is more limited than my contribution to 
theories of strategic narratives, public diplomacy, or contra-flows, it is nonetheless important. 
For my purposes here, it centers on the possibility of IBs to both diversify global news flows in 
terms of their geography and speaker and to provide counter-hegemonic coverage that challenges 
current power structures. First, because state sponsorship is a critical factor in IB content, 
especially in terms geographical focus and speaking actor selection, future analyses need to read 
content in terms of potential state interests. This is not to say that state interests are the 
controlling factor in all IB content, we have already seen that myriad other factors play a role in 
shaping coverage. Nevertheless, state interests do influence IB content, and need to be more fully 
accounted for in new scholarship.  
Second, and related to the first point, the potential power of these new broadcasters to 
eyewitness or create a global community must be seriously questioned given broadcasters’ 
connections to their state sponsor. While I want to be optimistic about the myriad potentials of 
new televisions stations, internet platforms, and other media tools, my analysis illustrated the 
folly of untampered sanguinity. Most notably, the uncritical view that RT, CCTV, or AJE may 
represent a form of counter-hegemony, broadcasters that provide a true alternative to mainstream 
journalism, appears profoundly weakened. A counter-hegemonic editorial mission, to the extent 
any network claims to provide such content, appears to be more branding exercise than reality. 
While CCTV, for example, certainly does diversify news given its fulsome coverage of Asia, 
said coverage also reflects and projects the interests of the CPC. Likewise, RT’s critical coverage 
of American and European policy may appeal to many around the world, however, similar 
examples of repression in the Middle East, China, and Russia itself go unreported or 
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marginalized. Certainly, the criticisms of an Americanized infotainment driven set of private 
channels cannot simply be swept aside. Nevertheless, hope likely does not exist in these 
networks, they appear to be the news, and often do perform critical journalistic functions, but 
carry within them the desires of their state sponsor and only move against journalism norms 
when those desires are in play. 
 
7.4 Limitations: The Need for Holistic Analysis 
Despite these contributions to the field, there are some limitations in this dissertation, and 
to my methodological approach in particular. While the mixed methodological approach utilized 
here fruitfully combined content and discourse analysis to examine IB content, this is also a key 
limitation. Miskimmon et al. (2012), in addition to developing strategic narratives as a theory, 
argue that narratives go through a process of initial formation in government, projection via state 
actors (including IBs), and finally reception by audiences. The analysis presented in previous 
chapters focused steadfastly on projection of narratives themselves and thus missed the two other 
phases Miskimmon et al. describe. 
In terms of the first phase, formation, content and discourse analysis can deconstruct the 
result but not the process by which is was made. Put another way content and discourse analysis 
can only find patterns and, in turn, can only infer the intentionality of said patterns. If DW’s 
coverage, for example, minimized Greek concerns about austerity and EU policy, as I argue it 
did, the possible reasons for that pattern are not completely in focus. I argued that factors such as 
the relationship of a broadcaster to its sponsor, journalism norms, and professional training, 
among others, explain at least some the patterns detected in coverage. Nevertheless, other factors 
like collusion between broadcaster and state, journalist’s status as citizens of the sponsoring 
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state, or work norms could all illuminate the causal relationship between IB content and IB 
structure and work culture. This opacity is well represented by the quotations from RT 
journalists seen in Chapter 2. RT journalist Liz Wahl, for example, claimed that “‘They [RT] will 
find ways to punish you covertly and reward those that do go along with their narrative.’” 
(Kirchick 2014). On the other hand, Abby Martin claimed after her on air criticism of Russia’s 
Ukraine policy that she received no punishment and was pleased to “have my network recognize 
that it’s good to have dissent” (Mayer 2014). Analysis of content, while critical, can only tell us 
so much about the work place culture of these newsrooms and we must be cautious about 
jumping to conclusions. 
The point on newsroom cultures needs some elaboration. Several studies have shown that 
the ways in which journalists perceive of their own role, how they are socialized into a particular 
work environment, influences the ways in which they craft journalism (Baumann, Gillespie, and 
Sreberny 2011; Dencik 2013). In addition, several of the scholars whose work I have cited have 
conducted ethnographic newsroom studies (Figenschou 2012; Powers 2012; A. Robertson 2010) 
and organizational setting are underexplored in the literature on journalism (Örnebring 2012). 
While I did use some of this work to illustrate the structural forces that shape IB content, I did 
not use these sources to full effect. One reason is that the extant literature asks different 
questions and explores newsroom from varied perspectives and so comparing between these 
works, while instructive, would suffer problems with generalizability. Nonetheless, the work 
developed from this dissertation will take these studies into account.  
Likewise, this dissertation did not engage with audience reception. Here, again, we are 
replete with anecdotes of effectiveness. If YouTube subscriptions are any kind of indication of 
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popularity and credibility, RT enjoys more than either AJE or CNN with 2.03m106 subscribers 
compared to 1.2m107 and 1.8m108 respectively. Evidence such as this, though provocative, 
illustrates a broader issue with media analysis. To fully understand the role of media, including 
IBs, in society we must also understand how people perceive and use that content. Conducting 
reception studies is, however, costly, difficult, and time consuming. Using proxies as I did above 
is not a substitute for engaging with actual people who view these channels and probing their 
beliefs, presumptions, and their use of IB content.  
On final limitation is my lack of attention to Miskimmon et al.’s (2013) concept of 
narrative alignment and non-alignment, where when actors’ narratives are aligned each actor is 
then empowered to act on those narratives; hopefully leading to non-violent change in the global 
order. My analysis does show some types of narrative alignment, between AJE, CCTV, and DW 
in terms of anti-austerity protests in Greece, arguably across all four networks in terms of 
neoliberal economic policies, across AJE and RT on the challenge to American hegemony from 
the AIIB, and several others. These convergences, between content and economic philosophy 
and between states themselves, present a chance for actors to change the global economic 
system. While narrative alignment is an important component of strategic narrative theories, I 
omitted it for two reasons. First, and more practically, my study period is relatively recent in 
time and many of the issues at play in IB content had yet to resolve. Compared to Miskimmon et 
al.’s (2013) analysis of the Iran nuclear negotiations, which had the benefit of many years of data 
to draw upon, my data is rather limited. In terms of the research questions I sought to answer, 
alignment is not my key object of inquiry, or at least not between states or between states and 
                                                 
106 Found at their YouTube channel site: https://www.youtube.com/user/RussiaToday.  
107 Found at their YouTube channel site: https://www.youtube.com/user/AlJazeeraEnglish.  
108 Found at their YouTube channel site: https://www.youtube.com/user/CNN.  
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agent of international capitalism. Instead, my inquiry concerned the degree to which broadcasters 
project economic policies and positions and if they so, how?  Narrative alignment signals the 
potential for strategic narratives to be effective means of achieving policy goals; my dissertation 
was not focused on the effectiveness of narratives, however, it was concerned foremost with their 
presence and mode of transmission. With these three broad sets of limitations in mind, I would 
like to suggest the following for future research. 
 
7.5 Future Directions: Greater Variety and Access 
I foresee several directions for my future inquiry into international broadcasting. First, 
more IB studies are needed that continue the work on economics with particular attention to the 
ways in which its contestation works horizontally (between actors of like kind as in states) and 
vertically (with protests, activists, and populist movements) against states and supra-national 
institutions. Chapter 1 illustrated that scholarly analyses of IB, public diplomacy, and global 
media provide sustained attention to states as political actors. While political conflict between 
and within states is a vital site of analysis, this has sometimes come at the expense of seeing 
states and conflict between and within them as economic actors. Particularly as states across the 
developed world continue to be embroiled with populist and activist movements ranging from 
UK and US Uncut, Podemos, Blockupy, Alternative for Germany, Syriza, Trumpism, anti-
Trumpism, Bernie Sanders’ campaign, and Occupy understanding the role and place of economic 
rhetoric is crucial. Judis’ recent, careful examination of both left-wing and right-wing populism 
in America and Europe suggests that anti-elite movements, no matter their stripes, implement 
economic rhetoric to characterize their opponents in a negative light. Should the movement be 
left-wing in its approach, then the enemy is a feckless and greedy elite, too deferential to capital. 
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Should the movement be right-wing, enemies are seen in both the immigrants who compete for 
jobs, and the greedy elite who facilitates their arrival for personal enrichment. In either case, 
economics forms a constitutive part of the movement’s rhetorical repertoire. This is not to 
dismiss the very tangible bigotry members of some populist movements profess, it is real and 
must be challenged. However, the rhetoric of a movement like Brexit, for example, used a canny 
combination of both cultural and economic argumentation to provide space for individuals to 
invest in the movement and deny unsavory, xenophobic elements within it. The movements that 
have sprung into existence since the 2008 financial crash, coupled with the possibility of the 
developed West retreating from its traditional policies of lowering barriers to trade and capital, 
both indicate that vital work must be done to incorporate the, admittedly obtuse, language of 
economic rhetoric into scholarly analyses of states and global media.  
Future studies that include a larger number of or different set of broadcasters would 
increase the comparative value and explanatory power of and test the basis for my typology. 
Broadcasters could be both IBs or private channels, but increased use of comparative and holistic 
work remains a necessary, if perilous, means of checking our assumptions and seeing media 
outlets in situ (Hallin and Mancini 2004; Hanusch and Obijiofor 2008).  
Concurrently, and in recognition that IBs are only one component of larger public 
diplomacy efforts, a multi-platform content analysis of a single state is needed to situate IBs 
deeper within their sponsoring state structures. RT, while it serves as a handy lightening rod for 
critics of Russian information policy, is merely one part of a large, well-financed operation. It 
also includes the wire service Sputnik, the Arabic and Spanish arms of RT, think tanks and 
policy institutes, loans to European political parties like France’s FN, and targeted programing in 
countries such as Ukraine, Estonia, and Latvia (Borchers 2011; Pomerantsev 2014; Ioffe 2010; 
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Lukin 2013; Rawnsley 2015a). Surely, such a project would be difficult for a single person to do 
and would require multiple language competencies, academic and journalistic training, and 
access to Russian government documents and political actors. However, analyzing broadcasters 
in isolation means that our picture of individual state efforts will necessarily be incomplete and 
fail to provide the whole picture of the many different arms of state public diplomacy policy. 
At a far more fundamental level, we also need better access to IB material in the first 
place and should develop a comprehensive archive of international news content, supported by 
fair use laws in a variety of countries. My own research used each broadcasters’ online archive 
of economic news programs. Luckily, all of them had approximately three to four months of 
content. However, all networks removed the episodes from their websites, making retrieving 
difficult if not impossible. Likewise, regular newscasts are often unavailable and need to be 
recorded as they air to be of use to researchers. My own research relied on Alexa Robertson’s 
generosity in using the archive she manages at the institutionen för mediestudier at Stockholm 
University. While this trip was rewarding, interesting, and ultimately cost neutral for me, not all 
may be so lucky. My initial, incomplete proposal would be for a major American university, 
preferably in an international travel hub such as Atlanta, to host an archive with similar scope to 
Stockholm University. It would record and catalogue a number of global news channels with the 
intent of making these records available for research. Should researchers find it too difficult to 
visit the archive directly it will become necessary to provide advice on how to access content and 
how to use fair use laws to limit legal liability. Failure to achieve this goal will leave scholars, 
journalists, and activists unable to check the media operations of the most powerful states in the 
world, leaving them unchecked and us all the more impoverished. 
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7.6 Final Thoughts 
I began this dissertation with a quotation from then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 
which she exhorted her audience to realize that the USA was in an “information war” with Iran, 
Russia, and China, a war which it was losing. That was in 2011. In 2017 that war appears to be 
continuing unabated and on more fronts that ever before. The right-wing populist wave that has 
seized parts of Europe, the USA, and other countries around the world and the left-wing 
populists who arose after the 2008 financial crash each reflect, in their own way, this information 
war. With each group siloed into their respective echo chambers, much commentary speaks of 
fake news, social media algorithms, or alternative facts. However, we must also consider the 
power of states to finance information brokers, such as international broadcasters, and to, in 
some small way, furnish the information that undergirds these movements. In the chaos of 
information available to us, state sponsored news, especially when it seems to say what no one 
else will, may seem a light in the darkness, a place to flee where certainties shield us from the 
unknown. But this is a false hope. My dissertation illustrates this through its analysis of IB 
content, which follows the interests of states and their policies. This is not to say one cannot 
learn from watch these channels, or that they engage in outright falsehoods. It is to say that IBs 
are no less connected to agendas and ideologies than private stations, even though many of the 
journalists working for these channels presumably have high minded ideals about journalism. In 
these new uncertain times, where old truths and ideologies falter, states such as Russia, China, 
and Germany’s use of media to contest people’s loyalties is only likely to increase. It my hope 
that this dissertation helped to illuminate the precise ways in which they do so, so that we might 
be better equipped to distinguish truth from falsehood.  
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APPENDICES: CODING SCHEMES AND SHEETS  
 
Appendix A: Economic News Programs Coding Scheme 
Economic news items are treated as the individual data points with the subcategories 
considered the variables.  
• ID Identification – alphanumerical code for individual episode ex. CCTV01-12-15-01 
• Issue(s) - Issue 
o The economic topic identified as subject of news item, for example: “net neutrality,” 
“trade,” or “quantitative easing.” These are usually stated in the episode description 
on the respective webpage or within the first few seconds of the news item by the host 
or reporter. They will be coded for precise phrasing used. 
• Geography Geography – The category refers to the entity that the news item frames as the 
primary subject of the story. This information is usually found within the first few delivered 
lines of news content, either as a set up by the anchor or the reporter.  
o Domestic – host nation only; coded with value 0 
o Intersectional – host nation and outside state, institution, or actor; coded with value 1 
o Outside world – no reference to host nation, only involves outside actors; coded with 
value 2 
o Missing/unknown = 99 
• GeoName Geography Name – codes for name of main subject nation and all nation’s 
subsequently mention in report 
• GlobalNorS Global North or South – codes for geographic specific geographic regions. The 
USA, Canada, Western Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea are North. 
All others are South.  
o North – coded as 0 
o South – coded as 1 
• EconSource Economic source data – This category refers to sources for economic data. Each 
source used will be coded for the following. 
o EconSourceName Name – this is the stated name of the source as shown in the 
episode null value = 99 
o EconSourceGeo Geographic level – This set of set of codes parallels Robertson’s 
(2010, 2014) coding schema for both news construction of the global and economic 
news. 
▪ Sub-national – Think tanks or universities; coded with value 0 
▪ National – Central banks or government ministries; coded with value 1 
▪ International – Institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, or United Nations; 
coded with value 3 
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o EconSourceGlobalNorS Global North or South – codes for specific geographic 
regions, see above 
▪ North – coded as 0 
▪ South – coded as 1 
• NewsType News item type- This category codes whether the story is presented only in studio 
with narration, or outside the studio, at the site of the news. 
o Studio is coded as 0 
o Site is coded as 1 
o Studio interview coded as 2 
o On site interview coded as 3 
o Mixture of these coded as 4 
o Roudtables coded as 5 
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Appendix B: Economic News Programs Coding Sheet 
• Issue(s) _____________________________ 
• Geography ____ 
• GeoName ________________________ 
• GlobalNorS ___________ 
• Economic source data  
o Name _____________  
o Geographic level ____  
o North or South _____ 
• “Speaking actors” 
o Political (government members, politicians, activists) ________ 
o Economic figures (bankers, businessmen, shopowners) ________ 
o Experts (academics, journalists, economists) ________ 
o “Ordinary people” (the man-in-the-street or woman-in-the-marketplace, members, 
politicians, activists) ___________ 
• News item type _____________  
• Discourse ____________________ 
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Appendix C: Speaking Actors Coding Book 
• Each speaking actor is considered a separate data point with the subcategories considered 
variables.  
• ID Identification – alphanumerical code for individual episode ex. CCTV01-12-15 
• SpeakActType “Speaking actors”109 – These are those speaking actors who are not either 
anchors or reporters for the network. Each actor has its own individual code 
o Political (government members, politicians, activists) coded as 0 
o Economic figures (bankers, businessmen, shopowners) coded as 1 
o Experts (academics, journalists, economists) coded as 2 
o “Ordinary people” (the man-in-the-street or woman-in-the-marketplace, members, 
politicians, activists) coded as 3 
•  “Speaking actors” demo data – Every individual speaker will be coded for the following 
data. 
o SpeakActName Name – Name given in episode. Normally stated and found in a 
banner underneath speaker. 
o SpeakActOrg Organization – This is the professional association given underneath 
the name in the episode. Coded with name of organization or work identification.  
o SpeakActNet Network – They appear on this network. 
▪ CCTV = 0 
▪ AJE = 1 
▪ DW = 2 
▪ RT = 3 
o SpeakActGen Gender – This is their gender, coded with 0 for male and 1 for female 
and 2 for ambiguous  
o SpeakActNat Nationality – The presumed nationality of the speaker as 
determined from statements during the episode, subsequent research into their identity, or 
association with particular governments. Coded as name of nation. If indeterminable null 
= 99 
o SponGovAff Sponsoring Government Affiliation – Works for sponsoring 
 government organization No=0 Yes=1 
o SponGovAffOrg – Sponsoring Government Affiliation Organization – if yes the 
name of organization if no value = 99 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
109 In the context of an economic news show the host does not need to be coded, but who they quote, their 
guests, and their sources will be.  
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Appendix D: Speaking Actors Coding Sheet 
 “Speaking actors” subset data – Every individual speaker will be coded for the following data. 
o Speaker 1 
▪ Name _________  
▪ Organization __________ 
▪ Network ____________ 
▪ Gender __________ 
▪ Nationality ____________ 
o Speaker 2110 
▪ Name ___________ 
▪ Organization _____________ 
▪ Network ___________  
▪ Gender _____________ 
▪ Nationality _______________  
  
                                                 
110 This can be repeated as needed. 
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Appendix E: Economic Protest News Coding Scheme 
• Economic protest news will be coded for the following: 
• Issue - The economic topic identified as subject of news item, for example: “net neutrality,” 
“trade,” or “quantitative easing.” These are usually stated in the episode description on the 
respective webpage or within the first few seconds of the news item by the host or reporter. 
They will be coded for precise phrasing used. 
• Topics 
o Network – Name of network where story appears. 
o Protest Presence – coded for presence of one of the given four protests in the item 
o Geographic Level 
▪ Domestic – caused by domestic conditions or state; coded with 0 
▪ Intersectional – caused by relationship between protest site and international 
actor; coded with 1 
▪ Outside World – caused by forces outside protests site’s control; coded with 2 
• Economic source data – This category refers to sources for economic data. Each source used 
will be coded for the following. 
o Name – this is the stated name of the source as shown in the episode  
o Geographic level – This set of set of codes parallels Robertson’s (2010, 2014) coding 
schema for both news construction of the global and economic news. 
▪ Sub-national – Think tanks or universities; coded with value 0 
▪ National – Central banks or government ministries; coded with value 1 
▪ International – Institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, or United Nations; 
coded with value 3 
•  “Speaking actors” – These are those speaking actors who are not either anchors or reporters 
for the network. Because any given news item might contain multiple speakers, this 
particular aspect of the news text cannot be coded with simple values that express categories. 
These categories need to be coded with a continuous variable beginning with “0” for no 
people fitting the description and going up to code the total number of people who fit the 
category.  
o Political (government members, politicians, activists)  
o Economic figures (bankers, businessmen, shopowners) 
o Experts (academics, journalists, economists) 
o “Ordinary people” (the man-in-the-street or woman-in-the-marketplace) 
o Worker 
• “Speaking actors” subset data - Every individual speaker will be coded for the following 
data. 
o Name – Name given in episode. Normally stated and found in a banner underneath 
speaker. 
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o Organization – This is the professional association given underneath the name in the 
episode. Coded with name of organization or work identification.  
o Network – They appear on this network. 
o Gender – This is their gender, coded with 0 for male and 1 for female and 2 for 
ambiguous  
o Nationality – The presumed nationality of the speaker as determined from statements 
during the episode, subsequent research into their identity, or association with 
particular governments. Coded as name of nation.  
• Discourse – Contains notes of interesting discursive features and patterns used for subsequent 
CDA. Coded as notes and observations.  
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Appendix F: Economic Protest News Coding Sheet 
• Issue _________________ 
• Topics 
o Network ____________________ 
o Protest Presence _____________________  
o Country subject __________________ 
o Geographic Level 
▪ Domestic ____________________ 
▪ Intersectional ______________________ 
▪ Outside World _________________ 
• Economic source  
o Name _______________________  
o Geographic level  
▪ Sub-national _______ 
▪ National _____ 
▪ International ______ 
•  “Speaking actors”  
o Political (government members, politicians, activists) __________ 
o Economic figures (bankers, businessmen, shopowners) _________ 
o Experts (academics, journalists, economists) ________ 
o “Ordinary people” (the man-in-the-street or woman-in-the-marketplace) _____ 
• “Speaking actors” subset data  
o Name _______________ 
o Organization __________________  
o Network _____________________ 
o Gender _____  
o Nationality ___________________ 
• Discourse ________________________ 
 
